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Chapter 1
Introduction
The 20th century has brought unprecedented improvements in citizens’ lives
in terms of income and health. For a large number of countries, this period has
meant a definitive break with a past of widespread and persistent economic
misery and illness. Using the metaphor of the Nobel laureate Angus Deaton,
millions of people in the world have experienced a ‘Great Escape’ from a
regime where poverty and early death were the norm to a reality in which
malnourishment and child mortality have been relegated to history books
(Deaton, 2013).
The consequences of this escape can be most clearly observed in devel-
oped economies for which long-term data are available and improvements
in material living standards and health have been most pronounced. To il-
lustrate this process, consider the case of Western Europe. In Figure 1.1, I
present data on income per capita and life expectancy at birth to measure the
economic status and health of Europeans. Between 1870 and 2010, economic
progress dramatically increased the amount of goods and services that an
average citizen could consume. While the average European had a yearly in-
come of around two thousand dollars (in 1990 prices) in the late 19th century,
her counterpart nowadays can spend annually 25 thousand dollars on food,
shelter, education, or leisure. The improvement in health has been equally
significant. The expected life span of newborns has more than doubled since
1870, rising from 35 to 80 years. The likelihood of having a long and healthy
life in the 21st century is far beyond 19th century expectations.
2 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Income and health in Western Europe, 1870-2010
Sources: Bolt and van Zanden (2014) for income and Riley (2005) for life expectancy.
While health and income have improved greatly throughout the 20th
century, improvements have been uneven and have in turn led to substantial
cross-country inequality. In Figure 1.2 I present information on how these
inequalities have evolved since 1900 using box-and-whisker diagrams of stan-
dardized gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and life expectancy.1 Fig-
ure 1.2 shows that income variance around the median has increased over
time and that the difference between the median country and those at the
bottom of the income distribution has widened.2 As Pritchett (1997) put it,
1Figure 1.2 conveys information on the median value of life expectancy and GDP per
capita; the interquartile range in which values between the 75th and 25th percentile can
be found; and the largest (smallest) observation that is less (higher) or equal than the
upper (lower) inner fence. The upper whisker is calculated as: 75th percentile + 1.5*(75th
percentile - 25th percentile); and the lower whisker: 25th percentile - 1.5*(75th percentile
- 25th percentile). The values for GDP and life expectancy refer to a balanced sample
of 36 countries covering most of Europe, the American continent and several countries in
Asia. Also, the two indicators have been standardized to make their degree of dispersion
comparable.
2Note that Figure 1.2 presents data for a balanced sample of countries, which do not
3the 20th century has witnessed a period of ‘divergence, big time’ in which a
small group of countries have forged ahead of the rest. The story is slightly
different in terms of health: cross-country differences in life expectancy first
widened until 1950 (especially during the first three decades of the 20th cen-
tury) but narrowed by 1990. This was the result of a reduced number of
regions benefiting from new knowledge of the germ theory of disease in the
early 20th century (Deaton, 2004). After 1950, the internationalization of
this new knowledge induced an international epidemiological transition that
would act as a convergent force with large increases in life expectancy par-
ticularly in developing economies (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007).
Figure 1.2: Inequality in income and health across countries since 1900
Source: see Figure 1.1.
This thesis is an inquiry into the nature of the forces behind the ‘Great
Escape’ and how they have impacted citizens’ well-being.3 Understanding
cover the whole income and health distribution. Especially for income, this results in an un-
derestimation of the degree of between-country income inequality because many developing
economies lack of data for the pre-1950 period.
3In the following, I will use the terms well-being, welfare and living standards inter-
4 Introduction
the drivers and consequences of these forces is foundational to understand-
ing how the large income and health inequalities we observe today – the
inequalities which are the focus of the international development agenda4 –
were shaped. Furthermore, this thesis also enhances our understanding of
past events which can be used as a tool to shed light on the potential ef-
fects of development policies. From an academic perspective, there has been
long-standing interest in the topic of this dissertation.5 This thesis offers new
insights to this literature on the process of development by using a combi-
nation of novel methodologies, encompassing new datasets across space and
time and employing a careful historical analysis of mechanisms that are bet-
ter understood from a long-term perspective. A further feature of this thesis
concerns its degree of flexibility with respect to the units of analysis and the
time periods considered. As I will explain below, this is intended to highlight,
or emphasize, particular aspects of the development process.
Before studying the evolution of income and health improvements in more
detail, it is worth stepping back and motivating their analysis. Given the fo-
cus of this thesis on living standards broadly understood, it is important
to understand the importance of income and health for individuals’ well-
being. Easterlin (2000) approaches this relationship by drawing on a survey
conducted in a number of developed and developing countries, asking what
people want or value in life. The results of the survey show that material
circumstances are of primary importance: they are mentioned most often in
every country. Income, as measured by per capita GDP, has also frequently
been found to correlate with health and other important measures of well-
being such as education. The predominance of material concerns for individ-
uals along with these associations with several aspects of well-being has led a
part of the economics discipline to embrace GDP per capita to measure liv-
ing standards across countries and time (Oulton, 2012). However, a growing
number of studies argue that an overemphasis on income variables may lead
to one-sided perspectives because of the importance of a multidimensional
framework to understanding living standards more completely.6
changeably.
4Among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals set by world leaders in 2015 at the
United Nations summit, seven are related to improving the economic status and the health
of citizens living in developing countries (United Nations, 2015b).
5Comprehensive overviews of the literature analyzing the determinants of income,
health and their relationship are provided by Caselli (2005), Galor (2005), Cutler, Deaton,
and Lleras-Muney (2006), Weil (2014), Costa (2015) or Jones (2016).
6See Sen (1985, 1987), Usher (1973, 1980), Easterlin (2000), Nordhaus (2003),
G. S. Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005) or Jones and Klenow (2016). Besides the body
5The renewed efforts from this literature to move ‘beyond GDP’ have been
recently echoed outside academic circles by governments and internationally-
renowned institutions. In 2008, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy,
appointed a commission to identify the limits of GDP (Stiglitz, Sen, &
Fitoussi, 2009). Three years later the European Framework for Measur-
ing Progress was initiated to coordinate activities performed by national
statistical institutes in Europe targeted at employing alternative indica-
tors to measure well-being (Ciommi, Gigliarano, Chelli, & Gallegati, 2013).
More recently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has published a series of biennial reports starting in 2011 on how
well-being varies across groups, countries and time (OECD, 2017). These ini-
tiatives along with the aforementioned studies have brought to the forefront
a crucial question for the discipline: how can we measure well-being across
countries and time? This is the first question at the heart of this dissertation.
The measurement of well-being is relevant not only for recent time peri-
ods, but also for our understanding of the past and the lessons we can draw
from it. This is particularly relevant and challenging when a focus on differ-
ent indicators present substantially different paths of human development.
As I discuss in Chapter 2, the study of European living standards during
the period 1913-1950 is a perfect example of this. As we can see in Figure
1.1, during the first half of the 20th century the slope of the GDP curve
is less pronounced than in any other period. European citizens experienced
historically-low rates of income growth due to armed conflicts, misguided
macroeconomic policies and a long-lasting economic crisis during the 1930s
(Roses & Wolf, 2010). At the same time, this period was also characterized
by an unprecedented increase in life expectancy from 47 to 65 years because
new knowledge stemming from the germ theory of disease improved pub-
lic health policies and hygienic habits throughout society (Mokyr & Stein,
1996; Deaton, 2004; Cutler et al., 2006). Besides health, two further aspects
of Europeans’ lives changed dramatically during this period. The first is an-
nual working time outside agriculture which experienced a 600-hour decrease
following the gradual introduction of the eight-hour workday and paid va-
cation during the interwar period (A. A. Evans, 1969; Huberman & Minns,
2007, 548). The second is income inequality that sharply declined after 1913
of literature emerging from the 1980s onward, it is worth noting that critiques to GDP are
far from new. Actually, in his report to the Senate of the United States in 1934, Kuznets
(1934) warned about the uses and abuses of a measure of national income. For instance,
he highlighted that non-market activity such as housework would not be captured by his
framework.
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as measured with the Gini coefficient (van Zanden, Baten, Foldvari, & van
Leeuwen, 2014; Lindert & Williamson, 2016). This rise in equality, also known
as the ‘Great Leveling’ (Milanovic, 2016, 53), was precipitated among other
factors by the eruption of the First World War and the compression of the
wage distribution (Atkinson, 2007; Milanovic, 2016).
The contrasting perspectives offered by income and non-income indica-
tors during the first half of the 20th century should serve as a cautionary
signal for assuming that income per capita is a good summary measure of
living standards beyond their material dimension. In the specific experience
of Western Europe during the period 1913-1950, GDP estimates show that
this was a period of missed opportunities. However, historical opportunities
emerged which greatly improved Europeans’ lives alongside these disappoint-
ing levels of economic performance. This suggests that traditional income
measures may not only be significantly underestimating progress in human
welfare, but also providing a one-sided perspective on relative levels of living
standards because high-income countries did not necessarily perform better
in other dimensions, and vice versa.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I provide a more comprehen-
sive view of overall well-being in this period by applying a new utility-based
measure to a set of ten Western European countries and the United States
using the framework developed by Jones and Klenow (2016). This methodol-
ogy represents an important improvement with respect to other widely-used
composite indices in the literature such as the Human Development Index
(HDI) developed by the United Nations (UNDP, 1990). First, besides the di-
mensions of income and health, it includes two aspects of well-being - leisure
and inequality - that deserve attention in a well-being analysis during the first
half of the 20th century. And second, contrary to the HDI and similar indices
of well-being, the new welfare indicator does not assume an arbitrary weight-
ing scheme (Nordhaus, 2003). By drawing on information about individuals
preferences, the relative weights of the different dimensions are determined
according to empirical evidence on their trade-offs. This feature makes possi-
ble a direct comparison between the new composite indicator and income per
capita since both of them are measured in the same units. In this way, the
utility approach not only provides a thus unexplored perspective on histori-
cal welfare levels taking a utility approach, but also lets us assess the extent
to which income per capita underestimates welfare growth by accounting for
changes in health, leisure time and inequality.
Applying the utility-based measure I find that welfare in Europe relative
7to the United States at the turn of the 20th century was 15 percent lower
than income per capita indicates (slightly above half of the American level).
This downward revision is explained by the higher levels of mortality and
working time on the old continent. For some countries such as Denmark or
Sweden, the welfare revision has a positive sign because their high levels of
life expectancy compensate for relatively low levels of material living stan-
dards. Studying how these differences evolved over time, I find contrary to
HDI-based evidence weak signs of welfare convergence. By the end of the pe-
riod, countries with relatively low welfare levels in 1913 (e.g. Italy or Spain)
experienced similar growth rates as those with high levels (e.g. the United
Kingdom or the Netherlands), thus suggesting that cross-country differences
were larger and more persistent than other composite measures of well-being
show. When we look at growth rates, I find that income underestimates an-
nual growth in European and American living standards by 1.5 percentage
points annually. Taking into account that people’s lives had changed dra-
matically by 1950 as a result of more efficient sanitary infrastructures, the
discovery of antibiotics, the expansion of workers’ rights and a steady in-
crease in equality, the new welfare metric indicates that well-being doubled
by mid-century.
Returning to the question about the measurement of well-being, the find-
ings of this chapter imply that taking a composite perspective is crucial
for avoiding one-sided views. In a period in which the evolution of material
living standards is not mirrored by other aspects of well-being, GDP per
capita misses how people’s lives are transformed in terms of health, leisure
and inequality. Moreover, the use of a framework that takes a theoretically-
grounded approach to combine these different elements shows that income
and health are the main contributors to well-being growth (adding 0.6 and 1.4
percentage points respectively to annual growth). This finding is in line with
individuals’ survey-based preferences from Easterlin (2000) and provides a
solid motivation for looking into the drivers of these dimensions during the
‘Great Escape’ in the remainder of this thesis.
Chapter 3 begins with the income dimension and analyses the factors
driving the between-country inequality pattern observed in Figure 1.2 which
was characterized by ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997). To understand
the drivers of this process, the literature has employed accounting techniques
that divide the proximate sources of economic growth into factor accumu-
lation (i.e. physical and human capital) and a residual, total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), which conveys information on the efficiency with which inputs
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are combined. The current view from this literature implies that the main
driver of income divergence is TFP and, therefore, in order to answer the
question why some countries are richer than others we need to understand
the determinants of productivity (Klenow & Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997; Hall &
Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005; Hsieh & Klenow, 2010; Jones, 2016).
This chapter examines the validity of this claim from a long-term perspec-
tive by calculating the relative importance of TFP for cross-country variation
in income levels since 1900. By considering such a long time span, I offer a
new viewpoint to a literature that has traditionally focused on recent bench-
marks and provide new insights on the long-term drivers of relative economic
performance. If these drivers have not been constant over time as evidence
from growth accounting studies suggests (Crafts & O’Rourke, 2014), single-
benchmark analyses focused exclusively on either recent or historical periods
cannot unveil their changing relative importance. Another advantage of en-
larging the studied time span with respect to other studies is that to fully
understand the process of income divergence, the period before 1950 needs to
be included in the analysis because a large part of world income divergence
took place then (Pritchett, 1997).
Conducting development accounting analyses since 1900 requires a com-
prehensive dataset covering a significant part of the world income distribu-
tion. For recent years, Penn World Table or World Development Indicators
provide the necessary data (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015; World Bank,
2016). However, such comprehensive datasets are not available for long-term
periods, if we want to extend our analyses further back than 1950, espe-
cially for physical capital. Goldsmith (1985) partially filled this gap by re-
constructing national balance sheets reflecting the structure of tangible and
financial assets for certain benchmark years. Complementing Goldsmith’s
work, Maddison (1994) calculated standardized annual capital stocks for six
countries by expressing them in a common international currency based on
purchasing power parities and assuming common asset lives across countries.
Following Maddison’s approach, a number of recent studies have extended
the number of countries and years covered (Madsen, 2010b; Bergeaud, Cette,
& Lecat, 2016; Madsen & Farhadi, 2016).
The existing capital series present several limitations for performing de-
velopment accounting exercises since 1900. For this reason, I have developed
a new dataset that improves earlier work on four aspects. First, most of the
available databases focus predominantly on developed economies. To have a
more complete coverage of the world income distribution, I gathered infor-
9mation for 38 countries located in the Americas, the European continent,
and parts of Asia and Oceania stretching back to the 19th century. Second,
some of the assumptions used in previous studies are relaxed in this chap-
ter by drawing on the careful work of statistical agencies and scholars for
each individual country. Third, when sufficient data are available, I take
into account the change in relative prices of structures and machinery and
equipment. Since prices for buildings have increased more than those for ma-
chinery, using constant relative prices from recent years – as it is common
in the literature – results in an overestimation of historical capital stocks.
And fourth, I have moved beyond the traditional steady-state assumption to
initiate the capital series to a new procedure – to the best of my knowledge
– for initiating the capital series that yield more realistic stocks during the
early part of the analyzed period.
With the new dataset and development accounting techniques at hand,
I find that the role of factor input accumulation was much more important
in the past than it is now. According to my estimates, physical and human
capital account for up to 65 percent of the sample income variance in 1900,
whereas in 2008 this figure is around 30 percent. Consequently, the percentage
of income inequality accounted for differences in TFP has increased over time.
Most of the rise of TFP took place between 1929 and 1990, coinciding with
a wave of productivity growth during the 1930s and 1940s that originated
in the United States and then spread to Europe and Japan during the post-
war period (Bergeaud et al., 2016). Another reason for the rise of TFP after
1950 has been the strong process of capital deepening experienced by Asian
economies (Young, 1995).
The changing relative importance of factor accumulation and TFP has an
important implication for studies in the literature which emphasize the role
of long-term and persistent factors on relative economic performance such
as institutions and culture (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Nunn,
2008; Dell, 2010; S. O. Becker, Pfaff, & Rubin, 2016). These should not only
account for the large differences in economic performance, but also for their
proximate sources (i.e. factor accumulation or TFP) and that their relative
importance has changed over time. A second implication of this chapter for
the literature comes from the finding that the relative importance of TFP has
remained fairly substantial and constant since 1990. Contrary to the surge in
TFP differentials following the widespread use of mature technologies stem-
ming from the second industrial revolution after 1929, the constant relative
importance of TFP may echo recent arguments about declining marginal
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returns of new inventions or that further innovations are harder to achieve
as they require an increasing amount of research and development (Gordon,
2016; N. Bloom, Jones, van Reenen, & Webb, 2017). At least until now, the
impact of the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution
on productivity beyond the United States has been rather modest (Crafts &
O’Rourke, 2014; Bergeaud et al., 2016)
Chapter 4 builds on the previous one searching for the drivers of income
divergence during the 20th century by introducing health as an important
aspect of human capital in the production process. A large body of litera-
ture has shown that healthier workers are more productive as they can work
harder, longer and more intelligently.7 With this augmented framework, we
can explore the effect that the internationalization of the germ theory of
disease and the induced health convergence (see Figure 1.2) had on world
income inequality.
To calculate the fraction of income level variation that can be attributed
to differences in health since 1900, I extend the health-augmented accounting
framework developed by Weil (2007) to include life expectancy at birth in
the analysis. This health indicator has been used extensively in the literature
and it is widely available across countries and over time. This methodological
extension along with the database on physical capital developed in the previ-
ous chapter provide a new viewpoint to a literature that has predominantly
focused on the second half of the 20th century. An exclusive focus on the post-
war period neglects the first phase of the long-term mortality decline and its
health-related productivity effects that started in some industrial countries
around 1900 (Deaton, 2013; Costa, 2015).
The analyses in this chapter show that health has been a historically
important source of cross-country income variation. Before the largest de-
clines in mortality took place in 1900, health variation accounts for almost
20 percent of income inequality. During the first half of the 20th century,
this figure rises and by mid-century 26 percent of income differences are ac-
counted for by variation in human capital in terms of health. This was due to
the health improvements occurring in a small group of countries as a result
of new knowledge stemming from the germ theory of disease (Deaton, 2013).
Between mid-century and 1990, the role of health as a source of world income
inequality declined from 26 to 12 percent. The large health gains experienced
by workers across the world during the international epidemiological tran-
7See Schultz (2002), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Weil (2007) or Costa (2015).
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sition contributed to significant improvements in relative productivity.8 A
counterfactual exercise derived from the main calculations shows that in-
come inequality would have been almost 20 percent higher in 2008, had the
process of health convergence not taken place (see Figure 1.2).
The realized catch-up potential points to a significant and positive effect
of health on aggregate economic performance that is in line with several
previous studies. For instance, Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008)
argue that high adult mortality causes lower economic growth because it leads
to underinvestment due to shorter time horizons and having more offspring.
In terms of levels, Aghion, Howitt, and Murtin (2011) find that having a
higher initial level of life expectancy is growth enhancing because healthier
individuals are more able to create and adapt to new technologies and invest
more.
The last conclusion from this chapter results from the constant relative
importance of health for income levels since 1990 due to a deceleration in
the rate of health convergence. Developing countries are progressing slower
in this respect because they are increasingly facing chronic diseases affecting
the cardiovascular and respiratory system which are much harder to fight
than infectious ailments (Deaton, 2004). Besides relative economic perfor-
mance, this lack of convergence has a profound effect on well-being growth
and inequality because, as we saw in Chapter 2, health has a particularly
large effect on welfare. In line with Prados de la Escosura (2015), this may
have contributed to a deceleration (or even a decrease) in convergence in
terms of human development during the last decades.
Chapter 5 closes this thesis by analyzing the factors that triggered both
the unprecedented health and welfare gains examined in Chapter 2, and
the cross-country inequalities discussed in Chapter 4: the epidemiological
transition. The internationalization of this process after 1940 has received
significant attention because of the magnitude of health improvements and
their (still debated) impact on economic performance (D. E. Bloom, Can-
ning, & Sevilla, 2004; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007; Cervellati & Sunde, 2011;
C. W. Hansen & Lønstrup, 2015). However, the origins of this transition,
and therefore some of its drivers, can be traced back to a small group of
industrialized countries during the late 19th century as the case of Germany
illustrates.
8The consequences of this process for world health inequality can be clearly observed
in Figure 1.2 as boxes become increasingly smaller and the difference between the best-
and worst-performing countries narrow.
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In the 1870s, the main causes of death in the German population were in-
fectious diseases affecting digestive and respiratory organs, especially among
the youngest (Vo¨gele, 1998). In comparison with other countries at the time,
Germany experienced such persistently high death rates that the literature
has termed this excess mortality as the ‘German penalty’ (Leonard & Ljung-
berg, 2010). In the subsequent decades until the eve of the First World War,
the health situation of German citizens would dramatically improve, despite
the strong process of urbanization and the public health challenges related to
it. Crude death rates declined by a third, infant mortality by almost half, and
life expectancy rose by approximately 10 years (Knodel, 1974). Concurrent
with these health improvements, municipalities made a substantial effort to-
ward improving the disease environment by establishing sanitary infrastruc-
tures. In the 1860s less than 50 cities supplied water to their citizens centrally,
whereas in the following decade a hundred projects were completed and then
two hundred more during the 1890s. As a result of this enormous public ef-
fort, more than four hundred cities benefited from central water provision
by 1900 (Grahn, 1904). Sewerage systems underwent a similar development
although with a delay of several decades (Hennock, 2000).
This chapter analyses the relationship between the acceleration of the san-
itary revolution in Germany and the mortality decline discussed above. For
this purpose, I created a dataset containing annual information on city-level
mortality disaggregated by different types of disease and by age between 1877
and 1913. These data was obtained from yearly statistical reports published
by the Health Imperial Office. To measure changes in sanitary infrastructures,
I looked at the year when substantial improvements in water supply and waste
disposal were made. I compiled this information by examining city-specific
reports on the sanitary conditions of the city put together by Grahn (1898-
1902, 1904), Salomon (1906-1911) and Brix, Imhoff, and Weldert (1934). The
matching of these two datasets resulted in a sample of 41 cities with a set
of characteristics that contribute to the literature in three respects. First,
considering water provision and sewerage jointly yields new insights not only
into the mechanisms through which infectious diseases may rapidly decline in
urban contexts, but also into the complementarity or substitutability of these
infrastructures. Second, the sample contains municipalities whose population
range from a few thousands to more than a million inhabitants, which pro-
vides a good coverage of the urban environment as opposed to other research
focusing on single and large cities.9 Third, the analysis of cities located in
9See Cutler and Miller (2005) or Ogasawara, Shirota, and Kobayashi (2016).
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different states within the German empire complements studies that have
considered a relatively homogeneous area or a single city.10 By controlling
for different institutional arrangements, I can obtain a better estimate of the
effect of sanitary infrastructures on mortality.
The results in this chapter show that improvements in water provision
have a significant effect on overall mortality. However, they were somewhat
limited due to the recontamination of sources and the exposure of citizens to
excrement in the absence of efficient systems of waste disposal. I find that
when a city completes not only a central water supply but also a sewerage
system, a large mortality decline follows. These two interventions together
explain, at least, 19 percent of the reduction in crude death rates due to the
reduced incidence of diseases transmitted via fecal-oral mechanisms. I found
two pieces of evidence in favor of this mechanism. First, sanitary infrastruc-
tures account for almost a third of the decline in infant mortality, which is
largely affected by waterborne diseases. Second, distinguishing by waterborne
and airborne diseases shows that improvements in water supply and waste
disposal are mostly related to the former. This type of infrastructures mostly
influence enteric-related diseases, while deaths from etiologies with a different
pathological basis are not affected.
These findings have direct implications for policy making in the field of
public health for developing countries where – as in late-19th-century Ger-
many – lack of access to sanitation infrastructures and related ailments are
a widespread problem (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; United Nations, 2015a). In
particular, the lack of efficient systems of waste disposal leads to open defe-
cation, which creates uncontrolled sources of disease in local communities.
In the specific case of India, the government has recognized the severity of
this issue for public health and is currently carrying out the ‘Swachh Bharat
Mission’ – launched in 2014 – to achieve universal sanitation throughout the
country.11 The case of Germany at the turn of the 20th century suggests
that these types of initiatives have a great potential to reduce the preva-
lence of infectious diseases via fecal-oral transmission mechanisms, especially
through their complementarities with systems of water supply. This chapter
also contributes to a long-lasting debate on the determinants of health out-
comes. The significant and robust effect of the sanitary interventions which
10See Ferrie and Troesken (2008), Alsan and Goldin (in press) and Kesztenbaum and
Rosenthal (2017).
11Detailed information about the program, its objectives and accomplishments can be
found at http://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm.
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are analyzed provide support to the strand of the literature emphasizing that
improving the disease environment was a crucial determinant of the epidemi-
ological transition and, probably, its internationalization after the mid-20th
century.12
Combining the insights of this last chapter with those of the rest of the
thesis suggests that a safer disease environment has been a key source of
gains in well-being throughout the 20th century. This aspect of progress is
barely captured by GDP per capita because it tends to underestimate wel-
fare growth resulting from health improvements, if these are not mirrored by
similar developments in material living standards as shown in Chapter 2. The
indicators of human progress that academics and policy makers use should re-
flect that the prospects of living a long and healthy life have improved beyond
any precedent during the last hundred years, and that present-day citizens
living in areas less affected by health-enhancing technologies are worse off
than indicators of material status imply.
Today’s health disparities across countries are not a new phenomenon. In
Chapter 4, I showed that during the ‘Great Escape’ the unequal application
of sanitary infrastructures and medical knowledge at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury initially fostered inequality in terms of health up to mid-century, which
in turn widened productivity differences. Besides economic performance, the
results of Chapter 2 suggest that world welfare inequality must have increased
during this period as well, due to my findings of weak signs of convergence
within some of the countries that forged ahead in terms of health. After mid-
century, the internationalization of the germ theory of disease facilitated by
the international community and the efforts of countless local actors and in-
stitutions reversed the previous divergent trend up to the 1990s. Today, we
seem to be at the verge of another period of health divergence as progress in
some indicators such as life expectancy has slowed down in the last decades.
The challenges of understanding the underpinnings of this divergence, and
how it might be mitigated, are not addressed in this thesis – this is the sub-
ject for future work. However, the findings of this manuscript do suggest that
the potential welfare and productivity gains from avoiding another period of
health divergence are enormous, and this should be a priority of global policy
leaders.
12Some influential works holding this view are Preston (1975), Szreter (1988), Cutler
and Miller (2005), Cutler et al. (2006) or Alsan and Goldin (in press).
Chapter 2
Missed Opportunities?
Human welfare in Western
Europe and the United
States, 1913-1950
2.1 Introduction
The evolution of living standards during the first half of the twentieth century
in Europe is characterized by sharp contrasts. On one side, this period is often
portrayed as one of missed opportunities in that income per capita exhibited
historically-low growth rates due to the effect and persistence of (among
others) armed conflicts, misguided macroeconomic policies and increasing
protectionism (Roses & Wolf, 2010). As a result, material well-being in the
old continent fell behind other developed economies less affected by these
events such as the United States, Canada or Australia. On the other side,
Europeans witnessed unprecedented improvements in other aspects of well-
being such as health, leisure or inequality, following the application of germ
theory of disease to private and public life, the development of antibiotics and
the introduction of the eight-hour day. The rate of progress in these aspects
was so remarkable in Europe that life expectancy at birth increased by 18
years and annual working time outside agriculture declined by more than six
hundred hours in the decades between the dawn of the First World War and
the mid-twentieth century (Riley, 2005; Huberman & Minns, 2007).
To jointly consider the different perspectives conveyed by economic and
social indicators during this period, an important part of the literature an-
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alyzing historical human welfare has taken a multi-dimensional perspective
on well-being and has employed a composite indicator that aggregates in-
formation on income, health and education: the Human Development Index
(UNDP, 1990). The application of this index to Europe during the first half
of the twentieth century indicates that this period should not be character-
ized as one of missed opportunities in terms of human development for two
reasons. First, European welfare growth was neither low in historical perspec-
tive nor significantly slower than in North America. Second, differences across
countries narrowed greatly as a result of strong growth in countries with low
levels of human development (Crafts, 2002; Millward & Baten, 2010). In
other words, HDI-based evidence for Europe in the period 1913-1950 sug-
gests that opportunities to improve well-being beyond income were taken
and contributed to a more egalitarian distribution of welfare across countries
by mid-century.
However, this optimistic view of the first half of the twentieth century
has been recently called into question primarily based on critiques of the
HDI as a suitable measure for understanding human welfare. Prados de la
Escosura (2015) argues that the linear transformation that this index applies
to its social dimensions (health and education) introduces a spurious ten-
dency towards convergence and makes comparisons across countries and time
difficult. Since these indicators have asymptotic limits, an absolute change
in, for example, life expectancy is larger the lower its initial level, thus fa-
voring countries with lower levels of HDI. To overcome this problem, he
developed the Historical Index of Human Development (HIHD), which gives
higher weight to improvements at high levels of the social indicators than
improvements of similar magnitude at low levels. With this new indicator,
cross-country variation in human development is larger than implied by the
HDI. Another aspect of the HDI (and similar indices such as the HIHD) that
has been criticized is the lack of theoretical basis for the aggregation proce-
dure because it arbitrarily assigns equal weight to its three sub-components
(Nordhaus, 2003, 20).1 Even if this arbitrary weighting scheme reflected in-
dividuals preferences in the present, this issue poses a serious obstacle for
long-term comparisons because the relative importance of the HDI compo-
nents is assumed to be constant over time.2 This is at odds with evidence on
1In Appendix 2.E I provide a detailed and formal elaboration about these different
welfare indices as well as the source of their differences. Also, I compare the results of using
these indices with those obtained with my welfare measure.
2Noorbakhsh (1998, 593-594) supports the use of equal weights employing principal
component analysis. The three dimensions of the HDI are so correlated with each other
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the trade-off between income and health showing that the relative importance
of the latter was lower in the past (Williamson, 1982; Costa & Kahn, 2004).
A more fundamental measurement issue for economic historians concerns the
interpretation of the HDI in the past and how it compares to income per
capita. Costa and Steckel (1997, 73-74) point out that whereas the HDI is a
distance measure that shows when modern living standards were achieved,
income growth is a measure of velocity that stresses the improvements wit-
nessed by contemporaries. In periods in which income starts from a low level,
a modest rate of economic growth (despite being important for contempo-
raries) has a small relative importance in the index because progress in this
aspect represents a very small fraction of modern living standards. On the
basis of this argument, the HDI is a retrospective index that may be at odds
with contemporary views in that the relative importance of its dimensions
in history depends on the level of attained living standards in the present.
Therefore, although the views provided by this index and income per capita
are useful for analyzing historical living standards, a comparison between the
two should be made with caution.
To overcome the weighting issue and provide a closer perspective of con-
temporaries’ well-being, a different strand of the literature has used measure-
ment frameworks grounded in economic theory that are directly comparable
to income measures. By combining income, health and leisure, Crafts (1997)
reports welfare growth rates for Western Europe between 1913 and 1950 that
are (on average) only one percentage point larger than income and that, con-
trary to the HDI, imply no welfare convergence. This varied evidence from
different indicators of well-being brings us back to the pessimistic picture por-
trayed by income per capita because it does not support the high-performing
and egalitarian view of European welfare suggested by the HDI. This leads
to the more general question of whether the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury can be characterized as a period of taken or missed opportunities for
European living standards.
To answer this question, I partially depart from the dimensions analyzed
by the HDI and propose a more encompassing framework that better suits
the historical context in which Europeans lived by considering four crucial
aspects of welfare: material well-being, health, leisure time and inequality.
I start looking at income per capita to provide a detailed quantification of
the extent to which economic opportunities were missed across regions and
time. Note that I will not use this indicator to measure material well-being
that most of the variation in one dimension is in common with the rest.
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as it is common in the literature, but rather for discussing and motivating
the need to expand the study of living standards beyond national income
because it partially neglects non-income aspects of well-being. As a more
precise (and less used) measure of individuals’ economic well-being, I will use
household consumption per capita. The advantage of this indicator is that it
is more closely related to the level of material living standards of the popu-
lation because it provides information on the share of national income that
is actually consumed by households. Furthermore, household consumption is
not affected by some unusual dynamics between government spending and
GDP that took place during this period. For example, rising political tension
between the two wars in some countries such as the United Kingdom resulted
in increased military spending and therefore increased GDP per capita which
did not, at least directly, benefit the population (Barro & Ursu´a, 2008).
The second aspect of well-being not taken into account in historical calcu-
lations of the HDI that will be considered is economic inequality. This aspect
of well-being experienced a substantial decline after the First World War in
a number of developed economies, often referred to as the ‘Great Leveling’,
due to war destruction, the expansion of education and the compression of
the earnings distribution (Lindert & Williamson, 1985; Atkinson, 2007; Mi-
lanovic, 2016; van Zanden et al., 2014). Consequently, European citizens lived
in a much more equal society by 1950.
The third aspect of well-being that will be discussed is health. In just a few
decades, Europeans’ health experienced a revolution due to the application of
the germ theory of disease to develop more efficient public health infrastruc-
tures and more hygienic practices employed by individuals, the discovery of
antibiotics and improvements in nutrition (Cutler et al., 2006). As a novelty
in this type of historical cross-country studies, I will not use life expectancy
at birth but age-specific mortality rates. This is particularly relevant during
the analyzed period because most of the mortality decrease took place in the
youngest part of the population and with these data I can measure the welfare
gains from improving health in different parts of the age distribution. The
last welfare dimension that will be considered is also not taken into account
by other indicators of well-being, except for Crafts (1997), despite it having
dramatically changed Europeans’ lives during the period 1913-1950: working
time. Due to the introduction of the 48-hour week and the increase in vaca-
tion and national holidays (A. A. Evans, 1969; Huberman & Minns, 2007),
the amount of time workers could devote to leisure increased substantially in
Europe. Moreover, including this aspect in the analysis is not only relevant
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from a long-term perspective, as the fall in annual hours worked during this
time span is unprecedented, but also because other studies have highlighted
that welfare gains derived from reduction in hours worked are comparable to
those from health improvements (Crafts, 1997; Jones & Klenow, 2016).
The discussion of these four dimensions of well-being highlights the excep-
tional character of the first half of the twentieth century. Historical opportu-
nities emerged to greatly improve Europeans’ lives along with disappointing
levels of economic growth. This suggests that traditional income measures
may be not only significantly underestimating progress in human welfare,
but also providing a one-sided perspective on relative levels of living stan-
dards – high-income countries did not necessarily perform better in other
dimensions, and vice versa. Therefore, to analyze the extent to which wel-
fare opportunities across time and space were missed (or taken), I will apply
a new utility-based measure to a sample of ten Western European coun-
tries and the United States. With this measurement framework grounded in
economic theory, developed by Jones and Klenow (2016), this chapter con-
tributes to the literature on comparative historical living standards using the
HDI and similar indices in two ways (Crafts, 2002; Prados de la Escosura,
2015). First, in this research I take into account changes in key dimensions
of well-being during the analyzed period that are typically not considered
in historical HDI-based studies, namely leisure and economic inequality. Se-
cond, and more importantly, this new welfare indicator tackles the criticisms
of the HDI (and some of the HIHD) mentioned above (tendency to conver-
gence, arbitrary weighting scheme and constant weighting scheme over time)
by drawing on information about individuals preferences and how, in the
case of health, they change over time.3 Contrary to the HDI, this approach
makes possible a direct comparison between the new composite indicator and
income per capita since both of them are measured in the same units. This
comparison will not only provide a so-far unexplored perspective on histori-
cal welfare levels taking a utility approach, but it will also assess the extent
to which income per capita underestimates welfare growth by accounting for
changes in health, leisure time and inequality.
This research is also related to another branch of the literature that has
analyzed welfare growth during the twentieth century with utility indicators
3It is worth highlighting that these critiques to the HDI do not invalidate its use, if this
is interpreted as its creator originally envisaged it: an ordinal measure of living standards.
However, as Amendola, Gabbuti, and Vecchi (2018) point out, this has been barely the
case in economic history research.
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that can be traced back to the seminal study of Usher (1973). By incor-
porating gains from mortality reductions to gross national product, Usher
concludes that the contribution of health to welfare from the 1910s to the
1960s is substantial since income growth can be revised up to forty per-
cent upward (e.g. France).4 Drawing on Usher’s work and Beckerman (1980),
Crafts (1997) applies a welfare measure that combines income, health and
leisure to a large sample of developed countries for the period 1870-1992. For
the first half of the twentieth century, he finds that income per capita under-
estimates annual welfare growth by 1.2 percentage points on average (health
contributes to this differential by two thirds and leisure by one third). While
the welfare measure I use is similar to that by Crafts (1997), the approach
I take differs from his study in several aspects. First, his analytical frame-
work only allows for estimating welfare growth rates. This leaves a number of
questions unanswered regarding relative well-being levels between different
regions in Western Europe (and the United States) that are key to under-
standing the effect of heterogeneous growth experiences on the distribution of
welfare across space. Second, Crafts’ analysis does not pay particular atten-
tion to the welfare dynamics within the first half of the twentieth century (he
only considers the benchmarks 1913 and 1950) as I do by including a further
benchmark in 1929. Third, I measure material well-being with consumption
per capita instead of income. Also, I use Gini coefficients to account for the
unequal distribution of the economic status of the population within coun-
tries. Fourthly, to measure the contribution of health to well-being Crafts
used life expectancy at birth and therefore does not take into account the
welfare effect of changes in mortality across ages.5 For this purpose, I use
age-specific mortality rates.
This chapter presents three main results. First, welfare in Europe rela-
tive to the United States at the turn of the 20th century was just over half
of the American level and 15 percentage points lower than relative income
per capita. This can be traced to higher mortality and longer working time
across Europe. For most countries, differences in living standards are larger
with the new welfare measure except for the Northern European region where
high levels of health compensate for lower income levels. Second, income un-
derestimates annual growth in European and American living standards by
4Improved versions of Usher’s model have been developed and applied exclusively to
the United States by Costa and Steckel (1997), Nordhaus (2003) and Murphy and Topel
(2006). See also G. S. Becker et al. (2005) for an analysis of world welfare dispersion since
1960 considering income and life expectancy.
5Crafts (2007) did consider age-specific mortality, but only for the British case.
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1.7 and 1.5 percentage points respectively, ranging from 0.8 to 2.2 percentage
points in France and Spain respectively. Taking into account that people’s
lives changed dramatically by 1950 as a result of more efficient sanitary in-
frastructures, the discovery of antibiotics, the expansion of workers’ rights
and a steady increase in equality with the new indicator suggest that well-
being had doubled by mid-century. Third, progress in human welfare was
not equal across space and, contrary to HDI-based evidence, by the end of
the period cross-country differences had barely narrowed. Countries with low
welfare levels in 1913 (e.g. Italy or Spain) experienced similar growth rates
as those with high levels (e.g. the United Kingdom or the Netherlands). This
pattern is further reinforced if 1960 is chosen as the terminal date for the
analysis because relative welfare in Western Europe is the same as in 1913.
Looking at cross-sectional welfare dispersion, I find that between 1913 and
1960 it only decreased by 15 percent. These findings suggests that despite
substantial improvements in living standards over this period, cross-country
differences were larger and more persistent than shown by other composite
measures of well-being, such as the HDI.
2.2 A period of missed opportunities for well-
being?
In this section I will present the data used to measure the four welfare aspects
that will be later considered in the composite indicator. By first discussing
material well-being, I will establish some basic patterns that will quantify
the extent of missed (or taken) economic opportunities across countries and
time in Europe. These patterns will then be compared with those of economic
inequality, health and leisure to both highlight their mismatch and the need
to use a framework that integrates them, if we are to analyze the evolution
of European welfare beyond income during the first half of the twentieth
century.
2.2.1 Material well-being
To measure material welfare or economic performance, the most common
starting point in the literature is to use GDP per capita. For this purpose,
I will use the data from the Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden, 2014),
which provides abundant information for a large number of countries and,
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most importantly, has been predominantly used by the economics profession.6
Even though these figures are not used in the welfare calculations, I will also
consider alternative GDP estimates from Prados de la Escosura (2000) and
Bolt, Inklaar, de Jong, and van Zanden (2018). These studies criticize that
the backward extrapolation method of present-day purchasing power parities
(PPP) employing volume indices of real product introduces distortions in
intertemporal comparisons. Therefore, I examine how the utility indicator
revises relative welfare levels with alternative datasets in Appendix 2.D.
To measure material well-being in the new measure, I will use house-
hold consumption drawing on Barro and Ursu´a (2008) instead of income
per capita.7 This metric is more closely related to the economic status of
individuals because it captures the share of the national product that is ac-
tually consumed by households (e.g. clothing, food, rent, etcetera).8 On the
other hand, this indicator may present some limitations for cross-sectional
comparisons because low current consumption shares over total income re-
sult into low relative levels of material well-being, while increasing future
living standards as high saving rates can lead to increases in investment and
productivity. Given that I consider several benchmarks during the analyzed
period, I take into account that low consumption shares in the early part of
the period may improve the relative position of some economies in the later
part of the period.9
Before reviewing the growth experience of Western European economies
during the period 1913-1950, it is instructive to know their starting levels.10 In
Table 2.1 I present the levels of income and consumption per capita relative to
the United States for the benchmark years in my analyzed time span for which
6Some recent influential works include Piketty (2014), Crafts and O’Rourke (2014),
Milanovic (2016) and Jones (2016).
7Given that Barro and Ursu´a (2008) used backward extrapolation, the previous cri-
tique to the work by Bolt and van Zanden (2014), and the work of Angus Maddison more
generally, also applies to the private consumption data.
8To test the reliability of these data, I compare my benchmark results in 1950 with a set
of alternative calculations using consumption figures from Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra
et al., 2015). As I show in Appendix 2.D, both datasets yield practically the same outcomes.
9Another limitation of private consumption is that it does not capture the goods and
services provided by the government. For the level results, the possible bias this may in-
troduce is likely to be small. As I show in Table 2.D.1, the results are the same in 1950,
if I include government spending. For the growth analysis, the data provide a lower-bound
calculation since government rose steadily during this period (Lindert, 2004).
10In the following, I will focus on a ten-country sample that was chosen on the basis
of data availability on household consumption, age-specific mortality, annual working time
and Gini coefficients for the period 1913-1950. See Roses and Wolf (2010) for a more
comprehensive exposition of European economic performance during this period.
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data on income could be obtained from the sources mentioned above;11 and
for Western Europe and three sub-regions: Northern Europe, North-Western
Europe and Southern Europe (weighted by population).12 At the beginning
of the twentieth century, the income level of an average Western European
was two thirds of the American level. Within the old continent, citizens in the
industrial core enjoyed higher levels of material well-being than those living
in peripheral economies. Actually, average income in North-Western Europe
almost doubled that of the less-industrialized southern periphery, where more
than fifty percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture (Buyst &
Franaszek, 2010). Using consumption data, these patterns are similar.
The large income gaps with respect to the United States suggest that the
growth potential in many European countries was quite substantial. To look
at the extent to which this potential was used, Table 2.1 also shows growth
rates for the periods 1913-1950, 1913-1929 and 1929-1950. During the first
half of the twentieth century, material well-being in Europe increased below
one percentage point yearly, whereas at the other side of the Atlantic it
grew more than two times faster (if we consider other countries overseas such
as Canada or New Zealand, the same pessimistic pattern emerges). These
growth rates also stand out negatively in comparison with other historical
periods such as the post-1950 decades or the years leading up to World War
I when income growth was five and almost two times faster respectively
(Bolt & van Zanden, 2014). This evidence is indicative of substantial missed
economic opportunities during the period 1913-1950 in Europe from both
an international and a long-term perspective. However, this average should
not be taken to summarize this period’s economic performance because it
masks substantial variation across countries and time. Particularly in Western
Europe, the years of the Great Depression up to 1950 stand in sharp contrast
with those of the earlier period with the exception of Northern Europe.
Until now, the income and consumption trends I have presented are na-
tional averages and do not reflect their distribution within the population. To
take this into account, I will employ Gini coefficients, a widely used measure
11Prados de la Escosura (2000) reports income data for 1913, 1929, 1938 and 1950. Given
that information on income inequality for 1938 is very scarce, I will consider 1913, 1929
and 1950.
12This regional classification will be used in the remaining of the chapter and it is defined
as follows. Northern Europe refers to Sweden and Denmark. North-Western Europe refers
to the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland.
Southern Europe consists of Italy and Spain. The regional aggregates are weighted with
population data from Maddison (2006).
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Table 2.1: Income and household consumption per capita in Western
Europe and the United States, 1913-1950
Level (US=100) Annual growth rate (in %)
Income Consumption Income Consumption
1913 1929 1950 1913 1929 1950
1913- 1913- 1929- 1913- 1913- 1929-
1950 1929 1950 1950 1929 1950
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
United States 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.3 0.8 1.7
Western Europe 67 62 49 61 61 47 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.4
Sub-regions
Northern Europe 60 63 69 65 73 75 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.8
North-Western Europe 77 70 55 67 66 51 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4
Southern Europe 42 40 30 41 46 32 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.6 1.5 -0.1
Notes: the sources for income and consumption are Bolt and van Zanden (2014) and Barro
and Ursu´a (2008) respectively. Northern Europe refers to Sweden and Denmark.
North-Western Europe refers to the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
France and Switzerland. Southern Europe consists of Italy and Spain. The regional
aggregates are weighted with population data from Maddison (2006).
of income inequality. Even though these data are more fragmentary and sub-
ject to measurement error than for other aspects of living standards, it was
possible to compile information on inequality for the whole sample from a
variety of secondary sources (a detailed discussion can be found in Appendix
2.C). As we can observe in Table 2.2, there is a general downward trend
throughout the period known as the ‘Great Leveling’ due to war destruction,
the expansion of education and the compression of the earnings distribution
(Lindert & Williamson, 1985; Atkinson, 2007; Milanovic, 2016; van Zanden
et al., 2014). By 1950, Western Europeans and Americans lived in a more
equal society than in the early 20th century when the share of national in-
come accrued by the top one percent of income earners in countries such as
the United States, Sweden or Germany was around 20 percent (Alvaredo,
Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2013).
2.2.2 Health and working time
To measure citizens’ health, I will use data on age-specific mortality rates.
With these data at hand, it is possible to calculate survival rates (i.e. the
probability of a person reaching a certain age given the mortality rates of
all ages in that same year) or life expectancies (i.e. the expected life time of
an individual at a given age, for example at birth, given the mortality rates
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United States 50 49 40
Western Europe 47 44 43
Sub-regions
Northern Europe 52 48 39
North-Western Europe 47 43 43
Southern Europe 47 45 43
Notes: see Appendix 2.C for the sources. See Table
2.1 for the country composition of each sub-regional
category.
across all subsequent ages in that same year).13 For most of the countries
in the sample, the main source is the Human Mortality Database (HMD)
that provides annual life tables with the exception of Germany, the United
States and the United Kingdom, for which the series only start in 1956, 1933
and 1922 respectively. To fill these gaps, data prior to 1923 for the United
Kingdom refer to England and Wales. In the case of the United States and
Germany, I used the Human Life-Table Database (HLTD). Table 2.3 shows
(Column I and III), in contrast with material well-being, that the improve-
ment of citizens’ health during the period 1913-1950 is quite remarkable. In
less than four decades, the years a newborn was expected to live in the old
continent increased by 16; and by 19 in the case of Southern Europe. Sev-
eral factors contributed to this such as the application of the germ theory
of disease to develop more efficient public health infrastructures, more hy-
gienic practices employed within households or the discovery of antibiotics
and improvements in nutrition (Mokyr & Stein, 1996; Fogel, 2004; Cutler et
al., 2006). In terms of levels, Europeans with the longest expected life span
at birth are not necessarily living in the richest region (i.e. the industrial
core), but rather in the northernmost area. Northern Europe even outper-
forms the United States despite having much lower levels of income per capita
throughout the whole period.
13With these data, I will later consider the age distribution of mortality to isolate health
improvements in different parts of the age spectrum. This is particularly important during
the analyzed period because infant and child mortality declined enormously as a result of
progress against airborne diseases like influenza or pneumonia for children less than five
years old, and water-borne diseases such as gastroenteritis for infants (Millward & Baten,
2010).
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Table 2.3: Life expectancy and annual hours of work in Western Europe
and the United States, 1913-1950
Life expectancy at birth Annual hours of work
1913 1929 1950 1913 1929 1950
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
United States 54 59 68 2900 2316 2008
Western Europe 50 57 66 2783 2200 2140
Sub-regions
Northern Europe 58 62 71 2740 2206 2032
North-Western Europe 51 58 67 2769 2192 2209
Southern Europe 45 51 64 2829 2222 1989
Source: for life expectancy I used the HMD and the HLTD. For annual hours of work see
Huberman and Minns (2007).
The last aspect of people’s lives that I will consider and that changed
dramatically during the first half of the twentieth century (not taken into
account in the HDI) is leisure or non-working time.14 For this purpose, I will
use information on annual hours of work from Huberman and Minns (2007)
for non-agricultural workers.15 Given that the sectoral structure of the labor
force differed markedly across countries (Buyst & Franaszek, 2010), I will
adjust the figures on working time by country (and over time) to take into
account the percentage of workers employed outside agriculture and par-
ticipation rates (see Table 2.C.4).16 As we can see in Table 2.3, European
workers witnessed a sizable decline in annual working time of roughly 650
hours throughout the period 1913-1950 (for the United States it was even
more pronounced). Most of the decline happened between 1913 and 1929
(Column IV and V) due to the reduction of working hours with the intro-
14Certainly, non-working-time is not the same as leisure. To account for changes in the
latter more precisely, one would have to distinguish between activities that involve leisure
and home production. However, given the data availability and the focus of this study on
other dimensions of well-being (not only leisure), I will provide an approximation of the
contribution of leisure and home production to welfare by looking at non-market work as
done by Crafts (1997).
15The unit of measurement is annual hours of full-time production (male and female)
workers engaged in non-agricultural activities. Huberman and Minns (2007) interpret their
series as the ‘approximate usual or normal hours the representative production worker
would have been engaged for during the year’ (page 543).
16A further element that I examine in Appendix 2.D not captured by Huberman and
Minns (2007) is the age distribution of working time and how it changes over time. Using
data for the United States on working time across different age groups from Owen (2001,
19) for the period 1921-1950, I find that the results are not affected by changes in the labor
supply over the life cycle.
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duction of the 48-hour week (or eight-hour day) after the First World War
(A. A. Evans, 1969). Further declines can be accounted for with the increas-
ing number of vacations and national holidays during the interwar period as
the annual paid vacation became a reality in many countries (Huberman &
Minns, 2007). If we compare Western Europe with the United States, we see
that workers in the old continent worked fewer hours (117 hours per year)
at the beginning of the period, although this situation was reversed by 1950.
Across regions, there seems to be another reversal. Whereas southern Eu-
ropeans worked longer hours than in the rest of the continent before the
outbreak of the First World War, by mid-century annual working time in
non-agricultural activities was the shortest in this region.
The analysis of European material well-being at the beginning of this
section pointed out that the period 1913-1950 can be characterized as one
of missed opportunities in material living standards across time and space
because income (and consumption) growth was historically low and signifi-
cantly lower than in other countries overseas (e.g. United States, Canada or
New Zealand). If we extend the analysis of citizens’ well-being beyond their
economic status, these patterns do not match. Taking the United Kingdom
as an example, by mid-century citizens lived in a drastically different society
than they or their counterparts lived in 1913. Their prospects and that of
their children of living a healthier life in a more equal society were much
higher. Also, if they were employed outside agriculture, they would spend
almost two hundred hours less in the workplace than at the beginning of the
century. What did these changes mean to British citizens in 1950? If they had
been confronted with the choice of living in the same society as their coun-
terparts did in 1913, how would they have valued the achievements in human
welfare since then? How does this view compare to the one provided by in-
come per capita? To answer these questions, in the next section I will present
a new measurement framework developed by Jones and Klenow (2016) that
will be the basis of my welfare calculations.
2.3 Methodology
In the spirit of the veil of ignorance emphasized by Rawls (1971), the frame-
work developed in Jones and Klenow (2016) theoretically confronts an indi-
vidual with a lottery. She does not know in which country she will live, the
level of consumption she will enjoy, or whether her life will be expected to
be long and full of leisure. What is the proportion of her yearly consumption
28 Missed Opportunities?
living in the U.S. that would make her indifferent between living there and,
say, in the United Kingdom? Equivalently, for time comparisons we could also
ask: by which factor would we have to adjust her yearly consumption living in
the United Kingdom in 1950 so that she would be as well off as her counter-
part in 1913? The answer to these two questions is a consumption-equivalent
measure of the standard of living and this is what I will use to calculate
welfare differences across countries and over time.17. See the methodological
appendix for further elaboration on the differences between the two.
To make welfare comparisons, I draw on historical information about peo-
ple’s preferences. Using this evidence provides a solution to two important
critiques of the HDI and the HIHD. First, the consumption-equivalent indica-
tor avoids assuming an arbitrary weighting scheme by drawing on empirical
evidence on how people respond to trade-offs between different components
of well-being. Second, assuming a fixed weighting scheme over time, as the
HDI does, has the implication that the relative importance of each dimension
does not differ over time. In the case of income and health, this can be prob-
lematic because, as Costa and Kahn (2004) show, the value individuals assign
to health has increased between 1940 and 1980 in the United States as mea-
sured with the premium for job risk. Therefore, assuming constant weights
over long time spans can be troublesome in the case of health because its
weight in the indicator would be very different if we take the perspective of
an individual today or in the past. To take this into account, the methodol-
ogy used in this research considers a representative individual with a given
set of preferences in 1950.18 Following Jones and Klenow (2016), the lifetime





17Following Jones and Klenow (2016) I will also refer to the consumption-equivalent
indicator as welfare, well-being or living standards for the sake of simplicity. Also, strictly
speaking, the example above refers to one of the two ways of calculating this measure: the
equivalent variation. To ease the explanation of the methodology in this section, I will focus
on this variation (I use a geometric average of the two for the main calculations)
18Following the literature, preferences across countries are kept constant. Jones and
Klenow (2016, 2429) note that a similar issue arises in cross-country comparisons using
income per capita, since this indicator requires a set of common prices. Moreover, these
comparisons become more complicated as we consider countries in very different stages of
economic development. Given that income in my sample differs at most by a factor of four,
in my analysis this issue is less problematic than in other studies where income can differ
by a factor of more than 40.
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where Sa is the probability that the individual is alive up to age a with a
maximum of one hundred, β is the discount factor, C is annual consump-
tion and l is leisure. In this framework, well-being is given by the expected
value (due to uncertainty) of things that matter to our individual such as
the amount of goods and services consumed and the number of hours spent
working throughout her lifetime. At this point, it is important to clarify the
aspect of health that is being measured with survival rates. Murphy and
Topel (2006) argue that health-related knowledge can affect the quality and
(or) the quantity of life. With Sa, I am mainly measuring improvements that
affect the quantity of life (i.e. mortality). On the other hand, one could also
argue that mortality rates at young ages can also capture some aspects of the
quality of life because children are more vulnerable than adults to the disease
environment, and a bad disease environment leads to high morbidity. Nev-
ertheless, measuring improvements in the quality of life is beyond the scope
of this chapter and for the discussion of the results I will consider that lower
mortality rates enhance well-being by increasing the prospects of citizens to
have a longer and richer life in terms of consumption and leisure.19
To assess differences in living standards across countries with this method-
ology, we first need to choose a benchmark with which welfare comparisons
will be made. By doing this, welfare levels are expressed in relative terms in
the same manner as the difference in income between two countries can be
expressed in percentage terms. Since one of the main purposes of this chap-
ter is to put the European welfare experience into perspective with that of
other developed countries that were less affected by the disruptive happen-
ings of this period, the benchmark for welfare comparisons will be the United
States.20 With this country as a benchmark, we can extend Equation 2.1 as
follows:
19See Murphy and Topel (2006) and Hickson (2014) for such an attempt.
20As I discussed in the previous section, European economic performance was not only
below that of the United States, but also of other developed economies such as New Zealand,
Canada, Australia (or the weighted average of these four countries). Therefore, choosing the
United States as a benchmark for welfare comparisons does not misrepresent the relative
performance of Europe throughout this period. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that
this choice does not affect comparisons between countries and regions that do not involve
the benchmark country (e.g. the percentage income difference between Spain and Denmark
is independent of whether we choose the United States or Canada as a reference country).
And, more importantly, using the United States to calibrate the model makes my results
comparable to other studies in the literature that have used American data to calibrate







where i indexes countries and λ multiplies consumption at every age. Given
that our individual lives behind the veil of ignorance and she does not know
in which country she will live, what consumption level, health and leisure she
will have: What proportion of the individual’s annual consumption in the
United States would make her indifferent between living in the United States
or in the United Kingdom? The answer to this question (λ in Equation 2.2)
can be formally expressed as follows:
Uus(λi) = Ui(1). (2.3)
To apply this theoretical framework, we first need to choose the function
that will determine an individual’s welfare:
u(Ci, li) = u¯+ log Ci + v(li), (2.4)
where log Ci is log-transformed consumption in country i (this form reflects
diminishing marginal returns as common in other welfare indices such as the
HDI or the HIHD), v(l) is the value of non-working time and u¯ is a constant.21
From a pure materialistic point of view, an individual would only care about
consumption and therefore annual well-being in the previous equation would
only depend on C. However, by introducing u¯ and v(l) other aspects of the
individual’s life are considered. To take into account economic inequality,
this model makes use of the concept of risk aversion implied by the concavity
of utility in consumption. As noted by Atkinson (1970), this concavity as-
sumption is equivalent to assuming that a person is risk averse, which results
in a negative contribution of inequality to individual welfare in the model.
On the other hand, one can argue that inequality can also have a positive
effect on well-being over long periods of time because it provides incentives
for catching up or it shows others the way to improve (Deaton, 2013). Ac-
counting for this channel is beyond the scope of this welfare measure, and
in the following I will focus on the risk aversion mechanism, even though it
21In the following, I will drop the age subscript for consumption and leisure for simplicity
and to ease notation. In the methodological appendix, I provide the relevant equations
taking them into account over the life cycle.
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may not reflect the total effect of inequality on well-being.22 If consumption
is log-normally distributed (with arithmetic mean ci and variance σ
2
i ) and
independent of mortality and age, then: E [log C] = log c − σ2/2. In other
words, expected consumption is a function of average consumption minus its












It is interesting to highlight the interaction between survival rates and
the rest of the dimensions. Suppose there is a certain improvement in sur-
vival rates. If living conditions in country i are characterized by low levels
of material well-being and leisure, then the increase in welfare (Ui) would
be lower than if the individual lived in a rich country with high levels of
leisure. As a result, and similar to the HIHD, health improvements at high
levels of other dimensions of well-being represent higher achievements than
at low levels. Furthermore, notice that non-working time, v(l), is consid-
ered throughout the life cycle in the welfare calculations so that individuals
younger than 15 and older than 64 are not affected by changes in work-
ing time.24 Related to this, the leisure component also takes into account
that participation rates are different across countries and time, and that the
annual hours of work reported by Huberman and Minns (2007) refer to non-
agricultural workers. These adjustments are aimed at reflecting that, similar
22Atkinson (1970) also notes that by assuming that the degree of income inequality is
independent of the level of income, as traditional measures do, implies a constant relative




1−γ , γ > 0; γ 6= 1
log y, γ = 1
where γ is the parameter of risk aversion. The logarithmic form used in this chapter, and
other indicators such as the HDI or the HIHD, would imply a risk aversion parameter of
one. In this chapter, I also use this functional form because a unitary value for the risk
aversion parameter is in line with the mean estimate found by Chetty (2006) and cross-
sectional evidence from Gandelman and Herna´ndez-Murillo (2015). Different parameters
would affect the extent to which inequality reduces welfare so that higher degrees of risk
aversion (and discounting) give higher weight to the negative effect of income inequality on
welfare (Co´rdoba & Verdier, 2008; Jones & Klenow, 2016).
23As common in the literature, the Gini coefficients are converted into the standard de-
viation of log consumption inverting the formula suggested in Aitchison and Brown (1957):
G = 2Φ σ√
2
− 1, where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution.
24In Appendix 2.B I elaborate further on this.
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to health improvements, changes in leisure time are also age-specific and con-
centrated among workers employed in the manufacturing and service sector
(in Appendix 2.C I present the sources used for this correction). Finally,
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This equation shows that welfare in country i relative to the United States
consists of four components. The first measures the contribution of differ-
ences in health to relative welfare, the second term captures differences in
consumption and the last two measure differences in leisure and inequality.
For comparisons of welfare over time, Equation 2.6 is also used. However,
instead of comparing countries with the United States in a given year, a coun-
try is compared with itself in two points in time. If, for example, we want to
calculate welfare growth in the United Kingdom during the period 1913-1950,
λ in the previous equation would answer the question: by what percentage
must the individual’s consumption be adjusted in the United Kingdom in
1950 so that she is as well off as her counterpart in 1913? In other words, by
which factor do we have to adjust our individual’s consumption in 1950 so
that she is willing to give up on working much shorter hours and living in a
society where infectious diseases have almost disappeared?
One of the strengths of the presented methodology is that it allows for a
direct comparison with GDP. In terms of growth rates, it is possible to cal-
culate the extent to which income per capita underestimates welfare growth
and provide a decomposition of the sources for the discrepancy between the
two measures (i.e. consumption, health, leisure or inequality). If we perform
this exercise in levels, it would show whether the welfare measure shows
higher or lower well-being in a certain country than income and, as before,
the contribution of each dimension to their difference.
The last step to apply the model presented above is to calibrate it accord-
ing to the preferences of a representative individual in 1950 to value changes in
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leisure and health.25 For calculating the contribution of leisure to welfare, first
we measure the amount of time that workers spent in non-market work annu-
ally with respect to their total time endowment from working-time evidence.
To illustrate how this calculation is made, consider the following example. In
1913, annual hours worked in the United States were 2900. Given that work-
ers’ time endowment (ignoring sleeping time) is 5840 hours (16 hours per day
multiplied by 365 days), annual leisure amounts to 50 percent of their time.
The second step is to choose a functional form for leisure. Following Jones
and Klenow (2016), I use a form that implies that the percentage change in
hours worked due to a percentage change in wages is constant (keeping the
marginal utility of consumption fixed). Then I calibrate it in the same way by
assuming that the elasticity of labor supply (i.e. how working hours respond
to wage changes) is one and using the observed annual working time in 1950
for the United States.26 The motivation for choosing this unitary elasticity
is twofold. First, it is in the middle of the estimates in the literature ranging
from 0.5 to 1.9 (Jones & Klenow, 2016). Therefore, the welfare calculations
based on it can be interpreted as the middle-range effect of leisure on well-
being. And second, this calibration yields similar results as other studies in
the literature such as Crafts (1997) or Nordhaus (1997).
As we saw before, health differences across countries (and over time)
depend on annual consumption, leisure, inequality and a constant to be cali-
brated (u¯). A value for this parameter and similar ones in other studies have
been traditionally chosen on the basis of empirical evidence from trade-offs
involving risk and money. This particular trade-off exists when a certain de-
cision involves a health risk. Since such risk is undesirable, the individual has
to be compensated in some other aspect (e.g. money) to accept that choice.
From this compensation we can infer the value individuals put into mortality
risk to get estimates of the so-called value of a statistical life (VSL).27 To
25Also, a value has to be chosen for β to measure preference for present and delay
satisfaction. For the main results I will assume that there is no discount rate. The reason
for this choice is that by assuming that β = 1, Equation 2.5 becomes much more intuitive in
that welfare in a given country is determined by the accumulated expected value of realizing
the consumption and leisure levels observed in one particular year (the conclusions are the
same if discounting rates are applied as the robustness tests in Appendix 2.D show).
26See Appendix 2.B for a more comprehensive explanation of this parameter as well as
several tests showing the robustness of the analysis to using different values.
27A historical example of this trade-off has been examined by Williamson (1982). In
this study, the author observed that British workers during the industrial revolution had
to be ‘bribed’ (or compensated in monetary terms) in order to move from small market
towns with low population density and relatively low mortality rates to densely-populated
industrial towns where mortality was much higher.
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obtain an estimate for u¯, I have used the same benchmark VSL ($6 million)
as Murphy and Topel (2006) and Jones and Klenow (2016), which in turn is
in line with the range suggested by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Although there
is some agreement in the literature concerning this estimate, drawing on cur-
rent evidence of individuals preferences to choose a value for u¯ in 1950 can
be problematic because ample evidence in the literature points out that the
value that people put into health was lower in the past (Costa & Kahn, 2004;
Fishback, 1992; Kim & Fishback, 1993; Williamson, 1982). For this reason, I
will draw on the work by Costa and Kahn (2004), who calculate an income
elasticity of VSL of 1.6 using evidence from American workers for the period
1940-1980 to adjust my model to people’s preferences in 1950 (I show the
results are robust to changes in this parameter in Appendix 2.D).28
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Level analysis
How does our view of the early 20th century change with the new welfare
measure? To answer this question, we can look at the left panel of Table 2.4,
where I provide relative levels of living standards using the consumption-
equivalent measure (Column I) and income per capita (Column II). Column
III shows the difference between the two measures (in logarithmic points)
and the remaining columns the extent to which each aspect of well-being
contributes to this difference. To put it in another way, Columns IV to VII
convey information on the contribution (in logarithmic points) by the dimen-
sions considered to higher or lower welfare relative to income so that their
sum add up to Column III. To make sense of the sign and magnitude of their
contribution to this difference, I also present the underlying raw data for each
aspect considered at the regional level: life expectancy at birth for health,
consumption over income in relative terms, annual working time for (the lack
of) leisure, adjusted for participation rates and for the sectoral structure of
the labor force, and the Gini coefficient for inequality.
28Also, in Table 2.D.1 I show that the results are roughly the same when assuming values
of the VSL in the range suggested by Viscusi and Aldy (2003).
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Table 2.4: Living standards in Western Europe and the United States in
1913
Living standards Welfare decomposition
(USA=100) (in logarithmic points)
Countries Welfare Income Difference Health Consumption Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
United States 100 100 0 0 0 0 0
(54) (1.00) (1152) (50)
Western Europe 57 67 -0.17 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 0.06
(50) (0.90) (1277) (47)
Northern Europe 72 60 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.02 -0.03
(58) (1.08) (1096) (52)
– Sweden 57 53 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.05 -0.17
– Denmark 104 74 0.33 0.13 0.06 -0.02 0.16
North-Western 63 77 -0.19 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 0.06
Europe (51) (0.88) (1408) (47)
– United Kingdom 88 93 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.01
– Germany 50 68 -0.30 -0.13 -0.32 -0.02 0.17
– Netherlands 68 76 -0.12 0.06 -0.20 -0.04 0.06
– Belgium 74 81 -0.09 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.00
– France 48 66 -0.32 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11
– Switzerland 108 137 -0.23 -0.01 -0.38 -0.06 0.22
Southern Europe 37 42 -0.12 -0.23 -0.01 0.06 0.06
(45) (0.99) (908) (47)
– Spain 34 39 -0.14 -0.35 0.06 0.12 0.02
– Italy 38 43 -0.12 -0.17 -0.05 0.01 0.08
Notes: the source for Columns II is Bolt and van Zanden (2014). The values in
Column I, III-VII were obtained using Equation 2.B.8 and 2.B.9 in Appendix 2.D.
Since the difference between the welfare measure and GDP per capita in Column III
is measured in logarithmic points, the contribution of each welfare dimension to this
difference is measured in the same units so that Columns IV-VII add up to Column
III. At the regional level (in brackets) I provide the underlying raw data on life
expectancy at birth, consumption divided by income; annual hours worked adjusted
for participation rates and the percentage of the labor force employed in
non-agricultural activities; and Gini coefficients.
According to the welfare measure, living standards in Western Europe
were slightly below two thirds of the American level, which represents a 15-
percent downward revision. What accounts for this? First, life expectancy in
the old continent is four years lower, which reduces welfare by eleven percent
(Column IV). And second, lower consumption reduces well-being relative to
income by a further ten percent (Column V).29 These two welfare-reducing
forces are partially offset by higher equality in the old continent (Column
VII). Leisure does not seem to play an important role since workers in both
regions are expected to work a similar amount of hours outside agriculture.
Across regions, we can see further revisions. For instance, the industrial core
29This figure was obtained by taking the logarithmic ratio of consumption and income
with respect to the United States (thus the ratio for the United States is zero by definition).
For the European aggregate, we can calculate it as: log (60.83/67.44) = log (0.9) = -0.1.
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does not exhibit the largest level of living standards because of lower health
levels, longer working time and less consumption relative to income. Instead,
Northern Europe takes the lead at three quarters of the American level with
its higher levels of life expectancy and consumption share that increase rela-
tive welfare by 12 and 7 percent respectively. In the south of Europe, living
standards are slightly revised downwards, mostly due to the heavy mortality
toll paid by its citizens.
The differences between Europe and the United States are consistent with
the HDI rankings by Crafts (2002) in portraying North Americans ahead of
Europeans in terms of well-being. However, the implied percentage relative
differences are very different. For instance, whereas Italian well-being using
the HDI is 75 percent of the American level in 1913 (and therefore much
higher than what income per capita shows), the welfare measure suggests
that Italian living standards were (roughly) a third of those in the other
side of the Atlantic. This downward revision is unsurprising and seems more
realistic, if we take into account that life expectancy in Italy was seven years
lower than in the United States. Another interesting case is the welfare gap
between the United States and the United Kingdom, which looks slightly
larger with the consumption-equivalent measure because British workers were
expected to work almost four hundred hours more than Americans and their
mortality rates were higher. This health premium is consistent with the idea
of Williamson (1982) that British workers living in unhealthy towns had to
earn more to accept the more hazardous conditions in 1905.
Even though migration decisions are the consequence of a large number
of factors such as wage levels, unemployment or demographic pressures, it is
worth noting that the levels of well-being in Table 2.4 are overall in line with
some of the migration flows around the turn of the 20th century presented
by Hatton and Williamson (1998). For instance, the downward revision of
Southern Europe further reinforces the idea that migrants at the beginning
of the 20th century had a lot to gain from moving to a different country not
only in material terms, but also in their health status. Also, if we consider
the European aggregate, we can see that migrating to the United States and
achieving its average consumption, health and leisure levels was practically
welfare-enhancing across the whole continent. In line with HDI-based evi-
dence, the only exceptions in which, on average, moving to the United States
could result in a decrease in well-being are Denmark and Switzerland. How-
ever, this view only holds for risk-averse individuals since in the absence of the
inequality component in Table 2.4, the Swiss and Danish welfare levels would
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be slightly below the American one. Interestingly, in the case of Switzerland
the welfare measure seems to yield a lower level than GDP, which is more in
line with the income estimates of Prados de la Escosura (2000) and Bolt et
al. (2018).
Within Europe, it is interesting to highlight how relative differences look
wider in some cases. Consider France and the United Kingdom. Whereas
income shows that French living standards were around 70 percent of the
British level in 1913, the welfare measure reduces this number to 55 per-
cent because French life expectancy was three years lower and inequality was
higher. Moreover, the higher investment rate of the French economy rela-
tive to Britain in 1913 further reduces relative welfare (Le`vy-Levoyer, 1978;
Feinstein, 1972), although future well-being may increase via increasing pro-
ductivity.
If we focus on how relative welfare evolved until mid-century in Table
2.A.1 and 2.5, we can see some interesting patterns. Beginning with the West-
ern European aggregate, up to 1929 there is some catching up with North
America as the life expectancy gap declines by two years and inequality de-
creases faster in the old continent. This is also true for the British welfare
gap that further narrows in 1929 as inequality decreases faster than in the
United States (Lindert & Williamson, 2016). Similar developments can be
seen in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands that come closer to
the United States due to improving health levels and increasing equality. In
the particular case of Germany, the loss of rents by owners during the hy-
perinflation years and the narrowing skill and gender differences contributed
to a marked inequality decline by 1929 (Go´mez-Leo´n & de Jong, 2017). In
Sweden, not only did inequality drive convergence as the share of national
income accrued by top earners declined from 24 to 14 percent (Piketty, 2014,
317), but also increasing productivity due to a major shift towards higher
value-added industries in the structure of the economy (Roses & Wolf, 2010).
By 1950, most of the relative progress during these decades had vanished.
As Table 2.5 shows, the welfare gap between the United States and Eu-
rope widened substantially despite health, leisure and inequality levels were
relatively similar in both sides of the Atlantic. The impact of the war on
the European economy was tremendous as labor productivity levels dropped
(Bergeaud et al., 2016), and aggregate relative consumption fell from 61 in
1929 to 47 percent of the American level in 1950. In countries such as Ger-
many or France, relative welfare levels in 1950 were at their lowest (around a
third of the American level) close to those of southern European countries in
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a context in which part of the stock of physical capital was destroyed during
the war (Kirner, 1965; Maddison, 1994). In the case of Northern European
countries such as Sweden, the 1939-1945 period brought a temporary de-
cline in GDP and consumption that rapidly recovered after 1945 (Edvinsson,
2005).
Table 2.5: Living standards in Western Europe and the United States in
1950
Living standards Welfare decomposition
(USA=100) (in logarithmic points)
Countries Welfare Income Difference Health Consumption Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
United States 100 100 0 0 0 0 0
(68) (1.00) (963) (40)
Western Europe 42 49 -0.14 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
(66) (0.97) (1080) (43)
Northern Europe 81 69 0.16 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.02
(71) (1.08) (1086) (39)
– Sweden 77 69 0.11 0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
– Denmark 89 70 0.24 0.07 0.14 -0.03 0.06
North-Western 45 55 -0.19 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05
Europe (67) (0.94) (1256) (43)
– United Kingdom 76 73 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.05
– Germany 28 39 -0.34 -0.03 -0.20 -0.09 -0.02
– Netherlands 59 61 -0.05 0.08 -0.16 -0.03 0.06
– Belgium 56 56 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.03
– France 31 53 -0.54 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.37
– Switzerland 83 96 -0.14 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01
Southern Europe 29 30 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.04
(64) (1.07) (682) (43)
– Spain 24 24 0.00 -0.12 0.15 0.05 -0.07
– Italy 32 33 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.02
Notes: see Table 2.4.
In Table 2.A.2 we can see that the post-war bleak situation did not last
long since by 1960 the welfare level of Germany, France or Western Europe
with respect to the United States had increased substantially. This suggests
that choosing 1950 as the end date of the analysis can have large impact on
our view of their post-1929 performance. However, choosing a benchmark 15
years after the end of the war does not override the idea that relative welfare
differences were quite persistent throughout the period since the gap in living
standards between the United States and the European aggregate was very
similar to that in 1929 (and even wider in some cases such as in Denmark or
the United Kingdom).
A further aspect that can be explored is the degree to which countries
converged (or diverged) in their levels of welfare, thus causing a decline (or
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an increase) in cross-sectional welfare dispersion. In the context of economic
growth, this phenomenon, also called sigma convergence, takes place when
poor economies grow faster than rich economies as they approach their steady
states. If this was the case for welfare as well, then achievements in medicine,
sanitation and workers’ rights would have created a more equal Europe as
HDI-based evidence suggests (Crafts, 2002; Millward & Baten, 2010). To look
at this, in the first row of Table 2.6 I present the coefficient of variation for
the benchmark years considered until now. Between 1913 and 1929, we can
observe a slight decline in welfare dispersion and then a rise up to 1950.
Actually, the increase after 1929 was so dramatic that the level of welfare
dispersion in 1950 was higher than in 1913, which suggests that the 1930s
and 1940s are characterized by welfare divergence. This pattern is in line with
Williamson (1996) and Lindert and Williamson (2003) who argue that the
eruption of the First World War and the disintegration of the world economy
during the interwar era broke with a convergence trend in wages and GDP
that can be tracked back to the late 19th century. However, inferring welfare
performance after 1929 on the basis of the 1950 benchmark may be misleading
because of the large impact of the war on consumption discussed above. If
we look at welfare dispersion in 1960 instead, we can see that it is lower than
in 1929, thus indicating that convergence forces were probably at play after
1929, but were temporarily interrupted by the war. These forces, although
somewhat weak as the coefficient of variation in 1960 is only slightly lower
than in 1929, have their roots in the widespread health improvements leading
to 1960 and economic convergence during the interwar era (Milanovic, 2006;
Roses & Wolf, 2010).
It is worth noting that the evolution of cross-country differences in hu-
man development (Table 2.6, second row) seems to be at odds with all the
patterns described above. In line with the idea that this indicator tends to
show convergence (Prados de la Escosura, 2015), welfare spread declined by
roughly a half between 1913 and 1950 despite the enormous disruptions of the
Second World War. A further noticeable difference between HDI-based dis-
persion in living standards and the consumption-equivalent measure or GDP
is that the degree of dispersion is much lower with the former. Actually, in
1913 and 1950 the coefficient of variation is three times and six times higher
for the consumption equivalent measure, thus implying that differences in
living standards across countries were not only much larger than the HDI
shows, but also more persistent.
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Table 2.6: Convergence in living standards using various indicators,
1913-1960
1913 1929 1950 1960
CoV (welfare) 0.38 0.36 0.46 0.32
CoV (HDI) 0.13 n.d. 0.07 n.d.
CoV (GDP) 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.31
Notes: values for welfare and GDP per capita dispersion
were taken from Table 2.4, 2.A.1, 2.5 and 2.A.2 (Column I
and II respectively). For the HDI, I used the values of
Crafts (2002, 396-397).
2.4.2 Growth analysis
Having shed light on relative welfare levels throughout the 20th century with
the new indicator, we can now address the question whether the first half
of the twentieth century in Western Europe can be characterized as one
of missed or taken opportunities for improving broader well-being. For this
purpose, I present annual growth rates of welfare using the consumption-
equivalent measure in Table 2.7 (Column I). To put these into perspective,
I also provide income and consumption growth rates in Columns II and III.
Moreover, in the right panel I provide a welfare breakdown to look at the
reasons why welfare and income per capita growth differ (the only difference
with Table 2.4 is that Column IV is now interpreted as the percentage growth
difference between income and consumption).
Does income growth underestimate welfare growth in Western Europe
during the period 1913-1950? According to the consumption-equivalent mea-
sure, the answer is clearly affirmative and its magnitude is sizable. To con-
tinue with the previous example of the United Kingdom, if we take into
account that British citizens in 1950 lived in a much safer country where
the incidence of infectious diseases was nowhere near that in 1913 and life
expectancy had increased by 16 years; that they were expected to spend al-
most two hundred hours per year less in the workplace; and that they lived
in a more equal society, then welfare growth during the period 1913-1950
is almost three times higher than what income per capita suggests. This is
not an isolated case since whereas average European income per capita grew
below a percentage point annually, the welfare measure suggests a yearly in-
crease of 2.4 percentage points. The implications of this difference are very
substantial: in almost four decades income per capita only grew by less than
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30 percent and welfare growth points to a doubling of well-being at the end
of the period. This difference is mainly explained by welfare gains derived
from the decline of mortality, expansion of leisure and fall of inequality. The
16-year increase in life expectancy, the almost two-hundred-hour decline in
annual working time and the 4-point fall in the Gini coefficient add 1.4, 0.2
and 0.2 percentage points to European welfare growth respectively (Column
V, VII and VIII). If we consider the whole sample, the growth differential
between the consumption-equivalent indicator and income ranges from 0.8 to
2.2 percentage points annually in France and Spain.
Table 2.7: Average annual growth in living standards in Western Europe
and the United States, 1913-1950
Measures of living standards Welfare decomposition
(in percentage points) (in percentage points)
Countries Welfare Income Consumption Diff. Health Cons. Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
United States 3.1 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.1 -0.4 0.3 0.5
(54-68) (1.7-1.3) (1152-963) (50-40)
Western Europe 2.4 0.8 0.6 1.7 1.4 -0.2 0.2 0.2
(50-66) (0.8-0.6) (1277-1080) (47-43)
Northern Europe 3.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 0.9 -0.4 0.2 0.6
(58-71) (2.0-1.7) (1096-1086) (52-39)
– Sweden 3.8 2.4 1.9 1.4 0.8 -0.5 0.1 0.9
– Denmark 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.9 -0.2 0.2 0.2
North-Western Europe 2.3 0.8 0.6 1.5 1.3 -0.2 0.2 0.2
(51-67) (0.8-0.6) (1408-1256) (47-43)
– United Kingdom 2.8 1.0 0.8 1.8 1.2 -0.3 0.2 0.6
– Germany 1.7 0.2 0.1 1.6 1.6 -0.1 0.1 0.0
– Netherlands 2.8 1.1 0.8 1.7 1.2 -0.3 0.3 0.5
– Belgium 2.4 0.7 0.4 1.7 1.2 -0.3 0.3 0.6
– France 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.1 -0.5 0.4 -0.2
– Switzerland 2.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1
Southern Europe 2.7 0.7 0.6 2.0 1.7 -0.2 0.2 0.2
(45-64) (0.7-0.6) (908-682) (47-43)
– Spain 2.6 0.3 0.2 2.2 2.0 -0.1 0.1 0.2
– Italy 2.9 1.0 0.8 1.9 1.5 -0.2 0.3 0.2
Notes: see Table 2.6, although there are two differences. First, the underlying raw data for
Column VI is the rate of growth of GDP and consumption per capita. Second, Column IV now
conveys information about the difference in percentage (or logarithmic) points between the
welfare measure and income per capita.
Across countries, growth experiences differ substantially as the case of
Germany and Sweden illustrate. While in the former welfare grew at 1.7
percentage points yearly because progress in material well-being was near
zero, in the latter citizens saw the four well-being aspects considered improve
and contribute to a yearly growth rate of 3.8 percentage points. Despite the
underestimation of welfare growth by income is sizable in both countries,
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choosing 1950 as the final year for the calculations may have a particularly
large impact on growth rates in some countries such as Germany and France
as discussed above. Actually, if we compare their performance with that of the
European aggregate, Germany and France exhibit roughly 30 and 25 percent
lower welfare growth rates respectively. Choosing 1960 as the end point of the
analysis instead (see Table 2.A.5), we can see that the experiences of France
and Germany are much more in line with those of other countries. This later
benchmark reinforces the previous findings that the analyzed period is one
of significant welfare improvements despite the low growth rates of GDP per
capita.
Before proceeding further to analyze the drivers of welfare growth by
period, it is worth putting the results of Table 2.7 into perspective with the
literature. Beginning with Crafts (1997, 317), we can see that our calculations
are in line on average. For instance, his (unweighted) rate of average welfare
growth of European countries for the 1913-1950 period is the same as in this
study: 2.4 percentage points. Also, looking at the same sample of countries
considered in both articles, welfare revisions by Crafts (1997) range from
0.6 to 1.8 percentage points and in Table 2.7 they range from 0.8 to two
percentage points.
Country specific cases can exhibit some important differences. Consid-
ering the United Kingdom, Crafts presents a growth rate of 1.8 percentage
points and in this study it is 2.8. Health and inequality, the latter not included
by Crafts (1997), account for the difference. In the Danish case, leisure does
not contribute to welfare growth in Crafts’ calculations, whereas in mine it
adds 0.3 percentage points yearly as result of the two-hundred hour decrease
in annual working time (this difference may seem small, but over a period
of almost 40 years it becomes very sizable). My results are also in line with
those of Usher (1980, 246) who calculates that health improvements in France
and the United States added up to one and 0.75 percentage points to welfare
growth between 1911 and 197230
The welfare gains from health improvements in the other side of the At-
lantic in Table 2.7 are also similar to the range provided by Nordhaus (2003)
for the period 1900-1950: between 0.9 and 1.7 on average. In the case of
leisure, Nordhaus and Tobin (1972, 10) calculate that it contributed to higher
American growth by 0.4 percentage points between 1929 and 1965, which is
close to the 0.3 percent reported in Table 6. Jones and Klenow (2016, 2455)
30My calculations imply a contribution to annual welfare growth of 1.06 percentage
points for France, and 0.9 for the United States.
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have similar values for a more recent period.31
Finally, to have a sense of the extent to which the results can change
when calibrating the model differently, I present in Table 2.D.1 and 2.D.4
a set of alternative results employing a parameter specification based on
evidence from the literature that yields the lowest relative importance of
health and leisure in the model.32 As we can see, welfare growth rates are
revised on average by only 0.5 percentage points, and the relative welfare
levels remain almost unaltered. All in all, the robustness and the consistency
of my results with those of other studies in the literature not only show that
the calculated growth rates of welfare and the model calibration are plausible,
but also provide support for the results of the level analyses.33
In order to look at the drivers of welfare growth over time, in Table 2.A.3
and 2.A.4 I consider the periods 1913-1929 and 1929-1950 separately. If we
focus on the first one, we can see that the growth trajectory of Western
Europe is steeper than the American as growth is 33 percent higher in the
old continent. Despite the negative effects of WWI (Roses & Wolf, 2010),
consumption grew by 0.9 percent, its distribution became more equal in a
number of countries (Piketty, 2014; Milanovic, 2016), and the introduction of
the eight-hour working day after WWI brought significant improvements for
workers’ well-being (A. A. Evans, 1969; Huberman & Minns, 2007). The most
important source of welfare gains, though, stems from health improvements
due to the establishment of more efficient sanitary infrastructures and dietary
improvements (Cutler & Miller, 2005; Millward & Baten, 2010), adding 1.4
percentage points to welfare growth. This welfare-enhancing wave caused
by health developments was not unique in Europe as non-OECD countries
also benefited from it (Prados de la Escosura, 2015). In the years from 1929
to 1950, welfare growth is unsurprisingly lower than in the previous period
because the contribution of consumption halves. Also, the one-time large re-
duction in working time was not realized again. Still, average welfare growth
in Western Europe is two percent as a result of further progress in sanita-
tion and medicine (e.g. antibiotics), that allowed treating major infectious
31For instance, they calculate that a 150-hour reduction in working time in Japan during
the period 1980-2007 increased welfare growth by 0.23 percentage points (a comparable
decrease in working time in North-Western Europe between 1913 and 1950 yields a similar
value).
32More specifically, I assume a discount rate of 2 percent given that there is discounting
included due to mortality, a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 2 (Jones & Klenow, 2016)
and the lower range of the VSL suggested by Viscusi and Aldy (2003): 5.5$ million.
33Moreover, in Appendix 2.D I perform a number of robustness tests showing that
changes in the calibration do not alter the main results.
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diseases (Cutler et al., 2006; Jayachandran, Lleras-Muney, & Smith, 2010;
Costa, 2015). Irrespective of the initial income level of a certain country,
these innovations diffused rapidly and contributed to improve the lives of
millions (Preston, 1975, 1980; Deaton, 2013).
2.4.3 Welfare across the age distribution
The decline in mortality did not happen in the same way across the age
distribution. Instead, progress against diseases such as pneumonia or gas-
troenteritis disproportionately increased the survival probabilities of children
between their birth and fifth birthday. To look at this in more detail, I will
quantify the effect of health improvements in different parts of the age dis-
tribution and test the robustness of the patterns described until now. For
this purpose, I can take advantage of the richness of the age-specific mortal-
ity data to perform the same exercise as in Table 2.7, but considering the
counterfactual that mortality improvements only happened after certain age
thresholds. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 2.1 where I
provide welfare growth rates for the period 1913-1950 when considering mor-
tality changes from birth until age 60 for the United States, Western Europe
and its sub-regions.
Unsurprisingly, welfare growth falls as the age threshold increases because
mortality declined less at older ages. This is especially visible in the age range
0-5. In fact, according to these estimates, not taking into account progress in
child mortality lowers welfare growth between 0.5 and one percentage points
annually in Northern and Southern Europe, respectively. While these growth
differentials are important, they do not override the idea that the period
1913-1950 is one of strong welfare growth for Europeans and Americans.
These results suggest that income per capita significantly underestimates
welfare growth during this period providing a one-sided view of welfare devel-
opment. If we extend the concept of living standards beyond their material
component to include the gains from the advent of modern medicine and the
rise in leisure, welfare in Western Europe by 1950 doubled with respect to
1913, despite the negative effects that armed conflicts, financial crises and
the like had on material well-being. According to the new welfare measure,
opportunities to increase well-being in health and leisure were taken over
time, and their impact on people’s lives was sizable.
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Figure 2.1: Welfare growth across the age distribution in Western Europe
and the United States, 1913-1950
2.5 Conclusions
The lenses through which we look at society greatly influence our perception
and narratives of the past. In the study of historical living standards, this
is particularly relevant and challenging when a focus on different indicators
present different paths of human development. The study of European living
standards during the period 1913-1950 is a perfect example of this: while
historically-low rates of economic growth would characterize this period as
one of missed opportunities for improving people’s welfare, unprecedented
achievements in levels of health and leisure due to the spread of modern
medicine, the implementation of large-scale sanitation infrastructures or the
introduction of the eight-hour working day indicate the opposite.
To examine whether the idea of missed opportunities for living standards
beyond their pure material component is supported by a larger basis of mea-
sures, I have applied a new composite indicator of welfare that integrates ma-
terial well-being, health, leisure time and inequality. Contrary to previously-
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used composite indicators that look at this period, this measure is more
comprehensive in the considered aspects of well-being. More importantly, it
is grounded in economic theory which allows for welfare calculations across
countries and time that are directly comparable to GDP. The main findings
show that income per capita underestimates welfare growth significantly –
up to 2.2 percentage points yearly – and that therefore many of the opportu-
nities that emerged during the first half of the twentieth century to improve
people’s well-being were not missed. However, these opportunities were not
taken (or did not arise) equally across countries since, as opposed to what
other measures of human welfare such as the HDI imply, differences across
countries were large and persistent throughout this period.
Supporting recent arguments on the limits of GDP as a comprehensive
measure of well-being, the results in this chapter show that income indica-
tors fail to fully account for improvements in important aspects of people’s
lives such as health or leisure. Actually, whereas GDP per capita shows an
improvement of less than 30 percent in European living standards during the
period 1913-1950, the utility indicator points to a doubling of well-being. A
further implication of the findings in this chapter is related to the measure-
ment framework employed for aggregating different welfare dimensions. In
the widely-used HDI, each dimension is given equal weight without consider-
ing that this weighting scheme is highly arbitrary and may change over time
alongside citizens’ preferences. The welfare measure applied in this chapter
employs a weighting scheme that is more in line with people’s preferences
and, therefore, reflect changes in well-being more accurately.
Future research could pay more attention to trade-offs involving income
inequality. The measurement framework applied in this chapter relies on a
number of assumptions concerning inequality that could be relaxed with a
deeper understanding of its effect on individuals’ welfare. Also, more evidence
on the long-term evolution of the compensation that people require for their
leisure time would improve the estimates of its contribution to well-being,
specially if these vary substantially over time as it is the case for health.
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2.A Supplementary material
Table 2.A.1: Living standards in Western Europe and the United States in
1929
Living standards Welfare decomposition
(USA=100) (in logarithmic points)
Countries Welfare Income Difference Health Consumption Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
United States 100 100 0 0 0 0 0
(59) (1.00) (957) (49)
Western Europe 63 62 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.10
(57) (0.98) (1044) (44)
Northern Europe 81 63 0.25 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.02
(62) (1.15) (975) (48)
– Sweden 70 58 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.02 -0.04
– Denmark 101 72 0.34 0.09 0.17 -0.03 0.11
North-Western 71 70 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.11
Europe (58) (0.94) (1163) (43)
– United Kingdom 97 81 0.19 0.00 0.12 -0.06 0.12
– Germany 62 60 0.03 0.02 -0.24 -0.01 0.28
– Netherlands 78 84 -0.08 0.11 -0.33 0.01 0.13
– Belgium 70 75 -0.07 -0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.07
– France 41 66 -0.47 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.33
– Switzerland 119 124 -0.05 0.04 -0.21 -0.05 0.17
Southern Europe 42 40 0.05 -0.21 0.15 0.04 0.07
(51) (1.16) (727) (45)
– Spain 41 40 0.05 -0.29 0.24 0.04 0.05
– Italy 42 40 0.05 -0.17 0.09 0.05 0.08
Notes: see Table 2.4.
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Table 2.A.2: Living standards in Western Europe and the United States in
1960
Living standards Welfare decomposition
(USA=100) (in logarithmic points)
Countries Welfare Income Difference Health Consumption Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
United States 100 100 0 0 0 0 0
(70) (1.00) (1036) (39)
Western Europe 58 62 -0.07 0.01 -0.10 -0.02 0.04
(70) (0.91) (1126) (37)
Northern Europe 86 78 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02
(73) (1.01) (1107) (38)
– Sweden 84 77 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.01
– Denmark 89 79 0.12 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.03
North-Western 63 70 -0.11 0.01 -0.13 -0.04 0.04
Europe (70) (0.88) (1261) (36)
– United Kingdom 82 75 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.08
– Germany 57 67 -0.16 -0.01 -0.25 -0.04 0.14
– Netherlands 59 71 -0.20 0.08 -0.24 0.00 -0.04
– Belgium 50 62 -0.20 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13
– France 47 66 -0.32 0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.17
– Switzerland 90 110 -0.20 0.04 -0.22 -0.02 0.00
Southern Europe 42 41 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03
(69) (0.98) (809) (38)
– Spain 39 29 0.30 -0.02 0.21 0.04 0.06
– Italy 44 49 -0.10 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 0.00
Notes: see Table 2.4.
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Table 2.A.3: Average annual growth in living standards in Western Europe
and the United States, 1913-1929
Measures of living standards Welfare decomposition
(in percentage points) (in percentage points)
Countries Welfare Income Consumption Diff. Health Cons. Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
United States 2.4 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 -0.8 0.5 0.1
(54-59) (1.6-0.8) (1152-957) (50-49)
Western Europe 3.2 1.1 0.9 2.1 1.4 -0.2 0.6 0.4
(50-57) (1.1-0.9) (1277-1044) (47-44)
Northern Europe 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.7 -0.4 0.4 0.5
(58-62) (1.9-1.5) (1096-975) (52-48)
– Sweden 3.6 2.2 1.6 1.4 0.6 -0.6 0.3 1.0
– Denmark 2.2 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.7 -0.1 0.5 -0.2
North-Western 3.3 1.1 0.7 2.2 1.5 -0.3 0.6 0.5
Europe (51-58) (1.1-0.7) (1408-1163) (47-43)
– United Kingdom 3.1 0.7 0.7 2.4 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.8
– Germany 4.2 0.8 0.5 3.3 2.3 -0.3 0.5 0.8
– Netherlands 3.3 2.2 0.6 1.1 1.3 -1.6 0.8 0.6
– Belgium 2.0 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.0 -0.5 0.7 -0.3
– France 1.3 1.6 1.0 -0.3 0.8 -0.6 0.8 -1.2
– Switzerland 3.0 1.0 1.3 2.0 1.3 0.3 0.6 -0.2
Southern Europe 3.4 1.3 1.5 2.1 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.2
(45-51) (1.3-1.5) (908-727) (47-45)
– Spain 4.0 1.7 2.0 2.3 1.7 0.3 0.0 0.3
– Italy 3.2 1.1 1.2 2.1 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
Notes: see Table 2.7.
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Table 2.A.4: Average annual growth in living standards in Western Europe
and the United States, 1929-1950
Measures of living standards Welfare decomposition
(in percentage points) (in percentage points)
Countries Welfare Income Consumption Diff. Health Cons. Leisure Inequality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
United States 3.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.2 -0.1 0.1 0.8
(59-68) (1.7-1.7) (957-963) (49-40)
Western Europe 1.9 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.5 -0.2 0.0 0.1
(57-66) (0.5-0.4) (1044-1080) (44-43)
Northern Europe 3.7 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.1 -0.4 0.0 0.8
(62-71) (2.2-1.8) (975-1086) (48-39)
– Sweden 4.1 2.6 2.2 1.5 1.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.9
– Denmark 3.1 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.2 -0.2 0.1 0.5
North-Western 1.6 0.5 0.4 1.1 1.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Europe (58-67) (0.5-0.4) (1163-1256) (43-43)
– United Kingdom 2.6 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.4 -0.4 0.0 0.4
– Germany 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 1.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.6
– Netherlands 2.4 0.2 1.0 2.2 1.2 0.7 -0.1 0.4
– Belgium 2.7 0.3 0.2 2.4 1.4 -0.2 -0.1 1.2
– France 2.2 0.7 0.3 1.5 1.3 -0.4 0.1 0.5
– Switzerland 2.1 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.1 -0.1
Southern Europe 2.3 0.3 -0.1 2.0 2.1 -0.4 0.1 0.2
(51-64) (0.3- -0.1) (727-682) (45-43)
– Spain 1.5 -0.7 -1.2 2.2 2.4 -0.5 0.1 0.1
– Italy 2.8 0.9 0.5 1.9 2.0 -0.4 0.1 0.3
Notes: see Table 2.7.
Table 2.A.5: Average annual growth in living standards in Western Europe
and the United States, 1913-1950 and 1913-1960
1913-1950 1913-1960
United States 3.1 2.9
Western Europe 2.4 3.0
Northern Europe 3.3 3.2
– Sweden 3.8 3.6
– Denmark 2.7 2.6
North-Western Europe 2.3 2.9
– United Kingdom 2.8 2.8
– Germany 1.7 3.3
– Netherlands 2.8 2.6
– Belgium 2.4 2.1
– France 1.8 2.8
– Switzerland 2.4 2.5
Southern Europe 2.7 3.4
– Spain 2.6 3.6
– Italy 2.9 3.3
Notes: see Table 2.7.
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2.B Methodological extension
The aim of this section is to complement the explanation of the methodology
sketched in the text with several extensions to show (i) the differences be-
tween the compensating and the equivalent variation, (ii) how welfare growth
rates are computed, (iii) how the consumption-equivalent measure is related
to income per capita and (iv) how the contribution of leisure adjusted by age,
participation rates and sectoral structure of the labor force is calculated. Also,
I will discuss the calibration of the model in more detail.
In the framework developed by Jones and Klenow (2016), the utility of an
individual behind the veil of ignorance is the expected value of flows derived





where S are survival rates up to age a, β is the discount factor, C is con-
sumption and l is leisure. To perform welfare calculations, we define Ui(λ) as






where i indexes countries. After choosing the United States as a reference
country, we can perform the calculation of welfare across countries in two
ways. The first is the one presented in the text (i.e. equivalent variation) and it
answers the question: by what factor (λev) must an individual’s consumption
be adjusted in the United States to make her indifferent between living there
and in country i? The second is the compensating variation and it calculates
the factor (λcv) by which an individual’s consumption in country i would have
to be adjusted so that she is as well off as in the United States. In terms of









To implement the welfare calculation using the previous equations, Jones






βaSus,a · [uus,a + log(λevi )], (2.B.5)
and
uus,a ≡ u¯+ ga+ log(cus,a) + v(lus,a)− 1
2
· σ2us, (2.B.6)
where u¯ is a constant, σ is the variance of log-transformed consumption and g
is consumption growth. Remember that the notion of consumption inequality
has been introduced by making use of the concept of risk aversion implied by
the concavity of utility in consumption. As noted by Atkinson (1970), this
concavity assumption is equivalent to assuming that a person is risk averse,
which results in a negative contribution of inequality to individual welfare
in the model. Then, if consumption follows a logarithmic distribution and it
is independent of age and mortality with mean ci and variance σ
2
i . If this
applies, then expected consumption is: E[log C] = log c − σ2/2. In other
words, behind the veil of ignorance the individual is inequality-averse and
therefore rising inequality lowers his expected consumption. Contrary to the
form used in the text, Equation 2.B.5 and 2.B.6 do not imply that leisure








Assuming that g = 0 (for the sake of easing notation and making this
section comparable to the text) and consumption is constant throughout life,





























Note that in both cases the contribution of leisure to welfare is adjusted
for its distribution across ages, for country-specific participation rates and for
the percentage of the labor force employed outside agriculture since the data









where µ is the factor adjusting for participation rates and the sectoral
structure of the labor force. For individuals younger than 15 and older than
64 this factor is zero to reflect that they are not affected by changes in working
time.
The compensating variation differs with the equivalent variation in one
important aspect: the first term is multiplied by the utility flow of the United
States, instead of country i. As a result, the equivalent variation gives lower
weight to differences in survival rates for low-income countries since these are
usually weighted by lower annual utility flows. In the case of the compensating
variation, the opposite is true because health differences are weighted by
typically-higher American utility levels. To avoid arbitrarily choosing either
of them I take the geometric average between the two.
Why do the consumption-equivalent measure and income per capita dif-
fer? This methodology provides a clear answer to this question since both are


















where y¯i is the ratio of income per capita in country i to the United States.
With this transformation, the logarithmic ratio of welfare differences mea-
sured with the consumption-equivalent measure and income per capita can
be decomposed into four elements: differences due to consumption, health,
leisure and inequality.34
To make comparisons over time, we can repeat the previous exercise but
instead of looking at two countries, we consider a country in two different
points in time. For example, if we want to calculate British welfare growth
during the period 1913-1950, we just have to replace the United States and
country i in Equation 2.B.8 for the United Kingdom in 1950 and 1913 re-
spectively. In this way, we would calculate the factor by which the annual
consumption of a British citizen in 1950 would have to be adjusted so that
she is as well off as her counterpart in 1913. Note that, as for cross-country
comparisons, the same issue between the equivalent and the compensating
variation arises. In this case, whereas the former weights health differences
by utility flows in 1913, the latter does it by taking utility flows in 1950. Once




t1 − t0 log λi, (2.B.12)
where t1 and t0 are the end and starting year of the analyzed time period
and log λi is
√
log λevi · log λcvi . Also, we can directly compare countries per-
formance using the consumption-equivalent measure and income per capita
terms as before:
34If we look at the consumption component, this formulation implies that part of the
difference between income per capita and the consumption-equivalent measure is due to
differences in consumption over GDP. In this study, I interpret this term in a different way
as in Jones and Klenow (2016) by expressing both income and consumption relative to the
United States. In this way, log cus
yus
is zero by definition and log ci
yi
becomes the percentage
difference between relative material well-being as measured with consumption and income.
Note that the only effect this transformation has on the results is of qualitative nature in


















where ∆yi is the percentage annual increase in income per capita during
the analyzed period. As before, with this formula we can look at the factors
accounting for the differences in well-being growth as calculated with the
welfare indicator and income per capita (i.e. mortality, differences in con-
sumption and income growth, leisure and inequality).
Model calibration
Before calculating welfare across countries and time using Equation 2.B.8
and 2.B.9, we need to choose a functional form to calculate the value indi-
viduals put in leisure and calibrate the model according to the preferences of
American individuals. Using a utility function separable in consumption and
hours worked, a form is used that, keeping the marginal utility of consump-
tion constant, implies a constant Frisch elasticity of labor supply, namely
v(l) = − θ1+(1 − l)
1+
 . This elasticity () measures how hours worked re-
spond to wage changes abstracting from consumption. In this paper, I follow
Jones and Klenow (2016) that, after surveying the literature, choose a uni-
tary value. Given that the decision on supplying labor depends on the wage
of individuals, the calibration of θ (i.e. disutility from working) is carried out
by solving θ = w(1− t)(1− l)−1 /c where t is the marginal tax rate. For the
marginal tax rate, I used a value of 0.2 that was obtained by using informa-
tion on marginal tax rates in 1950 from the database of individual income tax
rates from the Tax Foundation.35 Given that leisure in 1950 in the United
Sates is 0.6562 and the w/c ratio is 1.56 (I obtained this ratio using income
and consumption data for 1950 from PWT), θ in my setting is 7.58.
The next parameter to be calibrated is u¯. As for leisure, I do not take the
value reported by Jones and Klenow (2016) since they calibrate their model
35Their database is available online at: http://taxfoundation.org/article/us-federal-
individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets To
look for the appropriate income bracket I used income per capita (in nominal terms) in
1950 using data on total GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and population from
PWT 9.0.
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with data referring to the 2000s. To assign a value to this parameter, I use
evidence from the literature on the money-risk trade-offs that is consistent
with other studies, such as Murphy and Topel (2006), that imply a VSL of
$6 million (in 2007 prices). Then, since ample evidence points that the value
individuals put into health has been increasing over time proportionally more
than income, I apply the income elasticity of the VSL suggested by Costa
and Kahn (2004). The last step in calibrating u¯ is choosing a value for this
constant so that a 40-year old in 1950 with the welfare function specified
earlier (that is with consumption and leisure uncertainty) equals a value of
remaining life of $0.57 million (in 1990 prices).
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2.C Data construction
To replicate the results of this article, in this section I provide country-level
data for income, household consumption, Gini coefficients, life expectancy
and working time.
As common in the literature, the periods for which I report levels and
growth rates of income (Table 2.C.1) and household consumption (Table
2.C.2) are: 1913, 1929 and 1950. Also, to provide a check on the 1950 calcu-
lations, information is also presented for 1960. To make these figures more
robust to annual fluctuations I constructed these benchmarks taking averages.
For 1913, I considered the time span 1911-1913; for 1929 I took an average
for the period 1927-1929; for 1950 and 1960 I used the periods 1948-1952 and
1958-1962. These averages were also calculated for age-specific mortality (ex-
cept for Germany due to the lack of data). Data on income and consumption
were taken from Bolt and van Zanden (2014) and Barro and Ursu´a (2008)
respectively.36
For working time, in Table 2.C.4 I present the raw data from Huberman
and Minns (2007) as well as annual working hours adjusted for participation
rates and the share of the labor force working outside agriculture.
For the Gini coefficients in Table 2.C.5, I used a variety of sources. In
the following, ZBFL refers to van Zanden et al. (2014),37 ATG refers to the
‘All Ginis Database’ by Branko Milanovic,38 and WIID refers to the ‘World
Income Inequality Database’ by WIID (2017).39 The sources by country are:40
• United States: Lindert and Williamson (2016). Data for 1913 was
36The dataset for income is available at: https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/
maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2013. For consumption:
https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/barro-ursua-macroeconomic-data.
37Whenever I take data from this source for the earliest benchmark of the period, strictly
speaking the data point refers to 1910 (not to 1913). The database can be downloaded at:
https://www.clio-infra.eu/Indicators/IncomeInequality.html.




39The version used for this article is 3.4 and it can be downloaded at:
https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database.
40The Ginis I retrieved from the literature mostly mostly refer to individual pre-tax
income, although the precise definition and methodology employed differ in the literature
due to lack of consistent data for long periods of time. Although this may present some
limitations for cross-sectional comparisons, the literature has found value in putting these
data in comparative perspective (Milanovic, Lindert, & Williamson, 2011; van Zanden et
al., 2014).
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obtained by linearly interpolating between 1870 and 1929.
• United Kingdom: Lindert and Williamson (2016). For 1929 I use
their value in 1938 and for the next benchmarks the closest year.
• Germany: Go´mez-Leo´n and de Jong (2017) report yearly Ginis for the
period 1900-1950. For 1913, the inequality figures are larger than those
of Milanovic (2016). For 1950, the Gini is in the range of the figures in
the WIID. For 1960, I use the value for 1963 from Milanovic (2016).
• Spain: Prados de la Escosura (2008, 298) reports Ginis from 1850 to
2000 (data kindly provided by the author).
• Italy: Brandolini and Vecchi (2011, 35) report Ginis from 1861 to 2008.
The values for 1913, 1929 and 1950 refer to 1911, 1931 and 1948 re-
spectively.
• Netherlands: For 1914, Milanovic (2016) reports a Gini of 50, which
is very close to the value reported in ZBFL for 1910 (47.1). Given that
the former has no further data points until 1962, I also use ZBFL for
1929 and 1950 (the Gini for 1950 is lower than that in WIID). For
1960, I use the value for 1962 from Milanovic (2016), which is almost
the same as the one in ZBFL.
• Sweden: The only source that covers the analyzed period is ZBFL
since the earliest Gini in WIID is for 1935. Thus, I use the former
until 1950. Comparing ZBFL and WIID for the interwar period and
1950 we can see that the two seem to be in line since the Gini from
ZBFL for 1929 is very close to the one in WIID for 1935 (50.7 and 52
respectively). Similarly, in 1950 the Ginis are around the same level in
both sources (40.5 and 44). A further reason to use the data from ZBFL
is that the large fall in inequality indicated by the Gini coefficients in
this source is consistent with evidence from the evolution of the share
of the top percentile in total income by Piketty (2014, 317). Between
1913 and 1950, this measure fell from (roughly) 20 to 8 percent. While
this inequality measure is different from the Gini, Leigh (2007) shows
that there is a strong and significant relationship between top income
shares and Gini coefficients. For 1960, I use the value for 1963 from the
ATG dataset (this Gini is almost the same as the one in ZBFL.)
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• Denmark: As for Sweden, the earliest Ginis in WIID are for 1939,
which range between 45 and 50. The Gini from ZBFL for 1929 is close
to the lower-end of that range, although it is slightly lower: 43.3. Given
that the Ginis for 1950 in both databases are of the same order of
magnitude (39 and 35.7 for WIID and ZBFL respectively), I use the
figures from ZBFL throughout the period. As in the Swedish case, the
Gini decline between 1913 and 1950 from 41.1 to 35.7 is also supported
by evidence from the share of the top percentile in total income from
Piketty (2014, 318). For 1960, I use the value for 1963 from the ATG
dataset (this Gini is slightly higher than the one in ZBFL).
• Belgium: The data for Belgium are really scarce. The earliest Gini
from the WIID and ATG refers to 1969 and 1979 respectively, well
beyond my analyzed period. Thus, I will use ZBFL that is the only
source with Belgian covering the analyzed period.
• France: Similar to the Belgian case, the earliest data point by WIID
is for 1956. Thus, I will draw on ZBFL to cover the period 1913-1950.
For 1960, I will use the Gini for 1962 from ATG, which is very close to
that of ZBFL and an alternative estimate of the WIID.
• Switzerland: Data are considerably scarce for Switzerland as well.
WIID and ATG only start reporting Ginis from 1978 and 1982 onward.
Thus, I will use ZBFL for the whole period. Cross-checking the Gi-
nis from this source and those of Atkinson, Hasell, Morelli, and Roser
(2017) at the end of the period, we can see that these are very similar.
The sources for adjusting annual hours of work by participation rates and
the composition of employment are:
• United States: Carter et al. (2006).
• Sweden: Swedish Historical National accounts (Scho¨n & Krantz, 2015).
• Denmark: Johansen (1985) and S. A. Hansen (1984).
• United Kingdom: Feinstein (1972) and Thomas and Dimsdale (2017).
• Germany: Rahlf (2015).
• Netherlands: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2001) and Smits,
Horlings, and van Zanden (2000).
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• Belgium: Bairoch (1968).
• France: Lequin (1978) and Bairoch (1968).
• Switzerland: Swiss Historical National Accounts (Ritzmann-
Blickenstorfer, 1996).
• Spain: Prados de la Escosura (2017).
• Italy: Fua´ (1965).
For some countries, information on working age population was obtained
from the Human Mortality Database. Also, in some cases data for the unem-
ployed was not available.
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Table 2.C.1: Income per capita in Western Europe and the United States,
1913-1950
Level (US=100) Growth Rate (in %)
1913 1929 1950 1960 1913-1950 1913-1929 1929-1950
United States 100 100 100 100 1.7 1.6 1.7
Western Europe 67 62 49 62 0.8 1.1 0.5
Northern Europe 60 63 69 78 2.0 1.9 2.2
– Sweden 53 58 69 77 2.4 2.2 2.6
– Denmark 74 72 70 79 1.5 1.4 1.5
North-Western Europe 77 70 55 70 0.8 1.1 0.5
– United Kingdom 93 81 73 75 1.0 0.7 1.2
– Germany 68 60 39 67 0.2 0.8 -0.3
– Netherlands 76 84 61 71 1.1 2.2 0.2
– Belgium 81 75 56 62 0.7 1.2 0.3
– France 66 66 53 66 1.1 1.6 0.7
– Switzerland 137 124 96 110 0.7 1.0 0.5
Southern Europe 42 40 30 41 0.7 1.3 0.3
– Spain 39 40 24 29 0.3 1.7 -0.7
– Italy 43 40 33 49 1.0 1.1 0.9
Source: Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
Table 2.C.2: Household consumption per capita in Western Europe and the
United States, 1913-1960
Level (US=100) Growth Rate (in %)
1913 1929 1950 1960 1913-1950 1913-1929 1929-1950
United States 100 100 100 100 1.3 0.8 1.7
Western Europe 61 61 47 57 0.6 0.9 0.4
Northern Europe 65 73 75 78 1.7 1.5 1.8
– Sweden 57 65 72 77 1.9 1.6 2.2
– Denmark 79 86 80 81 1.3 1.3 1.3
North-Western Europe 67 66 51 62 0.6 0.7 0.4
– United Kingdom 93 91 76 79 0.8 0.7 0.8
– Germany 50 47 32 52 0.1 0.5 -0.2
– Netherlands 63 61 52 56 0.8 0.6 1.0
– Belgium 85 82 60 60 0.4 0.6 0.2
– France 62 63 48 56 0.6 1.0 0.3
– Switzerland 94 100 86 88 1.1 1.3 0.9
Southern Europe 41 46 32 41 0.6 1.5 -0.1
– Spain 42 50 28 36 0.2 2.0 -1.2
– Italy 41 43 34 43 1.8 1.2 0.5
Source: Barro and Ursu´a (2008).
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Table 2.C.3: Life expectancy at birth in Western Europe and the United
States 1913-1950
1913 1929 1950 1960
United States 54 59 68 70
Western Europe 50 57 66 70
Northern Europe 58 62 71 73
– Sweden 58 62 71 73
– Denmark 58 62 70 72
North-Western Europe 51 58 67 70
– United Kingdom 53 59 69 71
– Germany 49 59 67 70
– Netherlands 56 63 71 73
– Belgium 51 57 66 70
– France 50 55 66 70
– Switzerland 53 60 68 71
Southern Europe 45 51 64 69
– Spain 42 49 62 69
– Italy 47 52 65 69
Source: for most of the countries in the sample, the main
source is the Human Mortality Database (HMD) that
provides annual life tables with the exception of Germany,
the United States and the United Kingdom, for which the
series only start in 1956, 1933 and 1922 respectively. To fill
these gaps, data prior to 1923 for the United Kingdom refers
to England and Wales. In the case of the United States and
Germany, I used the Human Life-Table Database (HLTD).
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Table 2.C.4: Country-specific annual hours of work in Western Europe and
the United States, 1913-1950
Annual working time Adjusted working time
1913 1929 1950 1960 1913 1929 1950 1960
United States 2900 2316 2008 2033 1152 957 963 1036
Western Europe 2783 2200 2140 2075 1277 1044 1080 1126
Northern Europe 2740 2206 2032 1912 1096 975 1086 1107
– Sweden 2745 2152 2009 1902 974 888 1061 1087
– Denmark 2731 2301 2071 1929 1326 1135 1127 1140
North-Western Europe 2769 2192 2209 2106 1408 1163 1256 1261
– United Kingdom 2656 2257 2112 2134 1546 1324 1358 1466
– Germany 2723 2128 2372 2144 1309 1126 1342 1252
– Netherlands 2942 2233 2156 2002 1305 952 1089 1047
– Belgium 2841 2229 2404 2289 1469 1167 1183 1227
– France 2933 2198 2045 2025 1388 1076 1053 1115
– Switzerland 2704 2281 2092 1952 1524 1248 1200 1213
Southern Europe 2829 2222 1989 2023 908 727 682 809
– Spain 2601 2342 2052 2042 651 705 604 726
– Italy 2953 2153 1951 2012 1062 737 725 859
Source: Huberman and Minns (2007); for the adjusted annual working time see above.
Table 2.C.5: Country-specific Gini coefficients in Western Europe and the
United States, 1913-1950
1913 1929 1950 1960
United States 50 49 40 39
Western Europe 47 44 43 37
Northern Europe 52 48 39 38
– Sweden 57 51 41 39
– Denmark 41 43 36 37
North-Western Europe 47 43 43 36
– United Kingdom 49 42 36 33
– Germany 41 31 41 28
– Netherlands 47 42 36 42
– Belgium 50 52 38 47
– France 55 62 58 49
– Switzerland 38 39 41 40
Southern Europe 47 45 43 38
– Spain 49 46 45 35
– Italy 46 45 42 39
Source: see the beginning of the appendix.
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2.D Robustness tests
Table 2.D.1 presents a number of alternative analyses that are aimed at
testing the robustness of the main findings of this paper (see the first row) by
changing the different assumptions and parameters of the model. One of the
features of the benchmark results is that I assumed β=1 (i.e. no discounting
except for the inherent one because of mortality). If we set β at 0.98 or
0.96, the results are broadly the same. The only difference is that growth
rates decrease slightly because welfare gains are now discounted. If we allow
for consumption to follow a path as suggested by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2007), the results remain almost unaltered.
The second set of tests look at the health aspect of the model. As high-
lighted in the text, I adjusted a present-day VSL using the income elasticity
suggested by Costa and Kahn (2004), who use workers’ preferences over the
period 1940-1980. To test the impact of different VSLs, in Table 2.D.1 I repeat
the welfare calculations using the lower and upper bound range suggested by
Viscusi and Aldy (2003), namely 5.5 and 7.5 million dollars respectively. Intu-
itively, assuming a lower VSL reduces welfare growth, although the downward
effect is negligible. Using the upper-bound value, increases them slightly. It is
worth highlighting that in both cases relative levels remain almost the same.
The third set of analyses tests changes in the main parameter that affects
the relative importance of leisure: the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Using
the range discussed in Jones and Klenow (2016), I use two alternative set of
estimates using a value of two and 0.6 (remember that for the benchmark
results I used a unitary value). Choosing the former gives less relative im-
portance to non-working time and as a result growth rates decline by less
than one percent across regions. Conversely, using a Frisch Elasticity of 0.6
slightly increases the growth rates by, at most, 0.3 percentage points. The
level differences remain unaltered to changes in this parameter.
Another aspect of the results that will be tested is the sensitivity of the
findings in terms of levels to changes in the age threshold for calculating wel-
fare levels. Similar to the counterfactual performed for the growth rate anal-
ysis, we can assume identical mortality rates across countries below a given
age threshold. In Table 2.D.1 I perform this exercise for two age thresholds:
ten and 20. The outcome of these exercises broadly confirms the evolution of
relative welfare exposed in the text. The main difference they exhibit with
the benchmark results is that relative welfare levels are more compressed be-
cause mortality rates are more homogeneous after the age of ten. However, the
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patterns described in the text are the same. If we look at welfare dispersion,
the coefficient of variations support the main conclusions that welfare spread
is much higher using the consumption-equivalent indicator than using the
HDI. Moreover, and most importantly, considering the counterfactual that
cross-country mortality did not differ below the age of ten or twenty does not
support the idea of convergence in welfare that the HDI calculations imply.
Instead, a slight rise in welfare dispersion across countries rejects the egali-
tarian view of welfare and implies that cross-country differences were large
and persistent throughout the analyzed period.
Next, I use the calibration parameters affecting health and leisure that
tend to lower the relative importance in the indicator and construct a set
of lower-bound results. More specifically, I assume a discount rate of two
percent, a VSL of 5.5 million and a Frisch elasticity of two. This calibra-
tion slightly revises the growth rates downwards by 0.5 percentage points on
average and has almost no effect on relative welfare levels. In Table 2.D.4 I
present the same exercise with country level data and, similarly, the down-
ward revision in the growth rates averages 0.5 percentage points.
Given that inequality is introduced in the model by assuming that the
risk-aversion parameter of a CRRA function is one (this coincides with func-
tional forms used for income in the HDI or the HIHD), I test whether the
exclusion of inequality, thus assuming it has not impact on people’s wellbe-
ing, has any effect on the benchmark results. As we can see, the impact on
both growth rates and levels is very low.
The last test of Table 2.D.1 consists of providing a check on the consump-
tion data from Barro and Ursu´a (2008) as well as the exclusion of government
spending by taking private and public consumption from the Penn World Ta-
ble (Feenstra et al., 2015). The results are very encouraging since levels of
welfare are virtually the same using a different source and including govern-
ment spending.
As I highlighted in the data section, the data from Bolt and van Zanden
(2014) have been subject to some criticism concerning its cross-sectional as-
pect. Even though I do not use income data in the welfare calculations, it is
interesting to compare my welfare levels with alternative sources of income
per capita. For this purpose, in Table 2.D.2 I compare the benchmark re-
sults for welfare and income (Columns I and II) with relative levels obtained
from Prados de la Escosura (2000) and Bolt et al. (2018) in Columns III and
IV respectively. As we can see, the three sources present some deviations,
although there is not a clear pattern. Interestingly, the downward revision
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of Switzerland is in line with the welfare levels exhibited by this country in
Column III and IV.
Finally, in Table 2.D.3 I look at the effect that changing labor supply
could have on welfare growth since this aspect is not taken into account in
the data by Huberman and Minns (2007). For this purpose, I used data on
hours of labor input by males in the United States from Owen (2001, 19)
and calculated the growth rate of living standards between 1913 and 1950
assuming no changes in labor supply throughout life as in the benchmark
calculations and the pattern presented by Owen (2001, 19). As we can see,
this factor has virtually no effect on the welfare calculations for the United
States since the contribution of leisure to welfare growth declines from 0.27























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.D.2: Relative levels of welfare and income using various datasets in
1913
Countries Welfare Income
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
United States 100 100 100 100
Northern Europe
– Sweden 57 53 67 60
– Denmark 104 74 68 69
North-Western Europe
– United Kingdom 88 93 85 79
– Germany 50 68 74 69
– Netherlands 68 76 67 68
– Belgium 74 81 74 84
– France 48 66 77 64
– Switzerland 108 137 73 69
Southern Europe
– Spain 34 39 51 55
– Italy 38 43 53 34
Note: values for Column I and II are taken from Table
2.4; for Colum III I used Prados de la Escosura (2000)
and for Column IV I used Bolt et al. (2018).
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Table 2.D.3: Growth in living standards in the United States taking into
account changes in labor supply throughout the life cycle
Welfare Income Diff. Health Cons. Leisure Inequality
Benchmark 3.14 1.67 1.47 1.06 -0.37 0.27 0.51
Age adjusted Leisure 3.13 1.67 1.46 1.07 -0.37 0.26 0.51
Table 2.D.4: Growth in living standards using the benchmark and the
lower-bound calibration
Countries Lower-bound growth rate Benchmark growth rate
United States 2.7 3.1
Western Europe 1.9 2.4
Northern Europe 3 3.3
– Sweden 3.4 3.8
– Denmark 2.3 2.7
North-Western Europe 1.8 2.3
– United Kingdom 2.4 2.8
– Germany 1.2 1.7
– Netherlands 2.3 2.8
– Belgium 2 2.4
– France 1.3 1.8
– Switzerland 1.9 2.4
Southern Europe 2.2 2.7
– Spain 1.9 2.6
– Italy 2.3 2.9
Note: the values for the first column have been obtained by assuming a discount rate of 2
percent, a VSL of 5.5$ million and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 2. For the second
column, see Table 2.7.
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2.E Comparison with other measures of well-being
This section is aimed at complementing the introduction with a more formal
exposition of the attempts by Crafts (1997) and Prados de la Escosura (2015)
to overcome some of the measurement issues of the HDI.
Beginning with the HDI, this indicator was developed in 1990 and since
then it has been published in the Human Development Report by the United
Nations Development Programme. This measure aggregates information at
the country level on life expectancy, educational attainment and income. To
make these elements comparable, they are linearly-transformed and put on
a common (0,1) scale as follows:
Ix =
x− xmin
xmax − xmin , (2.E.1)
where x is life expectancy (LE) or educational attainment (E), xmin is
their minimum observed value and xmax their maximum. From UNDP (2010)
onwards, educational attainment is measured considering mean and expected
years of schooling (previously literacy and gross enrolment rates were em-
ployed). For the dimension of income, gross national income (GNI) is log-
transformed and rescaled:
Iy =
lnY − lnY min
lnY max − lnY min , (2.E.2)
where Y is GNI per capita (GDP per capita was used previously). For each
variable, the maximum and minimum values are goalposts that determine the
upper and lower bounds of the sub-indices. Finally, once the three dimensions









Note that this aggregating procedure is different from the pre-2010 one
since it uses a geometric and not an arithmetic average. This change was
made in order to avoid a perfect substitutability between its components.
Prados de la Escosura (2015) argues that the variables used for measuring
health and educational attainment have asymptotic limits and that therefore
an identical increase (in absolute terms) in these variables is lower, the higher
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their starting level. If we compare life expectancy in countries at very different
stages of development, we can observe that mortality declines take place
in different parts of the age distribution. In poor countries, life expectancy
improvements come from mortality reductions among the youngest and in
rich countries among the oldest. Therefore, if a change of similar magnitude
is observed in life expectancy and this receives a larger weight in the less
developed the country, we are arbitrarily giving more weight to saving the
life of younger than older people. By linearly transforming these variables,
the author argues, cross-country differences become smaller which introduces
a spurious tendency for convergence. In order to correct for this, Prados de la
Escosura (2015) draws on Kakwani (1993) which uses a function that allows
for increases at higher starting levels to represent larger achievements than
at lower starting levels:
f(x, xmin, xmax) =
(xmax − xmin)1− − (xmax − x)1−
(xmax − xmin)1− , for 0 <  < 1,
(2.E.4)
where x, as before, is life expectancy or educational attainment; the func-
tion is a convex function of x. Similar to Equation 2.E.1, the index ranges
from 0 to 1 (if x = xmin and x = xmax respectively). Note that if  = 0 the
function becomes identical as the form used in the HDI. The formula used
in Prados de la Escosura (2015) to create the sub-indices for life expectancy
and educational attainment is obtained by considering that  = 1:
Ix,HIHD =
log(xmax − xmin)− log(xmax − x)
log(xmax − xmin) . (2.E.5)
For income per capita, Equation 2.E.2 is used. Since income does not
exhibit an asymptotic upper bound, relaxing the property of diminishing
returns would drive the development of the indicator.
While Prados de la Escosura (2015) tackles the problems associated with
the linear transformation of the non-income variables in the HDI and their
tendency towards convergence, it still does not deal with the weighting issue
because the HIHD gives the same importance to each dimension. To address
this type of concerns, Crafts (1997) used a utility-based indicator drawing on
Usher (1980). With this methodology, welfare gains from mortality changes











where Y ∗ is GDP adjusted for mortality, L is an age-structure weighted
average of discounted life expectancies and β is the elasticity of utility with
respect to consumption. To value changes in mortality (the second compo-
nent in the right-hand side of Equation 2.E.6), Crafts uses a value of five
percent for the discount rate and 0.25 for β. This calibration is consistent
with wage premia for working in urban environments with high mortality
levels (Williamson, 1984). Besides health, Crafts accounts for changes in non-
market work drawing on Beckerman (1980). By using average wage rates, a
positive (or negative) imputation is made for a reduction (or increase) in
working time. Contrary to the methodology used in my study, the indicator
applied in Crafts (1997) does not allow for cross-country comparisons.
Overall, the calculations by Crafts (1997) and those of Table 2.7 are
broadly in line. The main difference between the two is that the measurement
framework used in this article accounts for inequality. Also, the contribution
of health is slightly larger in Table 2.7 because Crafts makes a 25-percent
downward adjustment to his calculations in order to avoid double counting
because part of health improvements during this period might be due to
income growth, which are already accounted for by GDP per capita. In other
words, this adjustment is aimed at taking into account only those health
improvements that are exogenous to income. While this issue is a relevant
one in studies using any type of composite index, the lack of agreement in
the literature on this matter makes such an adjustment very difficult (and to
some extent arbitrary). For this reason, I do not adjust my estimates and I
interpret them as an upper-bound estimate of the contribution of health to
welfare.
The different implications of the utility-based measure used in this chapter
and the HDI are somewhat discouraging for the study of cross-sectional wel-
fare in history because indicators that aim at measuring human welfare show
very different patterns. However, it is worth highlighting that the previous
analysis was specifically concerned with relative levels and in other studies
the HDI is used with a different purpose: to rank countries. Therefore, an
interesting cross-check would be to study how the ranking performance of
both indicators compares. If both convey information on a number of crucial
aspects of human life, they should show similar results.
In Figure 2.E.1 I present the outcome of ranking countries in 1950 (one is
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Figure 2.E.1: Ranking of countries using the HDI and the
consumption-equivalent measure in 1950
the highest and 11 the lowest). If there was a perfect correlation between the
two of them, we would expect all points to lie along a 45-degree line because
the position of a certain country in terms of the consumption-equivalent met-
ric (horizontal axis) would be the same as with the HDI (vertical axis). It is
very remarkable that despite the large differences in terms of data, method-
ology and dimensions considered in these indices, the correlation between
the two is quite high. Both measures recognize that welfare is highest in the
United States and Denmark; and lowest in Southern Europe and some parts
of the industrial core such as Germany and France.

Chapter 3




Modern economic growth has put the world on a path of increasing material
well-being for more than two centuries. While this process has improved
the lives of millions in an unprecedented way, its unequal onset across time
and space has widened differences in economic performance between different
regions of the globe. As Pritchett (1997) famously put it: the 20th century
has witnessed the unfolding of ‘divergence, big time’.
To understand the drivers of this process, the literature has employed
accounting techniques that divide the proximate sources of economic growth
into factor accumulation (i.e. physical and human capital) and a residual, to-
tal factor productivity, that conveys information on the efficiency with which
inputs are combined. In a seminal study taking this approach, Klenow and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) concluded that the largest part of income differences
across countries are overwhelmingly accounted for by differences in TFP. This
finding has been supported by a number of subsequent studies that have per-
formed similar exercises for more recent benchmarks (Hall & Jones, 1999;
Easterly & Levine, 2001; Caselli, 2005; Jones, 2016). The view from the de-
velopment accounting literature seems to be clear and unanimous: the main
driver of income divergence is TFP and, therefore, in order to answer the
question why some countries are richer than others we need to understand
the determinants of productivity.
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The main contribution of this chapter is to assess the validity of this
claim from a time perspective by examining the importance of TFP for
cross-country variation in income levels during the 20th and 21st centuries,
the period of ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997). Providing such a long-
term perspective enhances our understanding of economic development for
(at least) two reasons. First, this approach offers a new viewpoint since devel-
opment accounting studies have traditionally focused on recent benchmarks.
This focus comes partially from the justification laid down by Hall and Jones
(1999, 85) who argue that current levels GDP per capita capture differences
in long-run economic performance better than growth rates because the latter
may be mostly transitory. However, while current levels of economic perfor-
mance do indeed capture historical growth differences, their analysis does not
convey information about the long-term drivers of those differences over time
because these may have not been constant over time as a significant amount
of evidence from growth accounting studies suggests (Crafts & O’Rourke,
2014). This long-term view is particularly relevant to inform theories of why
TFP differs1 with encompassing evidence across countries and time that goes
beyond the two main paths taken in the literature: using improved measures
of factor inputs and understanding resource misallocation (Jones, 2016, 46).2
Second, and most importantly, to fully understand the period of ‘divergence,
big time’ and account for its drivers, we also need to study the period be-
fore 1950 when a large part of the income divergence took place (Pritchett,
1997).3 From the late 19th century until the end of the Second World War
technological improvements stemming from the second industrial revolution
contributed significantly to productivity growth in developed countries, thus
shaping the world income distribution by mid-20th century (Madsen, 2010a).
The second contribution of this chapter is the development of a new
dataset on physical capital stocks containing annual data for 38 countries
1On the importance of theorizing about cross-country TFP differentials and a review
of the literature, see Prescott (1998) and Parente and Prescott (2005).
2On improving the measurement of input factors, see Caselli and Wilson (2004) on
accounting for the composition of investment in capital across countries; Weil (2007) and the
next chapter on considering health as an important element of human capital; Chen (2017)
on the role of intangible capital (i.e. brand equity, research and development, etcetera);
and Lagakos, Moll, Porzio, Qian, and Schoellman (2018) on the importance of considering
experience in a measure of human capital. On resource misallocation, see Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) for a study using Chinese and Indian micro data.
3Pritchett (1997) notes that the income ratio between the richest and the poorest
country rose from 8.7 to 38.5 during the period 1870-1960. Until 1990, this ratio increased
up to 45.2.
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since the 19th century. This provides the basic input to analyze the sources
of income differences for more than a century and a large number of countries
using development accounting techniques. The new dataset tackles two issues
from other databases in the literature such as Maddison (1994), Bergeaud et
al. (2016) or Madsen and Farhadi (2016). First, their country coverage is
rather limited and, in the case of the first two, biased towards high-income
countries. And second, they do not address the effect that changing relative
prices has on the composition of capital stocks. Since prices for buildings
have increased more than for machinery, using constant relative prices from
recent years results in an overestimation of historical capital stocks when the
share of machinery increases over time.
With the new capital data and development accounting techniques at
hand, I calculate the importance and the evolution of TFP for world income
inequality for six benchmark years since 1900. This analysis presents two
main findings. First, the percentage of income variance accounted for by dif-
ferences in TFP was much lower in the past than nowadays. According to my
estimates, whereas factor inputs account for around 30 percent of the income
variance in 2008, this figure was up to 65 percent in 1900. And second, the
rise of TFP has not been steady since most of it took place between 1929
and 1990. This periodization coincides with the wave of productivity growth
during the 1930s and 1940s, identified by Gordon (2000, 2016), that origi-
nated in the United States and then spread to Europe and Japan during the
post-war period (Bergeaud et al., 2016). According to Gordon (2016), this
productivity wave was driven by developments in four technology clusters:
electricity, the internal combustion engine together with highways and su-
permarkets, chemistry and entertainment, communication and information.
Another reason for the rise of TFP after 1950 has been the strong process of
capital deepening experienced by Asian economies (Young, 1995), which has
reduced the scope of capital input to account for income gaps.4 Interestingly,
since 1990 the relative importance of TFP has remained fairly large and con-
stant due to further convergence in factor inputs and a slowdown in TFP
divergence. This recent constant trend of TFP together with substantive ev-
idence on the modest productivity gains from the ICT revolution beyond the
United States may echo recent arguments about declining marginal returns
of new inventions or that further innovations are harder to achieve as they
require an increasing amount of research and development (Gordon, 2016;
4Hsieh (2002) does not concur with the view that capital accumulation was the main
driver of economic growth in Singapore.
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Bergeaud et al., 2016; N. Bloom et al., 2017).
These results are robust to using larger samples and different sources
for income and physical capital for the post-1950 period, assuming varying
output elasticities with respect to capital besides the widely-used ‘one third’
and employing different measures of TFP and capital intensity.
This chapter is related to three bodies of literature that have examined
the sources of the divergence in living standards during the last two centuries.
The first stream, that can be divided into two sub-groups, has scrutinized the
consensus in the development accounting literature that most of international
income differences come from differences in efficiency, and not capital accumu-
lation. The first group employs traditional accounting techniques and takes
a long-term perspective to analyze the drivers of income differences. Clark
and Feenstra (2003) consider 21 countries in 1910 and finds that, similar to
recent benchmarks, TFP is the main driver behind world income differences.5
Turner, Tamura, and Mulholland (2013) take a different approach and use
state-level data from the United States to compare the inter-state American
experience with that of a multi-country sample. Interestingly, the results in
both cases are similar in that factor inputs account for output growth, but
TFP variation accounts for differences across states.6 The second sub-group
of this literature has relaxed the Cobb-Douglas assumption of the production
function in different ways to account for between-country income inequality.
For instance, Caselli (2005) considers a constant elasticity of substitution
production structure and finds that departing from the usually-assumed pro-
duction function leads to radical changes in the results. Assuming plausible
elasticities from the literature, the share of income variance accounted for
by factor inputs can rise up to 60 percent. Jerzmanowsky (2007) takes a
different approach by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Besides con-
firming the sensibility of the consensus to changes in the production function,
he finds that inefficiency, measured as the distance of a country from its pro-
duction possibility frontier, is the main explanation for low incomes around
the world.7 Moreover, this study finds that the relative importance of TFP
5The TFP calculations by Clark and Feenstra (2003) do not employ capital stocks.
By assuming that the rates of return to capital are equalized across countries, capital per
worker depends on the efficiency of the economy and become a consequence of lower income
levels rather than a cause.
6Studies taking a similar long-term perspective for a large set of countries include Baier,
Dwyer, and Tamura (2006), Madsen (2010b) and Bergeaud et al. (2016) which have samples
of 13, 16 and 23 countries respectively that extend backwards beyond 1900.
7The DEA approach is motivated by Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and
Russell (2005) who infer world production frontiers to decompose economic growth (and
Chapter 3 79
is not constant over time since it has increased since 1960.8 This chapter
contributes to these branches of the literature by providing a new test on the
consensus using standard techniques to a much longer time span and set of
countries.
A second branch of the literature has emphasized the effects of culture
and institutions on economic performance. Concerning culture, mechanisms
related to intergenerational transmission of traits such as patience and risk
propensity within the household can make offspring more fit for success
(Doepke & Zilibotti, 2014). At a more aggregate level, there is substantive
evidence that religious beliefs such as protestantism have a positive effect
on human capital, working ethic, governance and therefore economic growth
(S. O. Becker et al., 2016). Mechanisms with a similar long-term impact have
also been brought to the forefront in the context of institutions. For instance,
Nunn (2008) finds a negative effect of African slave trade on current economic
outcomes. In the American continent, Dell (2010) looks at the effects of Mita
in Peru, an extensive forced mining labor system. She finds that its persis-
tent effects are associated nowadays with lower household consumption and
increases the prevalence of stunted children. Given that inefficiency is often
related to the role of institutions and culture due to barriers to adoption or
rent seeking (Parente & Prescott, 1994; Wolcott & Clark, 1999), this chapter
contributes to this literature by assessing the potential explanatory power of
slow-moving processes on the evolution of TFP over time.
A third branch of related literature has looked at one of the key compo-
nents of TFP: technological change. Comin and Mestieri (in press) look at the
process of technology diffusion since the 19th century and shows that the in-
tensity of use, and to a lower extent adoption lags, of technologies is crucial in
understanding income gaps in the 20th century. Another group of studies has
focused on the non-neutral nature of technological progress. This literature
not income levels) into changes in efficiency (distance to the frontier), technological change
(upward shifts in the frontier) and physical capital accumulation (movements along the
frontier). For the period 1965-1900, they find that the most important source of economic
growth and the divide between rich and poor countries has been capital deepening rather
than improvements in productivity. However, these findings have been recently revised by
Badunenko, Henderson, and Russell (2013) with a larger set of countries and years. The
new results imply that technological change and human capital accumulation have also had
a significant impact.
8Arezki and Cherif (2010) support the idea of rising TFP by conducting annual de-
velopment accounting analyses since 1970. According to its results, the share of income
variance attributed to physical and human capital accumulation has dropped from 50-40
percent in 1970 to 30-20 percent in 2000.
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argues that inventions in developed economies respond to their factor endow-
ments, which complicates their adoption in less developed economies where
endowments are substantially different (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1969; Kumar &
Russell, 2002; Allen, 2012; Badunenko et al., 2013). This chapter contributes
to this literature by looking at the process of technological development over
a long period of time and for a large number of countries through the lenses
of standard TFP.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I will outline the different
development accounting techniques applied in the literature. Second, I will
present a new dataset on historical physical capital stocks since the 19th
century. Third I will present the results and finally I will conclude.
3.2 Method
The question why some countries are richer than others can be approached
by gaining understanding on the reasons why some economies produce more
output per worker than others. In the literature, the annual production of
goods and services in a given economy is determined by inputs to production
(i.e. physical capital and labor) and the efficiency with which the inputs are
combined in the production process. Formally, this relationship has often
been analyzed by assuming that aggregate output can be approximated with





where i indexes countries, Yi is total output, Ki is physical capital, Hi is
quality-adjusted labor (Hi = Lihi, where Li is the number of workers and hi
is their average human capital in the form of education), α is the elasticity
of capital with respect to total output (or the share of physical capital in the
production process) and Ai is the productivity term.
9 Since we are interested
in analyzing the determinants of material prosperity, the focus of the analysis
should be put on output per unit of labor. Therefore, the previous equation






9From now on, I will refer to A as efficiency and total factor productivity interchange-
ably.
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where yi is output per worker and ki is capital per worker (K/L). This func-
tional form establishes that output per worker is a function of the amount of
physical and human capital per laborer as well as of the efficiency with which
such inputs are combined. Despite this form has been used in a number of
development accounting studies such as Caselli (2005) or Weil (2007), it has
often been criticized because it does not separate the contribution of total
factor productivity and capital deepening. To illustrate this potential issue
with an example, consider a country that adopts a technological improve-
ment. As a result of the rise in productivity, the amount of capital per unit
of labor will increase (holding the investment rate constant), and part of the
output growth will be attributed to capital accumulation. To separate these











The two differences with respect to Equation 3.2 are that the ratio of
capital to labor has been substituted by the ratio of capital to output, and
that TFP and human capital have larger exponents (1/1−α instead of 1 and
1 instead of 1− α). As Hsieh and Klenow (2010, 209) point out, these mag-
nitudes reflect their impact on output both directly and indirectly through
capital per worker. Using this form allows capital per worker to vary due to
changes in productivity, while keeping the capital-output ratio constant. Be-
sides this, Hall and Jones (1999, 88) add that since the capital-output ratio
of an economy along a balanced growth path is proportional to its investment
rate, differences in this ratio have a more natural interpretation.
On the other hand, we should not dismiss the previous formulation solely
on these grounds because Equation 3.3 also has some drawbacks. For instance,
Caselli (2005, 688) argues that a formulation using physical capital per worker
leads to a cleaner and more intuitive measure of productivity differences
across countries because TFP does not feed into his factor-only model. A
further issue with this formulation is the assumption that capital-output
ratios do not vary with the level of productivity, as the neoclassical growth
model predicts. Despite the evidence presented by Jones (2016) for the United
States, and contrary to one of the widely-cited Kaldor stylized facts (Kaldor,
1961), there are reasons to be skeptical about this assumption. In light of long-
term studies of capital formation for Spain or the Netherlands, capital-output
ratios are not stable over long periods of time (Prados de la Escosura & Roses,
2010; de Jong & van Ark, 1996). For these reasons, and given that this chapter
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does not aim at discussing which form would be preferable, I acknowledge the
usefulness (as well as the weaknesses) of the two approaches by using both in
my calculations. This integrative approach also has the advantage of testing
the sensitivity of the results to choosing different production functions.
An important parameter to be calibrated in the model, irrespective of the
production function we choose, is the contribution of physical capital and la-
bor to aggregate output (α). Drawing on Gollin (2002), and partly on another
of Kaldor’s stylized facts (Kaldor, 1961), a considerable number of develop-
ment accounting studies usually assume one third for α. However, this value
should not be accepted uncritically since they have recently been contested
in two ways. On one side, after improving Gollin’s work methodologically
and extending the sample coverage as well as the years analyzed, Feenstra
et al. (2015) find that the cross-country average capital share is 0.48. On the
other side, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) show that since the early 1980s
there has been a decline in the global labor share in production (thus imply-
ing a rise in the capital share). These findings have also been supported with
longer term evidence for the United States, Germany, France and the United
Kingdom by Piketty and Zucman (2014). Given that several seminal studies
in the literature have used a value of one third for α, I have also employed
this figure for my benchmark calculations to have comparable results. In the
robustness section, though, I test the sensitivity of the results to changes in
this parameter and show that, if anything, assuming a larger capital share
in the production process in the past reinforces the main conclusions of this
chapter.
To account for the contribution of education to aggregate output, I apply
the standard procedure by Hall and Jones (1999) with the following formula:
hi = e
Φi(s), (3.4)
where s is average years of schooling and Φi(s) is piecewise linear with dif-
ferent slopes. The motivation for choosing this function is twofold. First, the
idea that the relationship between wage and schooling is log-linear motivates
a log-linear relationship between h and s. And second, having different slopes
allows for taking into account that there are international differences in the
rates of returns to schooling across different development levels. For exam-
ple, the average return to schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa is 13.4 percent,
whereas for a world sample and the OECD the rates are 10.1 and 6.8 percent
respectively (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). For
my calculations, I will use these returns in the same way as Hall and Jones
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(1999) and Caselli (2005) by assuming a slope of 0.134 if years of schooling in
a given country are less or equal than four years; 0.1 if they are larger than
four and less or equal than eight; and 0.07 if they are larger than eight.
Using these rates of return to years of education to infer stocks of hu-
man capital over time is not without problems. As Goldin and Katz (2000)
point out, the distribution of earnings (and therefore the skills premium) in
a country are shaped by a ‘race’ between technology and education. The cre-
ation and adoption of new technologies influence skills demand and workers’
educational attainment affects its supply. Using data for the United States,
DeLong, Goldin, and Katz (2003) look at the net effect of these forces and
conclude that despite returns to college and high school in recent decades
are similar to those at the beginning of the 20th century, they have not been
constant over time. Until 1950, the rising demand for skills due to industrial
shifts in employment and technology was outpaced by their supply. In the
second half of the 20th century (and especially in the 1980s), the demand has
outpaced supply and the rates of return to education have increased. While
taking into account the evolution of these returns are key for measuring the
stock of human capital of an economy over time, the detailed data for the
United States are not available for all countries in my sample.
Once data for yi, ki and hi have been obtained, we can draw on Equation
3.3 (or its equivalent using capital per worker) to decompose cross-country
differences in income due to differences in factor inputs or TFP.10 Following
Caselli (2005), see Equation 3.2, consider that yKH = k
αh1−α, where y, k
and h refer to income, physical and human capital per worker respectively.
Then, y = AyKH and its can be decomposed as follows:
var[log(y)] = var[log(yKH)] + var[log(A)] + 2cov[log(A), log(yKH)]. (3.5)
From this equation, we can derive two different indicators that mea-
sure the percentage of income variance accounted for by differences in fac-
tors inputs or productivity. The first is the measure used by Caselli (2005)
which answers the question: if all countries had the same level of TFP (i.e.
var[log(A)] = cov[log(A), log(yKH)] = 0), what would the sample dispersion
of income be?11 Intuitively, the larger the variance of income accounted for
10Due to data availability, in my calculations I will use per capita instead of per worker
data.
11We can see now more clearly why Caselli preferred not to specify the production
function in terms of capital-output ratios. Given that the thought exercise he proposes
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by cross-country differences in physical and human capital, the less relative
importance will be attributed to differences in productivity. Formally, this
indicator can be calculated:
TFPC = 1− var[log(yKH)]
var[log(y)]
. (3.6)
The second measure of TFP I will use is inspired by Klenow and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) and it answers a slightly different question: when
we see 1% higher income, how much higher is our conditional expectation of
yKH? To construct it, we do not only take into account the variance of yKH ,
but also the (evenly split) covariance between TFP and factor inputs:
TFPK−RC = 1− var[log(y˜KH)] + cov[log(A), (y˜KH)]
var[log(y)]
, (3.7)




1−αh. This indicator differs with TFPC in that it uses
capital-output ratios instead of capital per worker in the production func-
tion. Furthermore, TFPK−RC takes into account the indirect channel through
which physical and human capital can account for cross-country income dis-
persion by including the covariance term between factor inputs and TFP.
3.3 Data
Analyzing the determinants of comparative economic development with the
methodology exposed in the previous section requires a large dataset covering
a significant part of the world income distribution. For recent years, Penn
World Table (PWT) or World Development Indicators (Feenstra et al., 2015;
World Bank, 2016) provide the necessary data. However, if we want to extend
our analyses further back than 1950, such comprehensive datasets are not
available for long-term periods, especially for physical capital.
An important effort in this direction was made by Goldsmith (1985) who
reconstructed national balance sheets reflecting the structure of tangible and
financial assets for 20 countries. Though informative for some purposes, these
data do not convey information on the annual development of capital stocks
because they refer to individual benchmarks that differ across countries. Also,





1−α h instead of
yKH = k
αh1−α is less clean. The reason is that a functional form using capital-output
ratios is not invariant to A because the level of TFP affects y.
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if a researcher is interested in cross-country comparisons, these data have lim-
itations since they are expressed in domestic currencies. Improving on these
two aspects, Maddison (1994) provided annual estimates of long-term capi-
tal stocks for six countries several years later. These data were constructed
in a common international currency based on purchasing power parities and
assuming common asset lives across countries. Baier et al. (2006) built on
Maddison’s approach and provided information on physical capital for 145
countries and 10-year intervals. For 23 countries, information on stocks went
back beyond 1900. Such a comprehensive dataset was built drawing on Brian
Mitchell’s work (e.g. Mitchell, 2003) and around a number of assumptions
that affect its country-specific accuracy.12 Allen (2012) relaxed some of the
assumptions by Baier et al. (2006) and calculated capital stocks since the 19th
century for 17 countries. However, despite these data was specifically created
for cross-country and long-term comparisons, they did not present annual
information. Instead, Madsen (2010b) and Bergeaud et al. (2016) would pro-
vide this information for 17 and 13 advanced countries, respectively. Recent
efforts in this direction have yielded a more complete dataset containing 31
countries (Madsen & Farhadi, 2016).
Despite the enormous progress in the last two decades on this front, ex-
isting datasets are problematic for the development accounting exercise per-
formed in this chapter. For this reason, I have developed a new one that
improves the work by earlier researchers on four aspects. First, except for
Madsen and Farhadi (2016), the available databases mostly focus on ad-
vanced economies. To analyze the source of the income divergence during
the 20th century I need a more complete coverage of the world income dis-
tribution. Second, I relax some of the assumptions affecting the accuracy of
the historical stocks to obtain long-term investment series by drawing on the
work of statistical agencies or scholars for each individual country (see Ap-
pendix 3.B). Third, when sufficient data are available, I take into account
the change in relative prices between structures and machinery and equip-
ment. Since prices for buildings have increased more than for machinery,
using constant relative prices from recent years results in an overestimation
of historical capital stocks. And fourth, as I will show below, the existing
datasets draw on a procedure for initiating the capital series assuming that
12To give an example, page A14 in the online Appendix of these data (downloaded at
http://jerrydwyer.com/pdf/dataapp.pdf on 17th January 2018) states that investment in
physical capital for Spain during the period 1900-1949 was calculated assuming an invest-
ment rate of 0.09, which corresponds to the average for Italy during the period 1861-1951.
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all economies were in their steady state during the late 19th century. This
results in very large estimates of capital stocks for developed countries.
In the following, I will present the basic methodology as well as its dif-
ficulties for creating such a dataset. Then, I will show the outcome of this
exercise and argue that it is sensible and useful for the purpose of this chap-
ter. In the last part of the section, I will briefly discuss the underlying data
I used for measuring the other factor input considered: human capital.
3.3.1 Towards a new dataset of physical capital
Physical capital is a key input into the production process and therefore its
measurement is critical to any field of economics that aims at explaining eco-
nomic growth.13 However, whereas a consensus among economists concerning
its relevance for economic growth is commonplace, the same cannot be said
about its precise definition or how it should be measured. For this reason,
and as highlighted by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993), any researcher with the
goal of measuring aggregate physical capital for a large number of countries
and a long period of time has to approach this task humbly, and must remind
the reader to view the results with a reasonable degree of skepticism.
Having this caveat in mind, I have constructed capital stocks that refer
to fixed produced assets used repeatedly in production processes such as
non-residential structures, machinery and equipment or software as defined
in the most recent version of the System of National Accounts (SNA08).
Besides these, I also included dwellings because historical disaggregated data
on structures are not available for many countries. To construct these stocks,
I have applied the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). The main idea of this
methodology is to consider the stock of capital in an economy as an inventory
that increases with investments in assets. These investments provide services
to their owners which decrease when they age at a certain depreciation rate.14
The basic PIM formula is the following:
Kt,a = (1− δa)Kt−1,a + It,a, (3.8)
where t and a index time and asset categories respectively (i.e. structures and
13Although I focus on the productive side of capital in this chapter (i.e. capital services
provided by stocks of machinery, equipment and other forms of capital in the production
process), it is worth highlighting that it has a dual nature because it also serves as a storage
of wealth (OECD, 2009).
14Even though the value of these investments decrease over time, their use in this frame-
work is perpetual because it never becomes zero.
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machinery and equipment),15 Kt,a is the net stock of a specific asset type,
δ is its depreciation rate and It,a represents additions to capital.
16 The first
step in the creation of the dataset was to obtain annual series of gross fixed
capital formation for 38 countries (see Appendix 3.B).17 To illustrate the
procedure I followed, consider the Spanish case. As for many other countries,
its Historical National Accounts have been reconstructed by other scholars.
With these data at hand, provided in the Spanish case by Prados de la
Escosura (2003), I could obtain series of capital investment in structures and
machinery and equipment as well as their price deflators since 1850. Then I
linked the resulting series with the investment and price data from PWT from
1950 onward. Since the levels of gross fixed capital formation by Prados de la
Escosura (2003) are lower than those in PWT as a result of continuous GDP
revisions that raise its level and that of its components, splicing the data in
the two sources requires an upward adjustment in the pre-1950 data. While
this is a widely-used procedure by statistical offices and scholars, it should
be noted that this type of adjustments is not without problems (Prados de
la Escosura, 2016).18 However, I decided to make this adjustment because
otherwise there would have been an artificial acceleration in the rate of capital
accumulation in the 1950s. With respect to the depreciation rate, I assumed
it follows a geometric pattern as recommended by OECD (2009) and applied
in previous research such as Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) or Feenstra et
al. (2015).19 Besides accounting for decreases in the productive capacity of
15Ideally, we would like to distinguish residential and non-residential structures within
structures as well as machinery and transport equipment (among others) within non-
structures. However, the lack of data for many countries or time periods made this task
very difficult and led me to simplify the reconstruction of capital stocks. Even though this
approach has limitations for productivity comparisons, my results are in line with studies
employing higher quality data (Caselli, 2005; Jones, 2016).
16Note that I assume for my benchmark calculations a constant depreciation rate over
time and across countries. Even though this is a usual practice in the literature, Prados de
la Escosura and Roses (2010) considered time-varying depreciation rates. In the robustness
tests section I show that the results are the same if different depreciation rates are used.
17The countries considered are: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, France, Canada, the
United States, Japan, India, Australia, Austria, Switzerland, New Zealand, Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru,
El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Indonesia.
18More specifically, Prados de la Escosura (2016) argues that in the case of fast-growing
economies, like Spain in the second half of the 20th century, the usual procedure of retropo-
lation tends to bias GDP levels upwards and, therefore, underestimate historical growth
rates.
19Following other studies, the depreciation rate used for structures and non-structures
are 0.02 and 0.15 respectively. Assuming a declining-balance rate of 0.91 and 1.62 for
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the capital stock with asset-specific depreciation rates, further adjustments
were performed if a substantial amount of the stock is destroyed due to, for
instance, armed conflicts (see Appendix 3.B).
Before proceeding further, another caveat is worth mentioning. Although
a large number of studies in the literature automatically rely on measures of
capital input in terms of stocks for productivity analyses, it should be noted
that, ideally, we would rather have a measure of capital services (i.e. the flow
of productive services used in the production process). The implications of
this distinction are very important for this type of studies because capital
goods with higher amortization rates such as machinery have a larger return
in production, and therefore will represent a larger share in total capital in-
put.20 In this study, I recognize the importance of this issue and the potential
biases it may introduce, but given the data limitations I will not tackle it.21






where i, a and t index countries, asset categories and time respectively, v¯a,i,t =
1
2(va,i,t−1 + va,i,t) and va,i,t = Pa,i,tKa,i,t/
∑
a Pa,i,tKa,i,t. In this form, the
growth rate of total capital at constant national prices is the sum of each
asset’s stock growth weighted by their two-period average share in the total
stock in current prices (2011 is set to one for the growth rates in Equation
3.9).23
structures and machinery and equipment respectively, their average asset lives are 45.5 and
11 years. See Fraumeni (1997) for more on capital depreciation.
20Prados de la Escosura and Roses (2010) show that whereas the share of dwellings in
the stock of capital in 1850 is around 70 percent, its share in a capital input index using
rental values amounts to 45 percent.
21To obtain a measure of the flow of capital services, I would need data on rental price
of capital by asset and weight the quantity of each asset by its share in the total returns to
capital. Taking this approach would give more relative importance to machinery and other
equipment in the capital stocks, which are assets that developed economies have in larger
proportions than less developed countries (see Figure 3.A.3). As a result, a larger share of
income differences would be accounted for factor accumulation, instead of TFP.
22In the following, I use the notation in Feenstra et al. (2015).
23The advantages of using a chained index are well known and understood. The evolution
of the price of structures relative to machinery and equipment has not been constant over
time. Actually, it has increased significantly because technological improvements have had
a greater effect on productivity in the manufacturing sector, hence lowering the price of its
output relative to that of the construction sector. Consequently, ignoring the evolution of
the relative price of capital assets tends to overestimate stocks in the past. To have a more
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In order to apply Equation 3.8, we first need an initial stock of capital to
accumulate subsequent investments. To initiate the series, there are several
ways among which the most prominently used in the literature are two. The
first is the approach by Harberger (1978) assuming that if an economy is in
its steady state, the growth rate of capital and output are the same. We can
represent this as follows:












The advantage of the ‘Steady State’ approach is that it requires little
information to estimate initial stocks of capital. However, this may be seen as
a disadvantage as well since short-term fluctuations in output and investment
can strongly influence the outcome of Equation 3.11. To tackle this issue,
Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) calculate a fitted value of initial investment by
regressing log-transformed investment against time using data for the period
1950-1973. However, even though this procedure represents an improvement
over taking the initial investment level of the series, it requires the strong
assumption that all economies are in their steady states. Instead, Feenstra
et al. (2015) favor an alternative approach that makes use of capital-output
ratios. This method consists of assuming a given capital-output ratio at the
beginning of the analyzed period to obtain a value for initial capital: K0 =
Y0 ∗ k, where K0, Y0 and k are initial capital, initial GDP and the assumed
capital-output ratio respectively. Feenstra et al. (2015) show that the steady-
state approach leads to more plausible capital-output ratios in transition
economies such as Czech Republic or Slovakia.
In this chapter, I favor the approach by Feenstra et al. (2015), although
implementing it in my context may be problematic for two reasons. First,
Feenstra et al. (2015) assume the same capital-output ratio for all countries,
which seems unsatisfactory given their large degree of variation. Second, given
that the time span covered by the data used in this chapter is much larger
and that the starting year of the series for different countries can differ by
more than a hundred years, questions arise about the year that should be
precise idea of the extent to which this issue can affect historical capital stocks, consider
the British case. In 1850, the stock of capital using a chained series is 25 percent lower than
a stock calculated in 2011 relatives prices.
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used as a reference for the capital-output ratio or whether this should differ
by country.
In this chapter, I tackle directly these questions and propose, to the best
of my knowledge, a new approach that improves on the procedure used
by Feenstra et al. (2015) drawing on two empirical regularities concerning
capital-output ratios.24 These can be observed in Figure 3.1 where I plot the
ratios of capital to output for the United States, Spain and Sweden since
the 19th century. But before discussing them, it is important to note that
these ratios have been calculated in current prices. In this way, they are not
affected by differences between the relative price of capital and the GDP
deflator. To see how these can influence capital-output ratios, consider the
following formula:








where t indexes time, PK,t and PGDP,t are the price deflators for capital
and GDP respectively; and Kt and GDPt are total capital stock and GDP
in current national prices. If the ratio
PGDP,t
PK,t
becomes larger than one over
time, then the price of capital relative to GDP has decreased with respect to a
certain base year. As a result, the capital-output ratio in constant prices will
be higher than in current prices. Conversely, if the relative price of capital
rises, then the price ratio will become smaller than one and the capital-
output ratio in constant prices will be lower than in current prices.25 This
explains why my capital-output ratios for the United States increase over
time, whereas those reported by Jones (2016, 12) do not.
Returning to the two empirical regularities concerning capital-output ra-
tios, the first is that they tend to follow an upward trend. This point, also
made by Piketty and Zucman (2014) can be clearly observed in Figure 3.1.
Since 1950, capital-output ratios in the United States, Spain and Sweden ex-
hibit a clear increase (although with temporary setbacks). If we consider the
24An empirically-driven procedure should not be dismissed for its lack of theoretical
foundation a priori. As Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993, 44) point out, there are many ap-
proaches for calculating capital stocks and theory does not help in assessing the one that
leads to the least error.
25A numeric example of this phenomenon is useful. Using data for the United States
from PWT, we can see that in 1950 Pk and PGDP are 0.09 and 0.13 respectively (the base
year is 2011). Hence their ratio (1.4) is above one, which means that the capital-output
ratio will be higher in constant than in current prices. This is indeed the case as the former
is 3.75 and the latter is 2.6 (Feenstra et al., 2015).
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full sample in PWT, we can identify 107 countries in 2011 with a ratio larger
than that of 1950 (Feenstra et al., 2015). This suggests that there seems to be
a positive relationship between the level of development of an economy and
its capital share over GDP. The second empirical regularity, already men-
tioned above, is that differences in capital-output ratios across countries can
be sizable and persistent. According to data from PWT, capital-output ratios
range roughly between one and six in 2011.
With these two points in mind, I obtain the initial stocks of structures
and machinery by proceeding in three steps. To help the explanation, in Fig-
ure 3.2 I graphically illustrate this procedure for the case of Sweden. The first
step merely consists of creating a capital and capital-output series assuming
that inventories at the beginning of the period, in 1800, were zero. Obviously,
this is not realistic since the Swedish economy must have been operating at
some level of physical capital at the beginning of the 19th century. How-
ever, the information at my disposal does not indicate what this level was.
In order to obtain a sensible estimate of the level of physical capital (and
capital-output ratio) in a later point in time, we can use the available data to
observe the additions to capital after 1800. As time passes, the unobserved
initial component will disappear due to depreciation and we will be left with
stocks that have been observed since 1800. In Figure 3.2, this series is called
‘true’ stocks because the capital-output ratios we observe in 1870, after the
unobserved initial component of capital has worn out, can be considered as
the ‘true’ ratios (or constructed using observed investment data).26
The second step of this procedure consists of creating a number of al-
ternative modified series assuming initial inventories are zero as before that
start at later points in time. To make sure most of the unobserved initial cap-
ital in 1800 has worn out, the ‘modified’ series start in 1870 (Modified 1 ). In
addition, I create two further series that arbitrarily start in 1920 (Modified
2 ) and 1950 (Modified 3 ). If we look at Figure 3.2, we can see how, intu-
itively, capital-output ratios rise rapidly in the three ‘modified’ series when
they are initialized, whereas in the ‘true’ series they do not. The reason for
this is that the part of investment aimed at replacing the existing stocks of
buildings and machinery in the ‘true’ stock series, say, during the late 19th
26Note that using the perpetual inventory method the accumulated stocks never disap-
pear, but they become infinitely small. Using the assumed depreciation rates in this chapter
of 2 and 15 percent for structures and machinery and equipment respectively, 73 (64) per-
cent of the initial capital has fully worn out after 70 (50) years. Given the small percentage
of capital left seven decades after starting the series, in the following I will consider ‘true’
stocks can be observed then.
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Figure 3.1: Capital-Output ratios in the United States, Spain and Sweden
(1950-2014)
Note: ratios calculated in current prices from PWT (Feenstra et al., 2015).
century are instead rapidly accumulated in the case of Modified 1 because
we assumed that inventories were zero in 1870. In other words, the level of
investment is too high for the unrealistically low levels of capital. Despite
this assumption, the stocks of this series soon become in line with the level
of gross investment and the level of capital-output ratios in the two series by
the early 20th century are practically the same.
The third and final step consists of looking for the capital-output ratio




rationale of this exercise is quite straightforward. Knowing that the economy
in 1870 is operating at the level of capital-output shown by the ‘true’ series,
I track the years (t) that take for Modified 1 to achieve the same level of
capital to output in 1870. To see how this procedure allows us estimating
capital-output ratios (and therefore capital levels) even though information
about their initial level is missing, consider Figure 3.2. In this figure, I have
drawn vertical lines in the 40th year after each ‘modified’ series starts to
show how the capital-output ratio in the intersection point coincides with
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Figure 3.2: Graphical illustration of the initiating procedure of capital
stocks for Sweden
Note: the ratios have been calculated in current prices. See Appendix 3.B for the
sources.
the ‘true’ ratios 40 years before.27 More specifically, the capital-output ratio
in 1920 (A”) in the series Modified 1 is the same as that of True stocks in
1870 (A’); and the ratio of Modified 2 in 1950 (B”) is the same as that of
True stocks in 1920 (B’). For the post-1950 period, this procedure seems to
yield a ratio that is slightly larger than the one observed in 1950 due to a
temporary hike in the early 1990s. Had I chosen a couple of years earlier, the
ratio would have been the same as in 1950.28
For the remaining set of countries, I apply this procedure to initialize
the capital series in the first year when the investment data for each one of
them start. In the robustness section, I show that the results are reinforced,
if the capital series are initialized using the standard approach of assuming
the economy is at the steady state.
After this long introduction to the physical capital database, I now pro-
27The use of a 40-year window in the Swedish example comes from looking at the per-
formance of this procedure considering different periods and countries (i.e. United States,
the United Kingdom and Spain).
28Similar to other methodologies, this issue should make us aware of using these proce-
dures automatically for a large cross-section of countries without looking into the specific
developments of each country. For my dataset, I have gone through each country’s experi-
ence to make sure the initial capital-output ratios are not affected by outliers.
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Figure 3.3: Capital-Output ratios over the long term in the United States,
Spain, Uruguay and Sweden
Note: the ratios have been calculated in current prices. See Appendix 3.B for the
sources.
ceed to demonstrate that the figures obtained are plausible and that, there-
fore, they can be used in the development accounting framework outlined
in the previous section. First, I will present the evolution of capital-output
figures to examine whether the same increasing trend can be observed as in
Figure 3.1. This comparison not only tests the underlying data and proce-
dures used for obtaining the capital figures, but also provides a check on the
nominal GDP estimates used to construct these ratios. Figure 3.3 unequivo-
cally shows that the upward trend of capital-output ratios observed in PWT
is a long term phenomenon. Comparing different countries we can see that
the evolution of these series can be very different. In the Uruguayan case, for
instance, an increasing trend in capital-output ratios only becomes clearly
visible after 1900.
A second test consists of checking whether the strong positive relationship
between income and capital we observe in recent times holds in my data (see
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Figure 3.A.1). For this purpose, I plot capital per person against GDP per
capita in Figure 3.4.29 Given the large number of sources and the choices
made to start the series for each country, the results are very encouraging
because they unequivocally confirm the pattern we observe for 2011 for which
sources of higher quality are available: there is a strong link between the level
of development and the amount of capital per person in an economy. Taking
into account that Figure 3.4 only points to correlation and not causation,
we can see that high income levels are typically accompanied by relatively
high levels of capital intensity. Interestingly, we can observe the same positive
relationship between capital intensity and GDP per capita if I use capital-
output ratios in Figure 3.5. Both in 1900 and 2011, the economies with the
highest levels of GDP per capita tend to have higher capital-output ratios.
These figures also highlight a potential limitation of the data I have used
to compute the capital stocks in this chapter for some countries, namely not
including livestock. In 1900, Argentina has a relatively low level of capital per
capita despite exhibiting an income level close to that of the United States.30
Figure 3.4: Capital and GDP per person in 1900 and 2011
Source: see Bolt and van Zanden (2014) for income; see Appendix 3.B for physical
capital.
29Note the comparison is not in per-worker terms because I do not have per-worker data
for the pre-1950 period.
30This issue could be solved, at least partially, solved in the future using national bal-
anced sheets for some selected benchmarks from Goldsmith (1985).
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Figure 3.5: Capital-output ratios in 1900 and 2011
Source: see Figure 3.4.
3.3.2 Human capital
The second factor input in Equation 3.1 is human capital in the form of educa-
tion.31 To measure it, I use data on years of education from Clio Infra (2017)
and Barro and Lee (2016). This measure may be somewhat simple since it
does not take into account quality differences in educative systems. With
sufficient data on teacher’s education, test scores or students per teacher one
could create measures that can better capture differences in human capital
across countries and time. Unfortunately, these quality adjustments are not
possible in this research because the required information is not available for
a large number countries back to 1900. Notwithstanding the theoretical and
empirical improvement such an adjustment would bring to my research, this
would probably not change the main conclusions of this chapter. As Caselli
(2005) shows for a cross-section of countries in 1996, accounting for the hu-
man capital of teachers, pupil-teacher ratios, spending, quality of schooling
and workers’ experience barely alters the results using just years of education.
31These data refer to years of education for the population over age 15.
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Figure 3.6: Years of education by region
Note: the averages are unweighted. The sources are Clio Infra (2017) and Barro and Lee
(2016).
In Figure 3.6 I provide a snapshot of the evolution of educational attain-
ment throughout the 20th century by region.32 The first point that stands
out is the remarkable increase in educational attainment across the board. If
an average worker had 3 years of education in 1900, in 2010 this figure had
more than tripled. In this process, some parts of the world have made more
progress than others, and at different times. For instance, the lead exhibited
by Germany in terms of primary school enrollment rates during the 19th
century gradually disappeared by the turn of the 20th century, when North
America and the European offshoots overtook the old continent (Lindert,
2004). As a result, educational attainment in 1900 was highest in this region
of the world. The leadership of this region was maintained during the first
decades of the 20th century as the secondary-school revolution set in. In this
respect, the case of the United States is remarkable since it increased the
32For more summary statistics, see Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A.
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high-school enrollment rate of 18-year olds from 9 to more than 50 percent
by 1940 (Goldin & Katz, 2009).
If we look at the European experience, we can conclude that it has been
similar to that of North America, although with a lag of several decades. In
the remaining regions, most of progress in education over the 20th century
has been achieved after 1950 (Easterlin, 2000). Actually, convergence forces
have been so strong that by 2010 not only have developing regions converged
to Western levels, but they also exhibit less within-region differences (see
the coefficients of variation by region in Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A). In
terms of tertiary education, though, there are still important gaps because
industrialized economies experienced a longer and more sustained progress
than the rest (Barro & Lee, 2015). At this point, it is important to highlight
that all the discussed developments on the basis of my relatively small sample
are in line with the world-sample evidence by Barro and Lee (2016). This is
very encouraging as it makes us confident that, in terms of education, my
sample has a good degree of representativity of the regions analyzed.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main results
Do factor inputs matter more for income variance nowadays than in the
past? Have the forces unleashed by technological improvements led to a rising
importance of TFP throughout the 20th century or only in recent times? To
tackle these questions, I present in Table 3.1 the TFP measures outlined in
the methodological section.
The first is TFPC which was calculated using Equation 3.6 for a sample
of 38 countries (see footnote 17 or the Appendix) and six benchmark years.
After obtaining the level of cross-country income dispersion for each year,33
I computed the variance of factor inputs in the first and second row of Panel
A.34 Interestingly, cross-country inequality in human and physical capital
have followed a very different trajectory than income. Contrary to GDP per
capita, the variance of factor inputs decreased during the first half of the
20th century and, after a temporal break in the 1950s and 1960s, it decreased
even further. This long-term decline is mainly driven by a strong process of
33In the robustness tests I use samples that have a more complete coverage of Asian and
African countries.
34For the international comparisons, I used constant PPPs with 2011 as the base year
for GDP and capital stocks from Feenstra et al. (2015).
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convergence of physical capital accumulation throughout the 20th century
(its variance falls from 0.34 in 1900 to 0.2 in 2008) and human capital after
1973.
Putting together these two indicators, we can obtain a measure of the
extent to which variance in income is accounted for by differences in factor
inputs or TFP. To illustrate the interpretation of the figures using the indica-
tor inspired by Caselli (2005), consider 1900 as an example. In that year, if all
countries had the same level of TFP, the income variance due to differences in
physical capital per worker and human capital would be 0.34. Given that the
observed variance of (logarithmic) per capita income in the sample is 0.52,
factor inputs using this measure account for 65 percent of between-country
inequality (0.34/0.52) and differences in TFP account for the remaining 35
percent. Since this figure for 2008 is 72 percent, the results suggest that the
accumulation of factors of production at the beginning of the 20th century
was much more important in explaining relative economic performance than
nowadays. Interestingly, these results contrast those by Clark and Feenstra
(2003) who find a much larger role for TFP in 1910.
The rise of TFP has not followed a steady trend. In Table 3.1 we can see
that up to 1929 the relative importance of the productivity term and factor
accumulation is roughly constant. Only after this year, we can observe a sharp
increase in TFP as the fraction of income variance attributed to it rises from
37 to 56 percent. This rise coincides with the wave of productivity growth
during the 1930s and 1940s in the United States identified by Gordon (2000,
2016) and driven by advances in electricity, internal combustion engine, high-
ways and supermarkets, chemistry and entertainment.35 This technological
wave has also been observed by Bergeaud et al. (2016) who find a peak in
1940 for the United States, and a sharp increase in TFP between 1940 and
1955 in Europe and Japan following its diffusion.
35Recent research by Bakker, Crafts, and Woltjer (2017) has challenged the idea that
these decades were the most progressive ones in terms of TFP, although their figures still
imply that the American economy witnessed fast TFP growth during these years. A further
mechanism that would drive a rise in TFP related to the second world war would be the
destruction of capital. If parts of physical capital less relevant for output production were
destroyed and not rebuilt by 1955, then TFP in European economies would increase relative
to the rest due to relatively high output levels and lower capital stocks. Note that the
benchmark in 1955 has been chosen to avoid the potential effects of capital destruction
during the second world war. Actually, according to my calculations no European country
had a smaller stock of capital in 1955 with respect to 1938. On the other hand, I do observe
that the average capital stock in the western part of my sample declined relative to the
rest.
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Table 3.1: Income variance accounted for differences in factor input
accumulation and TFP (1900-2008)
1900 1929 1955 1973 1990 2008
Panel A
- var [log(y)] 0.52 0.48 0.60 0.66 0.76 0.69
- var [log(yKH)] 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.20
- % variance explained by inputs 0.65 0.63 0.44 0.40 0.30 0.28
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.35 0.37 0.56 0.60 0.70 0.72
Panel B
- var [log(y)] 0.55 0.48 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.50
- var [log(y˜KH)] 0.37 0.30 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.06
- cov [log(A),log(y˜KH)] -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.09
- % variance explained by inputs 0.59 0.59 0.37 0.39 0.28 0.30
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.41 0.41 0.63 0.61 0.72 0.70
Note: see the text for the sources. TFPC and TFPK-RC were calculated as indicated in Equation
3.6 and 3.7 respectively. Note that the variance of income and factor inputs differ in Panel A and
B because the samples are slightly different due to data availability (see the Appendix).
The strong TFP rise during the second quarter of the 20th century slowed
down during the period of the golden age of European economic growth.
In these years, Europe experienced a strong process of factor accumulation
which was not paralleled in other parts of the world. Consequently, the ave-
rage stock of physical capital per capita in the western part of my sample
relative to the rest increased from a factor of 4.24 to 5 in 1955 and 1973
respectively. This was not due to post-war reconstruction since pre-war GDP
levels were restored shortly after the war. Besides capital accumulation, Eu-
ropean growth was also marked by a rapid assimilation of American tech-
nologies that were now more congruent with European conditions due to a
larger availability of natural resources and larger markets, the economic in-
tegration of European markets, high rates of investment and the shift from
protectionist to open policies towards trade (Crafts & O’Rourke, 2014).
From 1973 to 1990, I observe a new rise in the importance of TFP stem-
ming from a slowdown in capital accumulation and the long-lasting produc-
tivity benefits derived from the second industrial revolution. As noted by
Bergeaud et al. (2016), the productivity wave originating from the United
States in the second quarter of the 20th century substantially increased the
level of TFP in developed economies until the 1990s. Also, the gap in fac-
tor inputs in Asian countries declined considerably during these years. In
economies such as Singapore, South Korea or Taiwan, investment rates rose
from (roughly) 10 percent at mid-century to 30 percent during the 1970s
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and 1980s (Young, 1995). In Latin America, though, the growth rate of cap-
ital stock per capita during the 1973-1990 period was very similar (and even
smaller in some cases) than in the previous period.
Contrary to the rise of TFP after 1929, its relative importance in the
last part of the analyzed period has remained fairly constant, accounting
for 70 percent of world income variance. One explanation for this can be
found in the modest contribution of ICT to productivity growth in the de-
veloped world beyond the United States and the United Kingdom (Crafts &
O’Rourke, 2014). Also, it could be that previous technological improvements
were easier to achieve and further innovations are becoming harder to de-
velop as suggested by N. Bloom et al. (2017) and Gordon (2016). However,
one should be cautious with such an interpretation because the benefits of the
second industrial revolution were only fully exploited in Europe and Japan
with a considerable time lag(Bergeaud et al., 2016).
While these numbers are suggestive of an increasing role of TFP through-
out the 20th century, the functional form chosen by Caselli (2005) has been
criticized for it does not account for the part of capital accumulation in-
duced by productivity improvements that is, therefore, attributable to TFP
increases. To tackle this issue, in Panel B of Table 3.1 I present a set of results
using the functional form suggested by Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
that uses capital-output ratios instead of physical capital per capita (or per
worker).36 To obtain this measure, we need to calculate two elements: the
variance of factor inputs and the covariance between TFP and factor inputs
(second and third row of Panel B).37 The source of variation in the second
element is interesting in itself because it conveys information about the im-
36Note that due to data availability the sample now consists of 32 countries. These
are: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany,
Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, France, Canada, the United States, Japan, India, Australia,
Austria, Switzerland, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Note that both samples are
comparable, since I obtained the exact same results when I restricted the set of countries
to the 32 mentioned above.
37To perform this exercise using capital-output ratios in current prices and income data
in 2011 PPPs from PWT, we need to assume that the PPP ratio of GDP to capital is con-
stant over time. To show this more formally, consider a production function using capital-


















where yi and ki are income and physical capital per capita in current national prices,
PPPy,i and PPPk,i are PPP exchange rates for GDP and physical capital, and h is human
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portance of the interaction between factor inputs and TFP. For instance, if
human capital is highly correlated with A because new technologies are more
likely to be used in economies with high levels of human capital or where
institutions encourage human capital accumulation, this correlation would
be high and would indicate that policies that foster human capital accumu-
lation have potential to reduce income variance. Another interpretation of
this term may be interesting for the literature on appropriate technology. If
TFP is highest in countries at the technological frontier, a strong positive
correlation between factor inputs and this term would indicate that they are
complementary. For current benchmarks, this is precisely what Klenow and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) and Caselli (2005) find.
Beginning with the variance of physical and human capital, they exhibit
a long-term decline. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the degree to
which capital-output ratios vary is relatively similar to the variation in capital
per capita in the early part of the analyzed period, while it becomes much
lower by the end of the 20th century. The process of convergence in factor
accumulation seems to be stronger in terms of ratios of capital to output. If
we now consider the covariance between TFP and factor inputs, the results
imply that their positive (and strong) association is quite recent because their
covariance before the mid-20th century was close to zero, and even negative.
In other words, countries with high levels of physical and human capital do
not necessarily have the highest levels of TFP in the early 20th century.
While the increasing correlation between TFP and factor inputs shows an
unequivocal pattern, its interpretation and explanation must be made with
caution because these figures point to correlation and not causation. One
reason why this correlation may have increased is because of the skill-biased
nature of technological change. Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2013) find
that between 1940 and 2000 educational attainment is driven by technological
variables because of the increases in returns to schooling that it creates. At
the same time, Kumar and Russell (2002), Jerzmanowsky (2007) or Allen
(2012) argue that skill-biased technological change is more likely to benefit
and be adopted by relatively rich countries with high levels of human and
physical capital. Abstracting from causal explanations, the increasing positive
correlation suggests that factor endowments and the level of technology, as
capital. As we can see, the ratio
PPPgdp,i
PPPk,i
has to be constant so that capital-output ratios in
current prices can be used. In Figure 3.A.2 I show that this assumption does not introduce
a bias against countries in any level of development because the PPP ratio is roughly the
same across the whole income spectrum both in 1950 and 2011.
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measured with TFP, have increasingly become more complementary since
1900.
When we combine these two sources of income variation across countries
(Panel B, fourth row), we can see that TFPK-RC broadly supports the pre-
vious results both in terms of trends and levels. First, the share of income
variance attributed to factor accumulation in 1900 is much lower than in
2008. According to my calculations, variation in physical and human capital
accounts for 59 percent of income differences at the beginning of the 20th
century, whereas nowadays this figure is only 30 percent. Second, TFPK-RC
experiences a sharp increase during the second and fourth quarter of the 20th
century; and a temporal break between 1950 and 1973.
Before analyzing the implications of these results for the literature, it is
important to mention a number of caveats related to the exercises performed
above. First, the results may be affected to some extent by measurement
issues. For instance, there is evidence pointing to an increase in the reliance of
developed economies on intangible capital (Corrado, Hulten, & Sichel, 2009).
Therefore, if my measure of capital does not account for intangible capital,
I may be incorrectly attributing a share of income variance to TFP instead
of capital. This idea is precisely examined by Chen (2017) who finds that
intangible capital can account for 14 percent of income variation. Subtracting
this figure from my estimates in 2008 yields a relative importance of TFP of 58
percent, which is large enough to support my main results. Most importantly,
in order to think the results are entirely driven by this factor, one would have
to make the argument that this type of capital was of crucial importance in
the period where TFP rises the most, namely 1929-1973. However, this is
not likely since in a frontier economy such as the United States most of the
increase in intangible capital took place after 1973 (Corrado et al., 2009).
A second element to consider when interpreting my main findings con-
cerns the way human capital is measured. Weil (2007), and myself in the
next chapter, include health as an important dimension of human capital in
a development accounting framework. We find that health accounts for 11
percent of world income variance in recent years. As before, this figure is not
large enough to argue that my main results are totally driven by this mea-
surement issue. Moreover, in the next chapter I find that health accounts for
an increasingly smaller fraction of income variance after 1955, which is the
opposite trend of TFP in this sample. Another aspect of human capital that
is not taken into account here is workers’ experience. Lagakos et al. (2018)
argue that developed countries have steeper wage-experience profiles than
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less developed economies, which is not captured by traditional measures of
human capital. However, Caselli (2005) looked at this issue and found that
accounting for experience would not improve substantially the performance
of the factor-only model. A third element could be that TFP may be reflect-
ing variance in the efficiency of management practices. N. Bloom, Sadun, and
van Reenen (2016) show that including this element can account for about
30 percent of cross-country income variance. While this would not change
the main results, it would certainly change their interpretation by giving
more importance to management than to technology, if the current relative
importance of management has remained constant over time.38
The results of this chapter have several implications for the literature.
Beginning with development accounting studies, the trends depicted above
tell us that the complex nature of cross-country income inequality indicated
by the varying relative importance of factor accumulation and TFP cannot
be inferred from single-benchmark approaches. While significant, TFP was
not the most important source of income variance before 1950. Second, the
relative importance of TFP has increased over time and theories that look at
TFP differences should account for both time and cross-sectional variation.
Related to this, studies that emphasize the long-term and persistent effects
of institutions and culture on economic performance should not only account
for the fact that differences in income are large, but also for their sources (i.e.
factor accumulation or TFP) and that their relative importance may change
over time. And third, the rise of TFP together with the increasing correlation
between factor input endowments and TFP lends support to the idea of
appropriate technology and the need to consider the endogenous nature of
technological advances.
3.4.2 Robustness Tests
One of the consequences of the limited data availability on physical capital
back to 1900 is that the less developed parts of the world are not well rep-
resented in my sample. In terms of GDP per capita, the ratio of the 90th to
10th percentile in 2008 in my benchmark sample is 8.5, whereas in a world
sample this figure amounts 36. This great economic divergence has deep and
long-term economic roots, although it accelerated substantially in the second
38In a study of Indian cotton textiles during the early 20th century, Wolcott and Clark
(1999) show that national business managers did as well as foreign managers pointing that
other factors such as workers’ culture or workers’ effort levels were more important in
explaining Indian stagnation.
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half of the 20th century. Therefore, it stands to reason to test whether the
composition of my sample is not driving the results after 1950. For this pur-
pose, I will use two alternative sets of countries using data from PWT. Given
that I will use information on income and physical capital from this source as
well, this exercise also tests the sensitivity of the results to choosing different
datasets.
Table 3.2: Robustness tests (1): using alternative samples after 1950
1955 1973 1990 2008
Panel A: PWT71
var [log(y)] 0.76 0.92 1.24 1.35
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- var [log(yKH)] 0.30 0.39 0.39 0.32
- % variance explained by inputs 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.24
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.61 0.58 0.69 0.76
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- var [log(y˜KH)] 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.10
- cov [log(A),log(kh)] 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.20
- % variance explained by inputs 0.29 0.35 0.23 0.22
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.71 0.65 0.77 0.78
Panel B: PWT118
var [log(y)] n.d. 1.18 1.47 1.85
Model based on Caselli (2005)
var [log(yKH)] n.d. 0.45 0.47 0.45
- % variance explained by inputs n.d. 0.38 0.32 0.24
- % variance explained by TFPC n.d. 0.62 0.68 0.76
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- var [log(y˜KH)] n.d. 0.17 0.15 0.14
- cov [log(A),log(kh)] n.d. 0.18 0.21 0.28
- % variance explained by inputs n.d. 0.29 0.24 0.22
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC n.d. 0.71 0.76 0.78
Note: see footnote 39 and 40 for the sample composition. The data are taken from
PWT (Feenstra et al., 2015).
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The first sample is PWT71 which includes 71 countries and covers the
period 1955-2008 (the results are presented in Table 3.2, Panel A).39 The
first point to note is that the variance of income is higher than before and
increasing uninterruptedly over time. This is the obvious outcome of intro-
ducing countries with relatively low levels of GDP that lack of data for the
first half of the 20th century. The results of TFPC are broadly in line with
the previous findings because the percentage of between-country inequality
accounted for factor inputs decreases over time, giving way to a rise in TFP.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that after introducing 33 countries more in
the sample using PWT71, the percentage of variance attributable to physical
and human capital accumulation is roughly the same than with the bench-
mark sample. Looking at the results of TFPK-RC in this larger sample does
not alter any of the previous conclusions. The covariance between input fac-
tors and TFP is both positive and increasing over time, and the fraction of
income variance attributable to TFP rises over time.
As a further robustness test on the countries analyzed, in Panel B I repeat
the same exercise using a sample that includes 118 countries and covers the
period 1973-2008 (PWT118).40 Overall, the results using TFPC and TFPK-RC
confirm my previous findings. First, the relative importance of factor inputs
in accounting for income variance declines since 1973 in favour of TFP. Se-
cond, the covariance between capital accumulation and TFP increases over
time. And third, the levels calculated in the benchmark sample do not differ
substantially using PWT118.
Another source of concern with my main findings can be due to the success
measures employed since they can be sensitive to outliers. To check their
robustness, in Table 3.3 I present an alternative indicator that measures the
39The countries are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Ire-
land, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Malta, Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia, Nigeria, Nicaragua,
the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Paraguay, El Salvador, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Taiwan, Uganda,
Uruguay, the United States, Venezuela, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
40Besides the countries mentioned in footnote 39, PWT118 includes: Angola, Burundi,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Barbados, Botswana, Central African Republic,
Cote de Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Algeria, Fiji, Gabon, Guinea, Gambia, Haiti, Hungary,
Indonesia, Iraq, Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nepal, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Singapore, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Seychelles, Syria, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania and
Vietnam.
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percentage of the income ratio in the countries at the 90th and 10th percentile
due to factor accumulation and TFP. Beginning with Panel B, using either of
the production functions suggested in the literature to account for physical
capital accumulation supports the pattern of rising TFP with an eventual
slowdown in 1973. Also, these analyses seem to point to a slightly lower role
of TFP, although still predominant.
Next, I test the robustness of the results to changes in the contribution of
labor and capital to aggregate production. In Panel C, I consider the value
for α reported by Feenstra et al. (2015): 0.48. Assigning a larger weight to
the output elasticity of capital will give capital accumulation a larger rela-
tive importance, and this is precisely what the results show. Assuming that
capital and labor contribute equally to aggregate output implies that factor
inputs account for all income variance in the early part of the 20th century
using TFPC, probably suggesting that this capital share is too large. If we
consider TFPK-RC though, the results are in line with the benchmark calcu-
lations. Regardless of these level effects, the main finding that the fraction of
between-country income inequality is increasingly attributable to TFP holds
strongly. In Panel D, I perform a third test drawing on the evidence from
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) showing that the global labor share has
been decreasing since 1975. Despite assuming an increasing capital share after
1973 would go against the main findings because capital accumulation gains
more relative weight, the results of this alternative analysis further reinforce
previous findings.
In Panel E of Table 3.3 I present alternative analyses assuming that phys-
ical capital depreciates slower. Drawing on Prados de la Escosura and Roses
(2010), I assume buildings wear out after 62 years (this is the average of 70
and 54.7 for dwellings and other constructions respectively) and machinery
in 20 years. Given that Prados de la Escosura and Roses (2010) consider
changing asset lives, I took those in the middle of their analyzed period re-
ferring to 1920-1959 to simplify. The outcome of this exercise in Panel E
shows that with the modified capital depreciation patterns support the idea
of rising TFP. Finally, in Panel F I test whether initiating the capital series
using the steady-state approach leads to different results. With this alterna-
tive procedure, we can see that the benchmark results are further reinforced
since factor accumulation gains relative importance for 1900, specially using
TFPC. For subsequent benchmarks the results are unchanged. Therefore, the
rise of TFP is more pronounced in this alternative analysis.
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Table 3.3: Robustness tests (2): using alternative measures of success
1900 1929 1950 1973 1990 2008
Panel A: Benchmark results
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.65 0.63 0.44 0.40 0.30 0.28
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.35 0.37 0.56 0.60 0.70 0.72
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.59 0.59 0.37 0.39 0.28 0.30
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.41 0.41 0.63 0.61 0.72 0.70
Panel B: 90th/10th income ratio
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.75 0.79 0.45 0.55 0.40 0.38
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.25 0.21 0.55 0.45 0.60 0.62
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.74 0.87 0.40 0.52 0.37 0.35
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.26 0.13 0.60 0.48 0.63 0.65
Panel C: α=0.48
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 1 0.95 0.67 0.61 0.47 0.46
- % variance explained by TFPC 0 0.05 0.33 0.39 0.53 0.54
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.82 0.80 0.45 0.50 0.32 0.36
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.18 0.20 0.55 0.50 0.68 0.64
Panel D: increasing α
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.88 0.83 0.59 0.53 0.43 0.46
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.12 0.17 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.54
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.73 0.72 0.42 0.46 0.31 0.36
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.27 0.28 0.58 0.54 0.69 0.64
Panel E: lower capital depreciation
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.64 0.63 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.29
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.36 0.37 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.71
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.60 0.60 0.37 0.40 0.29 0.30
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.40 0.40 0.63 0.60 0.71 0.70
Panel F: steady-state assumption
Model based on Caselli (2005)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.89 0.65 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.28
- % variance explained by TFPC 0.11 0.35 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.72
Model based on
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997)
- % variance explained by factor inputs 0.63 0.60 0.38 0.39 0.28 0.30
- % variance explained by TFPK-RC 0.37 0.40 0.62 0.61 0.72 0.70
Note: see Table 3.1.
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3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have looked at the sources of the unprecedented divergence
in material living standards that took place during the 20th century. By
applying development accounting techniques, I divided the proximate sources
of world income inequality into factor accumulation and TFP. To perform this
long-term exercise, I developed a new dataset on physical capital for almost
40 countries containing yearly data on capital stocks for more than a century.
The chapter presents two main findings. First, the consensus in the de-
velopment accounting literature that TFP is the main source of income in-
equality across countries only applies to the post-1950. In the early part of
the 20th century, factor accumulation was more important than TFP in ac-
counting for variation in relative economic performance. As a result, we can
observe a rise in the relative importance of TFP. And second, the growing
importance of TFP has not been steady over time since most of it took place
between 1929 and 1990. This periodization coincides with the wave of pro-
ductivity growth experienced in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s
that later spread to Europe and several Asian countries. This productivity
wave was prompted by rapid innovation in electricity, transport, chemistry,
communication and information (Gordon, 2016).
The results of this chapter have several implications for the literature.
First, the traditional single-benchmark analyses performed in the develop-
ment accounting literature do not account for the changing relative impor-
tance of factor accumulation and TFP. This masks important information on
the sources of income inequality and provides one-sided evidence to inform
theories accounting for differences in TFP. Related to this, the emphasis of
the literature on long-term and persistent factors, such as culture or insti-
tutions, explaining efficiency differences should not only account for the fact
that differences in income are large, but also for their proximate sources (i.e.
factor accumulation or TFP) and that their relative importance may change
over time.
Further research could improve the exercise performed in this chapter in
two respects. First, a higher level of disaggregation could be used to calculate
physical capital stocks that to take into account asset-specific depreciation
rates within structures and non-structures. Second, different forms for the
production function could be explored to relax some of assumptions under-
lying the Cobb-Douglas form used in this chapter.
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3.A Supplementary material
Table 3.A.1: Summary statistics for years of education by region
1900 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
Asia Average 0.76 1.84 3.06 5.29 7.79 10.19
Std. Dev. 0.94 1.79 2.29 3.18 3.76 3.64
Max. 2.18 4.95 6.75 10.14 11.84 13.15
Min. 0.02 0.60 1.14 2.01 3.33 4.84
CoV 1.24 0.97 0.75 0.60 0.48 0.36
Europe Average 4.73 5.82 6.80 8.77 10.74 11.67
Std. Dev. 1.84 1.83 1.76 1.99 1.90 1.38
Max. 7.29 8.30 9.40 11.19 13.05 13.30
Min. 1.38 1.95 2.50 4.19 5.98 7.82
CoV 0.39 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.12
Latin America Average 1.34 2.25 3.11 4.47 6.52 7.85
Std. Dev. 0.50 0.95 1.31 1.32 1.24 1.29
Max. 2.23 3.89 5.40 6.82 8.96 10.36
Min. 0.48 1.27 1.60 2.58 4.83 5.79
CoV 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.19 0.16
North America Average 6.67 8.34 9.24 10.31 12.17 13.04
and Offshoots Std. Dev. 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.68 0.81 0.53
Max. 7.10 8.48 9.61 11.06 12.73 13.61
Min. 6.25 8.06 8.73 9.59 11.02 12.33
CoV 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04
Source: Clio Infra (2017) and Barro and Lee (2016).
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Figure 3.A.1: Capital and GDP per person in 2011
Source: Feenstra et al. (2015).
Figure 3.A.2: Ratio PPPgdp/PPPk and GDP per person in 1950 and 2011
Source: Feenstra et al. (2015).
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In this section I present the sources and procedures I have used to obtain long
time series of investment, prices and nominal GDP. Unless stated explicitly,
price deflators come from the same sources as gross fixed capital formation.
PWT refers to Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015).
The Netherlands
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1800-1912: Smits et al. (2000). To obtain price deflators by asset
type, I used data from the project in which the previous article is em-
bedded, namely ‘Reconstructing National Accounts of the Netherlands
and the analysis of the development of the Dutch Economy in the period
1800-1940 ’.
• Period 1913-1949: Groote, Albers, and de Jong (1996) provide data
in constant prices for the whole period. For the price deflators I used
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2001) that provides yearly price
movements of investment in fixed assets.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Nominal GDP
• Period 1807-1913: Smits et al. (2000).
• Period 1914-1949: Flora, Kraus, and Pfenning (1983).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1943-1945: 10 percent evenly spread over time according to
Madsen (2010a).
The United Kingdom
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1800-1919: Feinstein and Pollard (1988).
• Period 1920-1949: Feinstein (1972).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1800-1830: Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton, and van
Leeuwen (2015).
• Period 1831-1949: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017).
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• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1943-1945: 3.5 percent annually according to Madsen (2010a).
Sweden
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1800-1949: ‘Swedish Historical National Accounts 1560-2010 ’
(Krantz & Scho¨n, 2007; Scho¨n & Krantz, 2012, 2015).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1800-1949: ‘Swedish Historical National Accounts 1560-2010 ’.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Denmark
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1835-1949: S. A. Hansen (1984). Investment data for the period
1915-1920 are not available. To fill this gap, I used the movements in
nominal and real GDP to infer total investment figures. To disaggregate
by asset type I interpolated investment shares between 1914 and 1921.
For the period 1940-1946 I used the movement in nominal investment
between 1939 and 1947, and I calculated the share of each asset type in
total investment by interpolating between the observed shares in 1939
and 1947. S. A. Hansen (1984) does not report deflators by asset, so I
had to use a total investment deflator for the pre-1950 period.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1818-1949: S. A. Hansen (1984).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Finland
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1860-1949: Hjerppe (1989). As for Denmark, a total investment
deflator is used.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
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Nominal GDP
• Period 1860-1949: Hjerppe (1989).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Norway
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1830-1949: Grytten (2004). To obtain investment by asset in
nominal prices I took the shares reported in Statistik Sentralbyr˚a
(1968). These are reported only every 5 years, so I interpolated be-
tween benchmarks to obtain yearly investment shares for structures
and machinery and equipment separately. For the period 1830-1864,
these shares are missing so I took the trend of the period 1865-1905
to extrapolate backwards until 1830. Concerning price indices, I used
the total investment deflator provided by Grytten (2004) as I could not
find information by asset type. For the period 1940-1945, investment
and price data are interpolated.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1830-1949: Grytten (2004).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Spain
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1850-1949: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1850-1949: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
War damage
• Period 1936-1939: 7 percent evenly distributed over time according to
Prados de la Escosura and Roses (2010).
Germany
For the sake of transparency I would like to point out that to obtain a
long-term series of capital investment for Germany has proven to be more
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complicated than for other countries given the number of sources and as-
sumptions I had to take (see below). However, despite the difficulties and the
room for improvement that there may be, I did the best I could with the
information at my disposal to create a consistent series of physical capital
stocks.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1850-1900: Kirner (1965) has constant-price data on structures
but not for machinery, therefore I assume they follow the same trend.
To deflate the series I use the investment deflator from Hoffman, Grum-
bach, and Hesse (1965).
• Period 1901-1949: Ritschl and Spoerer (1997) provide investment data
and price deflators by asset type for the period 1925-1938. For the
period 1939-1949 I use Kirner (1965) in real prices and to infer the
movement of the investment deflators I use a GDP deflator from Rahlf
(2015). Spoerer (1997) provides constant-price total investment for the
period 1901-1932. Since data are not disaggregated by asset type, I
assumed growth in structures and machinery and equipment followed
that of total investment. To obtain nominal figures, I used the nominal
price data for 1913 and linked it to the deflator in Ritschl and Spoerer
(1997). To fill the missing years after 1913 (i.e. 1914-1924), I used,
as before, year-to-year changes in the GDP deflator. For the pre-1913
period, I used the investment deflator from Hoffman et al. (1965).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1850-1949: Mitchell (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1940-1945: 12 percent spread according to Bergeaud et al.
(2016).
Belgium
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1890-1899: I used the movements of residential housing and the
deflator in Buyst (1992) for constructions; for machinery and equipment
I used the movements in real GDP from Bolt and van Zanden (2014)
and the price index for machinery from van Meerten (2003).
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• Period 1900-1949: van Meerten (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1880-1949: Mitchell (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1914-1917: 15.5 percent evenly spread according to van Meerten
(2003).
• Period 1943-1945: 7.1 percent evenly spread according to van Meerten
(2003).
Portugal
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1910-1949: Batista, Martins, Pinheiro, and Reis (1997).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1910-1949: Batista et al. (1997).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Italy
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1861-1949: Baffigi (2011).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1861-1949: Baffigi (2011).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1944-1945: 1 percent annually according to Bergeaud et al.
(2016).
France
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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• Period 1820-1908: Le`vy-Levoyer (1978) gives 10-year-average data for
investment in current prices for structures and machinery and equip-
ment. I assumed these values referred to the year in the middle of the
period and then I interpolated between benchmarks to obtain a contin-
uous series from 1820 until 1909. To obtain constant-price data (since
price indices are not given), I took volume indices and converted them
into absolute numbers using the current-price data given in the text.
• Period 1909-1949: Carre´, Dubois, and Malinvaud (1975) provide
constant-price data in the form of indices. To obtain a price defla-
tor, I use the constant-price data for 1954 to back out the level in 2011
prices during the period 1909-1938. Prices are interpolated between the
periods 1913-1922 and 1938-1950.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1815-1949: Toutain (1987).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1914-1917: 2 percent annually according to Madsen and Farhadi
(2016).
• Period 1942-1945: 2 percent annually according to Madsen and Farhadi
(2016).
Austria
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1870-1912: Schulze (2008) provides capital stock data in constant
prices. Using the assumptions of his article, I converted the stocks into
flows. I obtained a price index for machinery from Schulze (1997). Since
I have no data for construction, I used the same deflator for both asset
types.
• Period 1913-1949: I draw on Mitchell (2003) that reports both aggre-
gated investment data in current and constant prices. To allocate total
investment by asset, I use the investment share of each asset in 1950.
Data are lacking for the period 1914-1923 and 1938-1947, so I assumed
real GFCF followed the movements of real GDP (prices were interpo-
lated linearly).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
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Nominal GDP
• Period 1913-1949: Mitchell (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Canada
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1870-1925: Urquart (1986) provides data in current prices for
total GFCF by sector. I rearranged these data by asset type by con-
sidering that private investment in manufacturing goes into machinery
and equipment; and that investment in railway and telegraph, other
business, housing construction, public schools and other government
expenses go into structures. To deflate this series, I used the only price
index I could find, namely an implicit price index for GNP in the same
source.
• Period 1926-1949: I obtained the data from the ‘Historical Statistics of
Canada’ at Statistics Canada.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1870-1949: Urquart (1986).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
United States
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1834-1909: Rhode (2002) provides current- and constant-price
data from 1869 to 1909. Before 1869, this source only provides data
in constant prices. To obtain a price deflator, I used the point current-
price estimates in Gallman (1966) since 1839 and to have a yearly series
until 1868 I interpolated between benchmarks. Due to the lack of data
for investment and prices during the period 1860-1868 I linearly inter-
polated between benchmarks. For 1834-1838, I used the constant-price
data in Rhode (2002) together with a price index built on the basis of
the growth rate of each asset’s deflator during the subsequent 40-year
period.
• Period 1910-1928: I link the series in real prices of the previous period
with that of Maddison (1994). To convert the series into current prices, I
applied the GDP deflator of the ‘GDP Millenial Edition Series’ (Carter
et al., 2006).
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• Period 1929-1949: I draw on the data provided by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1834-1839: Gallman (1966). From 1834 to 1838 I use the value
in 1839.
• Period 1840-1949: Carter et al. (2006).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Japan
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1885-1940: I draw on Ohkawa, Shinohara, and Meissner (1979).
• Period 1941-1949: I used the data from Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973).
Given the aggregation level (residential and non-residential) I had to
infer investment in structures and machinery by interpolating invest-
ment shares between 1940 and 1950. Then I applied a ‘dwelling’ price
deflator to structures and a ‘non-residential investment’ to machinery
and equipment.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1880-1940: Ohkawa, Shinohara, and Umemura (1974).
• Period 1841-1949: Mitchell (2007a).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
War damage
• Period 1945: 25.7 percent according to Maddison (1994).
India
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1850-1949: Roy (1996).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1879-1949: Dincecco and Prado (2013).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
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Australia
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1861-1949: Vamplew (1974). Before 1901, investment figures are
given by sector and not by asset type. To categorize them in structures
and non-structures I considered that capital formation in the residential
and public sector go to structures, whereas industry, commerce, min-
ing, shopping and pastoral and agricultural contribute to machinery
and equipment investment.41 For the period 1901-1949, the investment
figures are given for residential and non-residential investment, there-
fore I will assume that in this sub-period capital formation in structures
follows the trend of dwellings and that for machinery it follows the trend
of non-residential capital).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1861-1949: Dincecco and Prado (2013).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
New Zealand
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1871-1900: Dowie (1966) provides data at the sectoral level. I
assumed that investment by the government and private investment in
the commercial and mining sector contribute to non-residential struc-
tures. Investment in manufacturing, shipping, railways and agriculture
contribute to machinery and equipment.42 To deflate the series I used
a total investment price index.
• Period 1901-1937: Due to the lack of data for this period, I used the
movements of nominal GDP to infer aggregate investment during this
period. I test the plausibility of this assumption by comparing the in-
vestment series by Dowie (1966) with figures obtained from nominal
GDP movements for the earlier period. Except for the 1890s, the fit
between the two is very good.
• Period 1938-1949: I obtained current price investment figures in the
volumes 1946 and 1950 of the ‘New Zealand Official Yearbook ’ for 1938,
41If I consider that pastoral and agricultural investment contribute to structures, the
investment shares for this asset type seem to be persistently too high (around 90 percent)
throughout this period.
42The resulting investment shares in total structures are between 80 and 70 percent of
total investment.
122 The rise of TFP
1943 and 1946-1949 (missing years are interpolated). To disaggregate
investment by asset type since 1901 I interpolate investment shares
between 1900 and 1950 using Dowie (1966) and PWT.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1871-1949: Historical Statistics of New Zealand.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Switzerland
Similar to the case of Germany, finding consistent long-term series of
investment for Switzerland is a complicated task. Therefore, I recommend
the reader to look at these figures with a bit more scepticism than those for
other countries (as I do myself).
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1814-1949: I use the Historical Statistics of Switzerland
(Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, 1996). For the period 1814-1849, only data
for residential structures are provided. For non-residential structures
and machinery I assume they follow the same trend as dwellings (this
assumption has small implications since investment in dwellings com-
prises 80 percent or more of total investment). For the period 1850-1914,
investment by asset type is complete except for 1850 and 1851.43 To
deflate these series, I use an index of construction costs for structures
and one of retail prices of metal goods for machinery, the later only
until 1890. From that date onwards I use the total investment deflator,
which does not differ much from using the retail deflator. For the period
1915-1947, I used total investment and disaggregated it by interpolat-
ing investment shares between 1914 and 1948. Data for 1948 and 1949
are complete.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1851-1949: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (1996).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Indonesia
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
43This gap was filled by taking the annual growth of investment in machinery and
equipment during the subsequent 40-year period. In any case, the share of machinery in
total investment is so low that this assumption barely influences aggregate investment.
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• Period 1880-1959: van der Eng (2010) provides non-residential capital
stocks (not GFCF). To get these stocks, he applies perpetual inventory
method (PIM) ‘assuming the average productive life of all capital goods
to have been 26 years, which is the implicit weighted annual average
age of 27 items of non-residential capital goods in GFCS during the
1950s’ (pp. 297). On page 297, he says that ‘It is also assumed that
repairs and maintenance allowed successive vintages of a capital good
to deliver the same services and that scrapping took place only at the
end of the service life of a capital good. Hence, the first complete esti-
mate of capital stock was for 1906’. Also he does not mention that he
assumes geometric depreciation, so I will convert stocks into flows by
assuming linear depreciation with life assets of 26 years. The series are
unfortunately reported only in constant prices.
• Period 1960-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1880-1949: van der Eng (2010) only reports GDP in 2000 prices.
To obtain a series comparable to my stocks I converted it into 2011
prices. So this is not a nominal GDP series.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT
Korea
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1911-1952: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
• Period 1953-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1911-1952: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
• Period 1953-2014: PWT
Singapore
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1900-1959: Sugimoto (2011). For the period 1940-1949 I inter-
polate.
• Period 1960-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1900-1952: Sugimoto (2011).
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• Period 1953-2014: PWT
Taiwan
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
• Period 1896-1951: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
• Period 1952-2014: PWT.
Nominal GDP
• Period 1900-1952: Mitchell (2007a).
• Period 1953-2014: PWT
Latin America
The following Latin American countries are included in the database:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay and
Venezuela. Investment data since the 19th century for these countries has
been taken from Tafunell (2013). Given that this article is an important
source of the database I use, it is worth (briefly) explaining how Tafunell
was able to obtain capital investment disaggregated by structures and ma-
chinery and equipment for such a long time span and number of countries.
For structures, Tafunell (2013, 11) produces volume indices based on the im-
ports of products used in the construction sector: iron, steel and (since 1900)
cement.44 For machinery, Tafunell (2013, 10) also looks at trade statistics
to obtain a measure of the equipment imported in each country. Between
1856 and 1929 only the imports from Germany, the United Kingdom and
the United States are considered since the author used trade statistics from
these countries exclusively. After 1929, though, country-specific statistics are
considered and the coverage of imports become complete. For some coun-
tries such as Argentina, Brazil or Mexico, Tafunell also looked at domestic
investment.
In the data section I mentioned that my measure of physical capital is
a To¨rnqvist aggregate that takes into account changes in the relative prices
of structures and machinery. To calculate it, I need price indices for struc-
tures and machinery. Whereas for most of the countries in my sample this
44Tafunell performs a robustness test for the period 1925-1950 by comparing a volume
and a value series (in constant prices), and he concludes that his results are insensitive to
using either of them.
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information is available, for Latin American economies it is not and, there-
fore, relative prices are fixed at the first year at which price indices by asset
type are available in PWT (see below). A further consequence of this lack
of data was that calculating ratios of capital to output in current prices was
not possible, so I used GDP instead of investment deflators for the countries
for which such information was available: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (see below for the time pe-
riods for which this was possible). Admittedly, this assumption is, although
necessary, not innocuous. To see its implications and the potential biases it
may introduce, I present in Figure 3.B.1 the ratio between GDP and invest-
ment deflators across countries during the post-1950 period. Two points are
worth highlighting. First, they are not identical but in some cases they are
relatively similar for long periods of time such as in the case of Argentina,
Mexico, Honduras or Peru. Second, in the aggregate I do not seem to be in-
troducing a bias since the ratio of the price deflators is both below and above
one. Therefore, I think this approach is suitable for the analysis conducted
in this chapter. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that this assumption only
affects the part of the analysis using capital-output ratios.
The sources for nominal GDP are the following:45
Argentina
• Period 1884-1949: Della Paolera and Taylor (2003).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Brazil
• Period 1870-1899: Contador and Haddad (1975).
• Period 1900-1949: Brazilian Statistical Office.
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Chile
• Period 1870-1950: Braun et al. (2000).
• Period 1951-2014: PWT.
45To obtain the series I have partially drawn on the data made publicly available by the
Global Price and Income History Group at http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/. Therefore, some of
the sources cited below are also reported in their work.
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Colombia
• Period 1905-1949: GRECO (Grupo de estudios del crecimiento
econo´mico colombiano) (1998).
• Period 1951-2014: PWT.
Honduras
• Period 1925-1949: Mitchell (2007b).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Mexico
• Period 1922-1949: Mitchell (2007b).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Peru
• Period 1896-1949: Seminario (2012).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Uruguay
• Period 1870-1949: Bonino, Roma´n, and Willebald (2012).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
Venezuela
• Period 1856-1949: de Corso (2013).
• Period 1950-2014: PWT.
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Figure 3.B.1: Ratio of GDP to investment deflators






This chapter builds on the previous one looking at the drivers of income di-
vergence during the 20th century by including the dimension of health in the
analysis. While income and health have been extensively analyzed in separate
literatures,1 a growing number of studies have focused on their interaction.2
On one side, a branch of the literature argues that the improvement of a
country’s health level brings increases in income per capita because a health-
ier population is more capable of adopting and inventing new technologies,
and healthier workers are more productive and earn higher wages.3 On the
other side, this view has not been supported by everyone since Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) - and more recently Acemoglu and Johnson (2014) and
C. W. Hansen and Lønstrup (2015) - have argued that increases in life ex-
1On economic growth, see Solow (1956), Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Galor (1996),
Hall and Jones (1999) or Aghion and Durlauf (2005, 2014). On health, see Preston (1975),
McKeown (1976), Fogel (2004), Cutler et al. (2006) and Costa (2015).
2Another aspect of development that has been considered in the context of rising health
concerns the welfare of individuals. G. S. Becker et al. (2005), Murphy and Topel (2006),
Jones and Klenow (2016), Gallardo-Albarra´n (2016) and Chapter 2 of this thesis argue that
increases in life expectancy are an important source of well-being improvements.
3Some influential studies at the macroeconomic level are Nelson and Phelps (1966),
D. E. Bloom and Sachs (1999), Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), Gallup and Sachs
(2001), Sachs (2003), D. E. Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003) D. E. Bloom et al. (2004),
Weil (2007), Ashraf, Lester, and Weil (2008), Lorentzen et al. (2008), Cervellati and Sunde
(2011), Strittmatter and Sunde (2013) and D. E. Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014). At the
microeconomic level, see Schultz (2002), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Black, Devereux,
and Salvanes (2007) or Case and Paxson (2008).
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pectancy have led to rapid population growth, which in turn resulted in
capital dilution of reproducible factors of production and, therefore, lower
economic growth.4
The main contribution of this chapter is to assess these contrasting views
by analyzing the impact of health on relative economic performance using
development accounting techniques for a number of benchmarks since 1900.
This long-term perspective is relevant to enhance our understanding of the
effect of health on cross-country income inequality for two reasons. First, it
provides a new viewpoint to a literature that has predominantly focused on
the second half of the 20th century due to the substantial health improve-
ments that took place worldwide during the international epidemiological
transition (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007). An exclusive focus on this period
neglects the first phase of the long-term mortality decline and its health-
related productivity effects that started in some industrial countries around
1900 (Deaton, 2013; Costa, 2015). The second reason why considering several
benchmarks during such a long time span is relevant concerns the analysis
of cross-country events on world inequality. While the approach taken by an
important part of the literature of considering periods spanning 40 or more
years is useful for examining long-term effects, shorter time periods have the
potential to unveil the productivity effects of certain health dynamics such as
the development of antibiotics during the second quarter of the 20th century
or the emergence of HIV during the 1980s (Deaton, 2013; Young, 2005).
To calculate the fraction of income level variation across countries that
can be attributed to differences in health since 1900, I extend the health-
augmented accounting framework developed by Weil (2007) and further con-
tribute to the literature in two ways. First, I expand Weil’s methodology to
include a health measure that has been used extensively in the literature and
that it is widely available across countries and over time: life expectancy at
birth.5 Second, I extend the benchmarks analyzed by Weil (2007) back to
1900 using a newly developed dataset on physical capital (see Chapter 3)
that contains information on historical capital stocks for almost 40 countries
4Young (2005) emphasizes the importance of this channel on the effects of HIV/AIDS in
South Africa with a simulation model. As a result of reduced fertility due to HIV prevention
measures and rising female wages, income per capita in the South African economy may
have been 10 percent higher in 2010 than in the non-HIV counterfactual.
5The health measures used by Weil (2007) are adult survival rates and age of menarche.
In an earlier study, Shastry and Weil (2003) also used an indicator of anemia. Besides
adding a measure of health to Weil’s methodology, I have also provided a check on his key
parameters for performing the calculations using different sources and more comprehensive
data.
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since the 19th century.
This chapter presents four findings. First, health has been a histori-
cally important source of cross-country income variation. In 1900, before the
largest declines in mortality took place, health variation accounts for almost
20 percent of income inequality.
Second, the percentage of income inequality accounted for by health dif-
ferences rises up to 26 percent during the first half of the 20th century,
especially during the period 1900-1929.6 This increasing role of health as a
divergent force for economic performance can be ascribed to the diffusion
of new knowledge stemming from the germ theory of disease among a small
group of developed countries (Gwatkin, 1980; Deaton, 2013).
Third, the period spanning from mid-century until 1990 shows an impor-
tant fall in the role of health as a source of world income inequality due to the
strong health convergence caused by the international epidemiological tran-
sition (Easterlin, 2000; Neumayer, 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007). More
specifically, the percentage of income variance attributed to health differences
declines from 26 to 12 percent. A counterfactual exercise derived from the
main calculations shows that income inequality across countries, measured
with log income variance, would have been almost 20 percent higher, had
the process of health convergence after 1955 not taken place. In other words,
the reduction of health differences in 1950 was an important source of in-
come convergence until 1990. This finding supports a large number of studies
in the literature that have found a positive and significant causal effect of
health on economic development. For instance, Lorentzen et al. (2008) argue
that high adult mortality causes lower economic growth because it leads to
underinvestment due to shorter time horizons and having more offspring. Be-
sides supporting this growth effect, Aghion et al. (2011) find that having a
higher initial level of life expectancy is growth enhancing because healthier
individuals are more able to create and adapt to new technologies and invest
more.
The fourth finding is related to the the last part of the analyzed period.
My calculations show a constant relative importance of health for income lev-
els due to a deceleration in the rate of health convergence because developing
countries are now increasingly facing chronic diseases which are much harder
6Prados de la Escosura (2018) finds strong health convergence in relative terms already
since 1929. In line with this view, my results show that human capital in terms of health
started converging around mid-20th century or somewhat earlier. However, this periodiza-
tion is slightly different if we consider absolute differences in life expectancy (see Figure
1.1).
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to fight against (Deaton, 2004). This finding parallels those by Prados de
la Escosura (2015) who finds that slower progress in terms of health among
non-OECD relative to OECD economies since the 1990s has slowed down
convergence in human development.
Besides the studies that analyze the causal effect of health on economic
growth, this chapter also engages with two related bodies of literature ac-
counting for the sources of economic development. The first considers phys-
ical capital and human capital in the form of education as basic inputs in
the production process to calculate TFP differentials. The consensus in this
literature is that efficiency plays the largest role in accounting for income
differences across countries (Klenow & Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997; Hall & Jones,
1999; Caselli, 2005; Easterly & Levine, 2001; Clark & Feenstra, 2003; Hsieh
& Klenow, 2010; Jones, 2016). By building on the work by Weil (2007) and
extending it back to 1900, I contribute to this literature showing that health
has historically been an important input factor in the production process.
Furthermore, the attempt in this chapter to obtain a better measure of hu-
man capital is also related to previous research that has constructed quality-
adjusted indicators of human capital using teachers’ education, pupil-teacher
ratios, test scores or workers’ experience (Caselli, 2005; Lagakos et al., 2018).
The second group of accounting studies goes beyond ‘traditional’ factor
inputs to also include health by studying individual mechanisms through
which health affects economic growth. Related to the mechanism analyzed in
this chapter (i.e. healthier workers are more energetic and productive), two
studies stand out.7 One is the seminal work by Fogel (1994) who estimates
that rising nutritional status accounts for 20 to 30 percent of British eco-
nomic growth since 1790. The improved nutritional status of the population
did not only allow beggars and paupers to provide more work, but it also
raised the productivity of those already employed.8 This idea was brought
to the cross-sectional dimension by Weil (2007) who developed a develop-
ment accounting framework including health. This chapter contributes to
7See Weil (2014) for an overview on other potential mechanisms such as the effect of
longevity on human capital accumulation, fertility or savings.
8It should be noted that these numbers are not undisputed. First, the figures of caloric
availability around 1800 may be too high (Harris, Floud, & Hong, 2014). Second, Fogel
assumes that individuals above the caloric threshold are engaging in some kind of work
which causes an upward bias in the labor force participation rates (Floud, Fogel, Harris, &
Hong, 2011). Third, the estimates of the returns to health based on the increase in slave
earnings according to their height and weight may be upward biased (Costa, 2015, 508).
And fourth, evidence from Bleakley, Costa, and Lleras-Muney (2014) suggests that returns
to health are not constant, but they have been increasing over time.
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this literature combining the long-term perspective by Fogel (1994) with the
richer cross-sectional framework of Weil (2007) to consider a large number
of countries. Contrary to single-benchmark analyses, taking this long-term
multiple-benchmark approach allows for unveiling different dynamics in the
role of health on relative economic performance during the ‘Great Escape’
(Deaton, 2013).9
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I will present the methodol-
ogy that will be used to include human capital in terms of health besides
education in a development accounting framework. Second, I will provide a
description of the data I have used. Third I will discuss the main findings of
this chapter and their robustness. And finally, I will conclude.
4.2 Method






where Yi is output, Ki is physical capital, Ai is a productivity term, α is the
elasticity of output with respect to capital and i refers to specific countries.
Hi is a labor composite determined by:
Hi = hiviLi, (4.2)
where Li is the number of workers, hi is human capital in the form of edu-
cation and vi in the form of health. In this framework, vi (for vitality) refers
only to the aspects of individual health that are relevant for the production
of output such as energy available for work or mental concentration.10 This
9It should be noted that Weil (2007, 1297-1298) briefly examines the time dimension of
its analysis. However, because this is not the main focus of Weil’s research, his estimations
present two potential issues. First, he uses the same value for the parameter to convert
returns to height into returns to adult survival rates, even though he shows that it changes
over time on page 1291. And second, the estimates of physical capital stocks for the early
part of the post-1950 period are less reliable than those in 1995 due to lack of long-term
investment data on capital.
10These channels have been proven to be relevant for productivity. In the case of energy
available for work, Fogel (1994) argues that British workers at the turn of the 19th century
were able to work only a few hours a day due to their low nutritional status. With the
increase in energy available for work since 1790, the bottom 20 percent of consuming units
was brought into the labor force. Concerning mental concentration, Black et al. (2007)
shows that twins with better health levels at birth exhibit higher levels of IQ, earnings and
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is similar to human capital in the form of education in that hi represents
the skills acquired in the educative system which are rewarded in the labor
market for their positive impact on productivity (e.g. the ability of solving
complex problems).
In this framework, the wage earned by a worker depends on his health,
education and the national wage of the labor composite:11
ln(wi,j) = ln(wi) + ln(hi,j) + ln(vi,j) + σi,j , (4.3)
where j indexes workers and σ is a term that accounts for individual-specific
traits that have an effect on the wage of an individual.
The health of an individual depends on a number of inputs during her life
such as the quality and quantity of nutrition, conditions in the workplace,
exposure to pathogens or access to health care (Floud et al., 2011; Cutler
& Miller, 2005; Strittmatter & Sunde, 2013; Costa, 2015). These inputs in
turn determine health output, which can be measured with anthropomet-
ric indicators (e.g. body height) or mortality measures (e.g. life expectancy
or adult survival rates). Weil (2007) assumes that the relationship between
health inputs and outputs is mediated by a latent or unobservable measure of
health. Formally (and dropping country subscripts), this can be represented
as follows:
Ij = constant+ γIzj + I,j , (4.4)
ln(vj) = constant+ γvzj + v,j , (4.5)
where I is any observable health outcome such as height or life expectancy,
z is a latent measure of health and v is the relevant health outcome for
productivity in Equation 4.2.12 The two previous equations show how the
latent measure of health (z) is relevant for both an observable health outcome
and for the effect of health on productivity.
To see how differences in health would translate into different wage levels
and health outcomes, an example can be illustrating. Consider two different
workers (A and B) with the same human capital in terms of education but
with different levels of latent health (z). Given that wages are proportional
to human capital in the form of health (see Equation 4.3), the expected
difference in wages and health outcomes will be:
education when they are adults.
11Assuming a production function as in Equation 4.1, wage is the marginal product of
a unit of labor: wi =
dYi
dhi
= (1− α)Ai[KiHi ]
α.
12The residuals in Equation 4.4 and 4.5 represent white noise measurement error.
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ln(wA)− ln(wB) = γv(zA − zB), (4.6)
IA − IB = γI(zA − zB). (4.7)
If we assume that there are no error terms in Equations 4.4 and 4.5, then
we can substitute (zA− zB) in equation 4.6 for (IA−IB)γI from Equation 4.7 to
obtain:
ln(wA)− ln(wB) = γv
γI
(IA − IB), (4.8)
where the wage differential between two workers with the same characteristics
except for their health endowment depends on the extent to which observable
health outcomes differ multiplied by the ratio γvγI . This ratio is the return to
characteristic I, say stature, because it relates changes in health aspects that
affect productivity (γv) to changes in health that affect health indicators (γI).
An example of this type of returns is provided by Schultz (2002), who shows
that taller individuals in Ghana and Brazil have higher wages; or by Behrman
and Rosenzweig (2004) who demonstrates that individuals with low birth
weight have lower earnings on average.13 Obviously, being taller (or having a
higher birth weight) does not affect the productivity of an individual per se,
but rather the higher level of latent health (z) that affects both body heights
(I) and features that are relevant for productivity (v). Therefore, if we know
the return to I, it is possible to obtain an estimate of the differences in
human capital in the form of health by employing data on observable health
indicators. Formally this can be expressed as:
ln(vA)− ln(vB) = ρ(IA − IB), (4.9)
where ρ is the return to characteristic I or the ratio γvγI . This equation is the
key element for measuring the extent to which human capital in the form of
health varies across countries (in the next subsection I will discuss the choices
I made for ρ and I). Also, note that Equation 4.9 is analogous to the more
well-known calculations of the differentials in human capital in the form of
education (h), if we consider years of education and schooling returns instead
of stature and height returns.
To calculate the percentage of cross-country income inequality accounted
for by health differences, I proceed in a similar manner as in the previous
13This relationship has also been observed in history. Margo and Steckel (1982) find that
slaves height and weight in the antebellum United States were positively associated with
their value. Thus suggesting that healthier forced workers were more productive.
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chapter. First, I obtain the data required by Equation 4.1 on a per capita
basis for a large cross-section of countries over time on income (Y ), phys-
ical capital (K), human capital in the form of health and education (H),
and TFP as a residual (A). Second, I construct three measures that allow
calculating the importance of human capital in the form of health for compar-
ative development. The first of these is, as in the previous chapter, inspired
by Caselli (2005) because it considers physical capital per capita instead of
capital-output ratios in the production function. To obtain it, I first calculate
a measure of TFP that only takes into account physical capital and educa-
tion (TFPC); and another TFP measure using the health-augmented model
presented above (TFP vC). Then, to obtain an indicator of the percentage of
income variance accounted for health inequality, I subtract the later by the
former. In other words, I calculate the difference in percentage points between
a TFP measure including health and a model that only considers physical
capital and education. Formally:
HealthC = TFP
v
C − TFPC , (4.10)
where TFPC = 1 − var[log(yKH)]var[log(y)] and yKH = kαh1−α (k and h are vectors
of aggregate levels of physical and human capital in the form of education
per worker); and TFP vC = 1 − var[log(yKHV )]var[log(y)] where yKHV = kα(hv)1−α (v
contains information on country-level human capital in the form of health).
The second measure of the percentage of income variance accounted for
health is inspired by Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) in that it uses
capital-output ratios instead of capital per capita. Also, this indicator con-
siders the covariance between factor inputs and TFP to account for cross-
country income inequality. We can calculate it as follows:
HealthK−RC = TFP vK−RC − TFPK−RC , (4.11)
where TFPK−RC = 1 − var[log(y˜KH)]+cov[log(A),(y˜KH)]var[log(y)] and y˜KH = Ai (k)
α
1−α h
(k is a vector of capital-output ratios); and TFP vK−RC = 1 −
var[log(y˜KHV )]+cov[log(A),(y˜KHV )]
var[log(y)] , where y˜KHV = Ai (k)
α
1−α hv. By using capital-
output ratios, this measure acknowledges that a part of capital accumulation
is due to efficiency improvements.
The third indicator I will use is proposed by Weil (2007) and it can be
calculated as the sum of the health variance (v) plus twice its covariance with











This measure answers the question: if all cross-country health gaps were
eliminated, by which percentage would the variance of (log) income per capita
be reduced? HealthW will be typically larger than the first two indicators.
If we compare it with HealthK−RC , we can see that Equation 4.12 does
not evenly split the covariance between TFP and the factor inputs, which in-
creases the relative importance of factor inputs. And with respect toHealthC ,
HealthW does consider the share of income variance explained by the covari-
ance between health and productivity.
4.3 Data
The data requirements for the development accounting exercise that will be
performed in the following are the same as in the previous chapter, with the
only exception of human capital in the form of health. For this reason, I will
focus exclusively on the data used for the latter in this section.
4.3.1 Changes in health since 1900
The indicators used in the literature to measure the impact of health on
economic development typically consider the number of deaths from a certain
disease (e.g. malaria), life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rates or adult
mortality rates. The measure chosen for my analysis should reflect as best
as possible the mechanism explored in this chapter: healthier workers are
more productive because they can work longer and harder. Examining this
mechanism, Weil (2007) uses two different indicators: adult survival rates
(ASR) and age of menarche.15 The advantage of using ASR is that these are
widely available for a large number of countries since 1950 and they refer
explicitly to the health status of the labor force. The second measure he
uses, age of menarche, is also available for many countries, although to a
14Note that Weil (2007) follows Caselli (2005) in the functional form chosen for physical
capital so that the contribution of physical capital in HealthW is measured in per capita
terms.
15Adult survival rates measure the number of 15-year-old people that reach the age of
60.
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much lower extent than ASR. Given the long-term nature of my approach,
these indicators cannot be used for a broad number of countries due to lack
of data. In its stead, I will use a health indicator that has been widely used
in the literature: life expectancy at birth.
The use of this measure is convenient because the availability of data for
a large number of countries over a long period allows for performing analyses
since 1900 using a comprehensive balanced sample. However, we should not
accept the use of this indicator uncritically, since one can argue that life
expectancy has a relatively large influence through events that affect the
youngest part of the age distribution. While this is certainly true and well-
established, life expectancy has the potential to capture the aggregate health
component we are interested in for three reasons. First, the prevalence of high
infant mortality rates (and therefore low levels of life expectancy) implies the
existence of a hazardous disease environment that not only affects infants and
children, but also citizens that live and work in that environment. As shown
by Cutler et al. (2006, 107), high-income countries with high levels of life
expectancy suffer much less from diseases such as tuberculosis, diarrhea or
respiratory infections than low-income countries nowadays. Also, this pattern
can be observed in history (Leonard & Ljungberg, 2010). Second, there is a
very strong relationship between ASR and life expectancy as we can see in
Figure 4.A.1, where I plot one measure against the other for a sample of 125
countries and three benchmark years (1970, 1990 and 2009). If we look at the
correlation coefficient between the two indicators for separate years or pooling
them, we obtain values which are very close to one (see Table 4.A.2). Third,
and most importantly, there is a large body of literature which argues that
individuals exposed to a deadly disease environment characterized by high
infant mortality have worse labor market outcomes due to the long-lasting
effects of such events (Barker, 1992; Doblhammer & Vaupel, 2001; Case,
Fertig, & Paxson, 2005; Parman, 2015; Saavedra, 2017). In the robustness
section I show that using either of these health measures during the post-
1950 period yields very similar results.
It is common knowledge that health conditions are nowadays much better
than in the past. We can confirm this widespread view by looking at Figure
4.1, in which I present the evolution of life expectancy since 1900 by region
drawing on data from Zijdeman and Ribeira da Silva (2015), United Na-
tions (2017) and World Bank (2016).16 Without exception, the health status
16The countries considered are the same as in the previous chapter with the exception of
Singapore and Ecuador. Therefore, the new list of countries is: Sweden, the United King-
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of citizens has improved significantly in all parts of the world. In Europe, a
newborn was expected to live only 45 years at the beginning of the period due
to high levels of infant and childhood mortality, whereas in 2010 virtually any
child was expected to reach old age as its life expectancy was almost 80 years.
This large increase highlights not only one of the most remarkable features of
prosperity during the ‘Great Escape’, but also the deadly living conditions of
humankind a few generations past. Related to this, a further impression we
obtain from Figure 4.1 is that already in 1900 there were substantial differ-
ences across regions. Consider the substantial health gaps between the North
American and the Asian region. The difference between the best and the
worst performing countries, New Zealand and India respectively, amounted
to 35 years.
Figure 4.1: Average life expectancy by region since 1900
Source: Zijdeman and Ribeira da Silva (2015), United Nations (2017) and World Bank
(2016).
At the turn of the 20th century, a revolution stemming from the develop-
ment, acceptance and implementation of the germ theory of disease started
spreading within the ‘Western’ part of the world. In the 1880s, this theory
was empirically validated and by the turn of the 20th century it began dis-
dom, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Portugal,
Italy, France, Canada, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, Austria, Switzerland,
New Zealand, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia.
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placing the miasma theory of disease in developed countries (Deaton, 2013).
A relatively immediate outcome of this process was not the creation of drugs
to treat the large number of infectious diseases that aﬄicted citizens, but
rather the development of effective preventive measures by public health de-
partments and households (Cutler & Miller, 2005; Alsan & Goldin, in press;
Mokyr & Stein, 1996; Mokyr, 2000).
Besides improving the health of millions, the process of diffusion and im-
plementation of the germ theory of disease also created large inequalities
within and between countries. Consider the case of the United States as an
illustrative example of the within-country dimension. At the turn of the 20th
century, before the germ theory of disease was broadly accepted, mortality
between families with different socioeconomic backgrounds were almost the
same. By 1924, after best-practices first spread within the highest socioeco-
nomic classes, the children of teachers and physicians had a 35-percent lower
mortality rate than the national average (Preston, 1996). If we consider dif-
ferences across countries, Western European countries and their Offshoots
started experiencing higher increases in life expectancy than the rest of the
considered regions during the first three decades of the 20th century (see
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.A.1). Gwatkin (1980) characterises this process as the
first wave of mortality decline that would afterwards spread to Southern and
Eastern Europe by the 1920s spurring a second wave.
To identify more clearly the consequences of these mortality waves for
health differences across countries, I present box-and-whisker diagrams in
Figure 4.2 as done in the introduction of this thesis. This figure contains
information on the median value of life expectancy for the whole sample;
the interquartile range in which values between the 75th and 25th percentile
can be found; and the largest (smallest) observation that is less (higher) or
equal than the upper (lower) inner fence. As we can see, the unequal onset of
the health transition during the first half of the 20th century had two main
consequences. First, median life expectancy moved much closer to the higher
levels of the distribution (i.e. the difference between the upper whisker and
the horizontal line in the box is shorter in 1950 than in 1900). And second,
the regions with the lowest levels of health saw their gaps increase relative
to good-performing countries. This was the case of countries such as India or
Bolivia that despite experiencing increases in life expectancy, the gap between
them and the country in the 25th percentile during the period 1900-1950 rose
from 5.5 to 14.5 years and 3 to 10 years respectively. Consequently, mid-20th
century was characterized by enormous health differences between countries
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that had been steadily adopting knowledge stemming from the germ theory
of disease (mostly Western countries) and another set of countries that were
lagging behind in this respect.
Figure 4.2: The evolution of life expectancy inequality since 1900
Source: Zijdeman and Ribeira da Silva (2015), United Nations (2017) and World Bank
(2016).
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, developed countries had
completed, or were about to complete, the epidemiological transition. An
important part of this process took place in the 1940s due to public action
via establishing efficient water infrastructures and implementing broad vac-
cination campaigns during the previous decades, the adoption of hygienic
practices at the household level, the development of antibiotics and dietary
improvements (Mokyr & Stein, 1996; Cutler & Miller, 2005; Jayachandran et
al., 2010; Fogel, 2004).17
By 1945 little progress had been made in developing countries, although
considerable improvements were on the way due to a number of international
17In Chapter 2 I discuss the sources of mortality improvements during the first half of
the 20th century in more detail.
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interventions on immunization. UNICEF started vaccinating children against
tuberculosis, and in the 1950s its program was extended worldwide to also
provide immunization against leprosy, yaws, malaria and trachoma. In 1974,
the WHO launched the Expanded Programme on Immunization that pro-
moted immunization against diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), tetanus,
measles, polio and tuberculosis (Deaton, 2013). By the 1970s, progress had
been very substantial in countries such as India where 170 million people
were vaccinated against tuberculosis and 83 million against smallpox. A se-
cond important factor behind the health increase was the reduced exposure
of citizens to pathogens due to an active role of the government in vector
control and the implementation of sanitation projects. By 1964, almost 2
billion people lived in areas that were originally malarial, and only 19% of
these people were living in areas where no measures against malaria had been
taken. In terms of sanitation infrastructures, 69% of urban populations had
sewage disposal facilities in developing countries (Preston, 1980).
These and other factors prompted the international epidemiological tran-
sition, as Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) put it, characterized by rapid health
gains in countries with lower income levels than observed in developed coun-
tries when they experienced them. To continue with the Indian example, its
level of life expectancy in 2010 is similar to that of the United States in 1950,
even though American GDP per capita at mid-century was more than 3 times
higher than that of India nowadays (Feenstra et al., 2015; United Nations,
2017). The effects of this process on the world distribution of life expectancy
can be clearly observed in Figure 4.2. Not only did the differences between
the best- and worst-performing countries decrease between 1950 and 1970,
but also the spread in life expectancy in countries within the interquantile
range is much smaller (Gwatkin, 1980; Neumayer, 2003; G. S. Becker et al.,
2005).18
While the developing world was experiencing rapid increases in life ex-
pectancy, progress in developed countries slowed down because they were now
fighting against chronic diseases that were much harder to eradicate. One
group of these is cardiovascular and respiratory ailments that only started
declining after 1960 mainly due to medical advances and reduced smoking
(Cutler, 2004; Cutler et al., 2006). Also, middle-income countries belonging
18Strictly speaking, mortality declines in some less developed countries started earlier
than mid-20th century reducing relative inequality in terms of relative life expectancy
(Prados de la Escosura, 2018). However, as Gwatkin (1980) notes, these were not as marked
as those experienced in the second half of the 20th century.
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to the former Soviet Union have experienced an increase or stagnation in
mortality . Alcohol consumption and stress from the transition to a market-
based economy due to unemployment uncertainty for middle-aged workers
appear to be largely responsible for this trend (Prados de la Escosura, 2015).
The further internationalization of the best-practices stemming from the
germ theory of disease as well as the development of new treatments to tackle
infectious, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases have contributed to global
health improvements since 1970. These improvements, as Figure 4.2 shows,
have narrowed the gap between the best- and worst-performing countries in
terms of life expectancy (Deaton, 2004). In my sample, this gap is at its
lowest level since 1900. While this is indeed a good development for citizens
living in the poorest countries of the world, the data for 2010 also shows
that there are still many countries which are a long way from converging.
The closeness of the mean to the upper whisker indicates that citizens in
half of the countries considered have a life expectancy around 80 years. The
remaining half ranges between 65 and 79 years.
4.3.2 Returns to health
Similar to education, we need to use returns to health if we are to include
this aspect of human capital in a development accounting framework. Given
that the health indicator employed in this chapter is life expectancy at birth,
calculating stocks of human capital in terms of health requires returns to life
expectancy. Given that they are not available for mortality measures, these
can be inferred from returns to height as shown by Weil (2007).
The first step in this procedure involves choosing the benchmark height
returns that will be used in the following. For this purpose, I present some
estimates from the literature in Table 4.1. In line with Floud et al. (2011,
21-23), we can observe that they seem to be larger in developing than in
developed countries. However, before assuming that health returns in the
past in developed economies are as high as in developing countries nowadays,
it is worth considering that such high returns are not found everywhere as
LaFave and Thomas (2017) shows for Indonesia. In addition, Bleakley et
al. (2014) argue that in a developed economy such as the United States
height returns in the past were lower than in developing countries nowadays.
Their study suggests that the shift to a ‘brain-based’ economy and the rise
of public schooling increased the marginal benefit of education, thus leading
to an increasing importance of cognitive abilities acquired in early childhood.
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Given the lack of consensus in the literature, I took the health returns from
Fogel (1997) since they are in the middle range (see Table 4.1).19 A further
reason for choosing this rate of return is that it has been calculated drawing
on long-term historical data covering my analyzed period.
Table 4.1: Returns to body height from the literature
Returns to height Country Source
(in %)
9.4 Ghana Schultz (2002)
8 Colombia Ribero and Nun˜ez (2000)
7.8 Brazil Schultz (2002)
7.3 UK Fogel (1997)
4.1 Indonesia LaFave and Thomas (2017)
3.5 Norway Black et al. (2007)
3.3 US Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004)
Note: the returns by Fogel (1997), Black et al. (2007) and Behrman and Rosenzweig
(2004) are taken from Weil (2007).
The second step is to obtain a return for the health indicator that I will
use to measure the health status of the population, namely life expectancy.
In terms of the framework outlined above, I would like to calculate γvγLE using
data on γvγH . These are given by:
heighti,t = αi + γHzi,t + i,t, (4.13)
LEi,t = α+ γLEzi,t + µi,t, (4.14)
where i refers to countries, t indexes time and i,t and µi,t capture mea-
surement errors in heights and life expectancy respectively.20 To obtain a
measure of the return to life expectancy γvγLE , we can calculate the ratio
γH
γLE






.21 This ratio can be obtained by rearranging
19The returns in this source were calculated by Weil (2007) as follows. Using Equation





It+1−It . Fogel (1997, 388) estimates that the output increase
due to increased availability of calories for work has been 95 percent, which implies that
ln(1.95)=0.668. Then, given that the change in height has been 9.1 centimeters, the implied
returns to height using historical data is 0.668/9.1=0.073.
20Note also that αi in Equation 4.13 differs by country to allow for genetic variation,
whereas in the case of life expectancy we assume that this is not the case.
21The return to life expectancy, ρLE is analogous to the schooling returns used from
Mincer regressions to calculate human capital stocks in terms of education.
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Equation 4.13 and 4.14 as follows:
heighti,t = αi +
γH
γLE




With data on body heights, life expectancy at birth (and a set of fixed
effects) we can obtain the ratio γHγLE to convert height returns into life ex-
pectancy returns. To this end, I constructed a sample with information on
body heights from Hatton and Bray (2010) and life expectancy from the Hu-
man Mortality Database that has data on 15 countries since the mid-19th
century for most of them.22 The results of the regressions are reported in Ta-
ble 4.2 in the same manner as by Weil (2007, 1291). I have four specifications
that stepwise include country fixed effects, a linear time trend (normalized
to be zero in 2000) and an interaction term between the time trend and life
expectancy to account for the changing relationship between stature and life
expectancy.
As we can see, the coefficient for LE decreases as we include country
fixed effects and a linear time trend in the second and third specifications.
The benchmark value for γHγLE that will be used in the next section is that of
Column 4, where I interact the linear trend with life expectancy. Using this
specification implies that an increase in life expectancy of one year is associ-
ated with an increase of 0.248 centimeters in stature in 2000. If we consider
1900 instead, the associated change would be 0.132 centimeters fewer.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Main results
Keeping other factors constant, the existing large health differences across
countries make workers in some countries more productive than others, which
in turn affects the overall productivity level in the economy. To analyze the
quantitative importance of this mechanism as well as its evolution through-
out the 20th and early 21st centuries, Table 4.3 reports the results of the
methodology presented above for six benchmark years since 1900. The first
indicator, HealthW, conveys information on the percentage of income variance
22Before conducting this regression, I first replicated Weil’s procedure using ASR to
make sure our analyses are fully comparable. It is worth highlighting that despite we use
different sources and I have a larger sample with more countries and observations (284 as
opposed to 93), we get very similar coefficients. This should give us enough confidence that
the coefficients calculated for life expectancy are comparable to those for ASR by Weil
(2007).
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Table 4.2: Regressions results to calculate the ratio γHγLE
Height Height Height Height
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LE 0.345*** 0.323*** 0.197*** 0.248***
(32.54) (54.77) (11.72) (15.11)




constant 152.3*** 153.5*** 163.3*** 160.3***
(241.61) (438.93) (128.11) (133.28)
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 284 284 284 284
R-Squared 0.790 0.918 0.933 0.946
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
that could be eliminated if there were no health gaps across countries (Weil,
2007). The last two indicators, HealthC and HealthK-RC, show the added per-
centage of income variance accounted by a health-augmented model inspired
by Caselli (2005) and Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997).
Before discussing in detail the results in Table 4.3, two aspects are worth
highlighting. First, the calculated share of income variance accounted for by
health differences of up to 12 percent in the later part of the analyzed period is
in line with Weil (2007). Given the differences in the sample composition and
data sources for both health and physical capital, this should provide enough
confidence to later examine the results for earlier benchmarks. Second, the
trends and levels exhibited by the three indicators are practically the same,
even though there are important methodological and data differences between
them. In the following, I will focus on HealthW to discuss a comparable
measure to that of Weil (2007).
Table 4.3 presents four main findings. First, the importance of health as
a source of divergence in economic prosperity is not negligible. At the turn
of the 20th century when citizens were still deeply affected by communicable
diseases, health differences across countries account for almost 20 percent of
income inequality. Moreover, the effect is larger than in 2008 practically for
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Table 4.3: Cross-country income inequality accounted for health differences
since 1900
1900 1929 1955 1973 1990 2008
Income variance
accounted for:
- HealthW 18.5 23.3 25.7 17.8 11.8 11.5
- HealthC 17.0 24.6 22.0 13.2 7.0 6.9
- HealthK-RC 14.5 18.0 19.4 12.6 9.0 9.1
Note: see the text for the sources. The share of income variance accounted for health
differences with the different indicators were calculated using Equation 4.10, 4.11
and 4.12.
any earlier benchmark. Similar to one of the implications of the results in the
previous chapter, this finding should make us wary of relying exclusively
on single-benchmark analyses. It can be problematic to establish general
conclusions on the magnitude of the effect of health on economic development,
if this has not remained constant since 1900.
Second, the percentage of income variance accounted for health differences
increases substantially during the first three decades of the 20th century,
and it keeps rising up to 1955. Actually, eliminating health gaps in that
year would reduce income inequality by 25 percent. This increasing role of
health as a divergent force for economic performance can be ascribed to the
diffusion of new knowledge stemming from the germ theory of disease among
a small group of developed countries (Gwatkin, 1980; Deaton, 2013). As a
consequence, mid-20th century was characterized by substantial disparities
of human capital in terms of health between countries. According to my
calculations, the economic potential of closing the health gap in the sample
increased by 40 percent with respect to 1900. If we consider HealthC in Table
4.3, we see that we should be careful in pinpointing the year at which most
income variation are accounted for by health inequality because this measure
exhibits its highest value in 1929. Rather, we can conclude that this happened
somewhere between 1929 and mid-century.
The third finding is the dramatic fall in the role of health as a source
of world income inequality between 1955 and 1990 due to the strong health
convergence caused by the international epidemiological transition experi-
enced by low-income countries (Easterlin, 2000; Neumayer, 2003; Acemoglu
& Johnson, 2007). This decline has its origins in the internationalization (at
least in the intensive sense) of the germ theory of disease. After the Second
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World War, the knowledge accumulated by Western countries became widely
available and citizens across the board benefited from working and living in
a much cleaner and safer environment. Consequently, this finding suggests
that the economic potential for catching-up created before mid-century was
realized to a large extent by 1990. Actually, the figures for the importance of
health for income variation in 1990 are 50 percent of those in 1955.
Before interpreting these findings in the broader context of the literature,
it is crucial to highlight two aspects of the nature of the exercise performed
in this chapter. First, the effect I am measuring is the direct role of health on
workers’ productivity. Therefore, mechanisms such as capital dilution due to
population growth or increased educational attainment as a result of longer
time horizons due to health improvements are not taken into account. Second,
a development accounting exercise sheds no light on causality. In other words,
my analysis does not show whether improving health would lead to higher
income, or whether higher income leads to higher health levels. However,
the significant share of income variance accounted for by health differences
in 1955 suggests that their narrowing had a great catch-up potential. This
finding supports a large number of studies that have found a positive and
significant causal effect of health on economic development.23 An example
is Lorentzen et al. (2008) who argue that high adult mortality causes lower
economic growth because it leads to underinvestment due to shorter time
horizons and having more offspring. Aghion et al. (2011) supports this growth
effect and finds that having a higher initial level of life expectancy translates
into faster growth because a healthier population is more able to create new
technologies, adapt to them and invest more. Further support for a causal
interpretation comes from the instrument used by Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007). They argue that a large part of the increase in life expectancy during
this period is due to global interventions (e.g. mass distribution of penicillin,
use of DDT against mosquito vectors, etcetera) unrelated to the level of
economic development in those countries.24
23Nelson and Phelps (1966), D. E. Bloom and Sachs (1999), Gallup et al. (1999), Gallup
and Sachs (2001), Sachs (2003),D. E. Bloom et al. (2003) D. E. Bloom et al. (2004),
Weil (2007), Ashraf et al. (2008), Lorentzen et al. (2008), Cervellati and Sunde (2011),
Strittmatter and Sunde (2013) and D. E. Bloom et al. (2014).
24More specifically, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007, 945) argue that by mid-20th century
the prevalence of malaria was higher in parts of South Asia or Central America than in
Western Europe or Southern Latin America. Therefore, the use of DDT should reduce
the incidence of malaria and mortality in the former regions more than in the latter ones.
Using a measure of predicted mortality constructed on the basis of disease-specific mortality
before the global interventions provides a good predictor of the actual mortality decline.
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The fourth finding is the constant importance of health for relative in-
come levels since the 1990s. The impact of HIV and the increasing challenge
of fighting chronic diseases prompted a deceleration in the rate of health
convergence (Deaton, 2004). This recent slow down is worrisome from a well-
being perspective. Looking at convergence in human development, Prados
de la Escosura (2015) finds that slower progress in terms of health among
non-OECD relative to OECD economies since the 1990s has contributed to
divergence in human development.
Until now, I have focused on the percentage of income variance that can
be attributed to differences in life expectancy because it answers a clear ques-
tion rooted in the literature: which percentage of income variance would be
reduced if all countries had the same health status? Another useful way to
look at the results is to calculate how income inequality would have evolved,
had health differentials stayed constant after (or before) a given benchmark.
More specifically, if we take 1955 as a reference year, the counterfactual exer-
cise would be: how much would (log) income variance increase, if health levels
had not convergence after 1950?25 This counterfactual is useful for looking at
a hypothetical scenario after 1955 in which the process of health convergence
had not taken place or a situation where the percentage increase in income
variance related to health differences in 1900 had not changed throughout
the 20th century. Obviously, interpreting these alternative scenarios require
a large number of assumptions (e.g. if part of the mortality decline depended
on income or schooling is affected by health, it is difficult to argue that health
differentials can be held constant). But, it is instructive to look at the impli-
cation of my results from this different perspective.
In Figure 4.3, I present information on the observed and the predicted
25This question can be answered in three steps. First, I calculate the predicted income
variance, if cross-country health gaps did not exist. For this purpose, I subtract from the
observed income variance a term consisting of health variance and two times its covariance
with physical capital, education and productivity. This term is the same as the denominator
in Equation 4.12. Second, I choose a base year, say, 1955 and look at the factor by which
health differences increase log income variance. This step requires dividing the observed
income variance by the predicted income variance if all health gaps were eliminated. Third,
I multiply each of the predicted measures of income variation across time without the effect
of health by this factor. To illustrate this calculation with an example, consider the following
counterfactual: what would income dispersion in 2008 be, had health across countries not
converged after 1955 so that its contribution to income variation stayed constant? First,
I calculate the observed and predicted log income variation for 1955, namely 0.62 and
0.46 respectively. The factor by which health increases income dispersion in 1955 is 1.35
(0.62/0.46). Therefore, we can say that had health levels not converged after 1955, income
dispersion would have been 0.82 instead of the observed 0.69. This represents an almost
20-percentage increase in world income variance.
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log income variance in my sample using 1900 and 1955 as a base year for
the effect of health on income inequality. Using 1900 as a benchmark, we can
see how keeping constant the effect of health on world income variance in
that year results in lower income inequality up to 1973. In such a scenario,
the germ theory of disease would not have acted neither as a divergent force
for income inequality until mid-20th, nor as a convergent force after 1955.
Interestingly, despite income variation would have been lower before 1973, in
the later part of the period income inequality would have been nine percent
larger than the observed one. Considering health levels had not converged
after 1955, then income inequality would be almost 20 percent higher than
observed in 2008. All in all, these results reinforce the previous findings that
the role of health on economic development in history is not negligible. The
international epidemiological transition had a large potential to reduce the
differences in material living standards during the second half of the 20th
century.
Figure 4.3: Observed and counterfactual evolution of income inequality
Source: the counterfactual figures are based on the percentage increase in income
variance attributable to health differences in 1900 and 1955 (see footnote 25 for a
detailed explanation on the calculations behind these numbers).
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4.4.2 Robustness tests
The trends and size effects of the role of health on economic development
discussed in the previous section may be driven by the composition of the
sample. To test the sensitiveness of the main figures to this, I present in Table
4.4 the results for two alternative samples using data from Penn World Table
9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). The first is, as explained in the previous chapter,
PWT71 and it consists of 71 countries containing information on income
and physical capital from 1955 onward. The second sample, PWT118, has
information for 118 countries since 1973.26
Table 4.4: Robustness (1): using alternative samples after 1950
1955 1973 1990 2008
Income variance accounted for:
Panel A: PWT71
- HealthW 21.4 16.3 14.9 15.6
- HealthC 18.7 13.4 9.7 9.1
- HealthK-RC 17.8 13.2 11.8 12.4
Panel B: PWT118
- HealthW n.d. 18.1 17.2 15.6
- HealthC n.d. 14.6 12.0 9.3
- HealthK-RC n.d. 14.8 13.8 12.4
Note: see Table 4.3.
The results for PWT71 (Panel A) supports previous trends regardless
of the indicator we look at. Immediately after mid-century there is a sharp
drop in the percentage of income variance accounted for health inequality
that continues, although less marked, until 1990. From that year on, the rela-
tive importance of health remains constant due to the slowdown in mortality
convergence. Including 47 countries more with PWT118 (Panel B) further
supports these findings. After 1990 though, the results look a bit more op-
timistic than with the other set of countries because the role of health in
accounting for income inequality declines even further.
Another element of the main results that can be tested with these samples
is the magnitude of the health effect. In general, the values reported in Table
4.4 indicate that the percentage of income variance accounted by health are
26See footnote 39 and 40 in the previous chapter for a list of the countries included in
each sample.
152 Health and economic development
very similar as those in Table 4.3. Eliminating health gaps in 1955 would
reduce cross-country income inequality around 20 and 25 percent. After 1973,
the effect of health slightly rises because PWT118 includes more developing
economies, although the difference is not substantial.
To show the sensitiveness of my results to changing the health indicator
used in the analysis, I present a set of results from 1955 onward for the bench-
mark sample using adult survival rates in Panel A of Table 4.5.27 As we can
see, the post-1950 trends discussed previously hold when I use adult survival
rates as a measure of health. First, there is a sharp decline in the share of
income variance accounted for health between 1955 and 1973, and a further
smaller decline until 1990. Then the indicator remains roughly constant. It
is worth highlighting that the magnitudes are smaller for the years 1955 and
1973, although still substantial. This can be explained by the fact that life
expectancy at birth varies more across countries than adult survival rates be-
cause the former are more sensitive to disease and food deprivation.28 Does
this mean that one of these measure may overestimate or underestimate the
role of health on comparative development? Certainly not. Life expectancy
at birth and ASR capture different aspects of workers’ productivity that may
be equally important for the production process. For instance, the sensitivity
of life expectancy to changes in the disease environment conveys information
on the incidence of infectious diseases on workers productivity due to absen-
teeism, lower effort as less calories are available for work or scarring effects
during early life (Barker, 1992; Floud et al., 2011; Saavedra, 2017).
A further test looks at the sensitivity of the results by using different
values of the ratio γHγLE obtained in Table 4.2. As I mentioned previously,
this ratio is used to convert returns to height into returns to life expectancy.
In Panel B, I use the interaction term in Table 4.2 (Column 4) to calculate
year-specific ratios. As we can see, the patterns are identical as in the main
results since the indicators increase during the first half of the 20th century,
decline until 1990 and then remain constant. The main difference between
this alternative analysis and the benchmark one is that the size effects are
somewhat smaller before 1973.
A third test looks at the impact of changing the health returns. In Panel
C, I use the returns calculated for recent periods in the United States and
27The data on ASR were taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2016) and World Population Prospects (United Nations, 2017). See Appendix 4.B for a
more detailed description of the data.
28As shown in Chapter 2, health patterns across countries seem more similar if differences
in infant and child mortality rates are not taken into account.
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Norway that are around 3.4 percent. These returns do not affect the trends
discussed so far, but they have a substantial impact on the magnitudes.
Assuming the returns to health of developed economies lowers the indicators
by roughly 50 percent. Similarly, if we consider higher returns as suggested
by Schultz (2002) and Ribero and Nun˜ez (2000), the calculated magnitudes
will be higher.
Table 4.5: Robustness (2): alternative analyses




- HealthW n.d. n.d. 21.1 12.1 10.0 10.4
- HealthC n.d. n.d. 17.7 8.5 6.2 6.3
- HealthK-RC n.d. n.d. 17.6 9.5 7.3 7.5
Panel B: changing γHγLE
- HealthW 11.4 19.2 19.0 14.7 11.8 11.5
- HealthC 9.7 19.5 15.2 10.6 7.0 6.9
- HealthK-RC 8.6 14.5 13.9 10.3 9.0 9.1
Panel C: lower health
returns
- HealthW 9.0 11.5 12.7 8.6 5.6 5.5
- HealthC 7.5 10.8 9.5 5.9 3.1 3.1
- HealthK-RC 6.7 8.3 9.0 5.9 4.2 4.2
Panel D: α=0.48
- HealthW 16.6 21.2 22.4 15.7 10.3 10.2
- HealthC 15.4 22.2 19.4 12.1 6.6 6.6
- HealthK-RC 14.5 18.0 19.4 12.6 9.0 9.1
Note: see Table 4.3.
The fourth test in Table 4.5 is aimed at testing the sensitivity of the results
to changes in the parameter, α, that measures the relative contribution of
capital to aggregate production. Instead of using one third, in Panel D I report
the results taking the value suggested in Feenstra et al. (2015), namely 0.48.
Intuitively, the magnitudes of the indicators in this test are smaller than those
in Table 4.3 since the contribution of human capital is now lower. However,
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we can clearly see that this downward revision is very small and barely affects
the main findings.
4.5 Conclusions
What is the contribution of health to economic development? What has been
the effect of the uneven escape from a high-mortality to a low-mortality
regime on income inequality throughout the 20th century? In this chapter
I have tackled these questions using a development accounting framework
that allows for calculating the share of world income inequality that can be
attributed to health differences drawing on Weil (2007). To apply it to a
number of benchmarks for more than a century, I have extended it to include
life expectancy as a health measure and I have combined it with a new dataset
on physical capital that was developed in the previous chapter.
The findings of this chapter show that health has been an important
source of income variation in the last century. Beginning in 1900, its im-
portance rose substantially due to the unequal spread of the germ theory of
disease during the first decades of the 20th century so that the percentage of
income variation accounted for by differences in human capital in terms of
health rose up to 25 percent in 1955. This large potential for catch-up together
with the decline in the relative importance of health until 1990 suggest that
health improvements have acted as a positive and convergent force for world
income inequality during the second half of the 20th century. This force has
stopped in the last 30 years as some developing countries suffered from HIV,
increasingly face diseases affecting the elderly that are much harder to fight
against and the one-time improvements of saving the lives of the youngest are
petering out. Also, middle-income countries belonging to the former soviet
union have experienced an increase in mortality or stagnation.
The findings of this chapter support a body of literature that has empha-
sized the positive relationship between health and economic development.
The large health improvements realized in developing countries after 1950
have contributed to income convergence. Actually, a counterfactual exercise
derived from the main calculations suggests that between-country income




Table 4.A.1: Summary statistics for life expectancy at birth
1900 1930 1950 1970 2010
Asia Average 28.1 36.7 47.2 61.6 69.6
Std. Dev. 6.4 6.9 10.0 9.2 7.8
Max. 38.6 45.7 59.2 72.0 79.0
Min. 23.5 29.3 36.2 50.6 59.3
CoV 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.11
Europe Average 45.2 57.9 67.0 71.8 76.1
Std. Dev. 5.4 5.3 3.8 2.0 1.0
Max. 53.5 64.7 71.6 74.7 77.6
Min. 34.8 47.0 58.5 67.1 74.2
CoV 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01
Latin America Average 31.1 36.5 50.9 60.4 69.3
Std. Dev. 6.9 7.4 8.1 6.5 4.1
Max. 49.0 52.6 66.1 68.8 76.2
Min. 24.0 28.0 40.4 46.7 60.1
CoV 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.06
North America Average 52.9 62.2 68.6 71.3 76.3
and Offshoots Std. Dev. 4.8 3.4 0.6 0.9 1.0
Max. 58.7 65.3 69.3 72.6 77.4
Min. 48.6 58.9 68.1 70.7 75.4
CoV 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01
Source: Zijdeman and Ribeira da Silva (2015), United Nations (2017) and World Bank
(2016).
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Figure 4.A.1: Life expectancy and adult survival rates since 1970
Notes: the source is World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016). The data refer
to a sample of 136 countries in 1970, 1990 and 2008.






Source: see Figure 4.A.1.
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4.B Replication and comparison with Weil (2007)
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, I will present the data on adult
survival rates used in some of the robustness tests. And second, given that
Weil (2007) uses this measure instead of life expectancy, I will discuss why
our results are identical even though I chose a slightly different calibration
of the model.
Beginning with the discussion of adult survival rates, I present in Figure
4.B.1 a box-and-whisker diagram. In the two decades following the Second
World War, we can see a substantial shortening of the lower whisker which
implied a sharp decrease in cross-country differences in adult survival rates.
After 1970, the median of ASR in the sample exhibits an increasing trend
followed by a gradual decline in dispersion. Broadly, these trends are in line
with those of life expectancy in Figure 4.2 suggesting that the internation-
alization of the germ theory of disease largely improved health levels across
the whole age spectrum.
In the following I will compare the results of my analysis with those of
Weil (2007). The reader may wonder why our results are identical if I chose
a lower health return (7.3 instead of 3.4 percent).29 To look at this issue in
more detail, in Table 4.B.1 I present a replication of Weil’s results using data
from PWT 9.0 in Column I (Feenstra et al., 2015). In the second column of
the same table I report a replication of the results by Weil (2007, 1293).30 The
first row shows the variance of (log) income in the sample. The second part
shows the extent to which each factor input, except for health, as well as their
covariances with other inputs account for income variation. Third, I show the
percentage that health variance (v), measured with ASR, and its covariance
with the rest of the factor inputs and TFP account for cross-country income
inequality. And finally, I present the reduction in income variance if all health
gaps were eliminated (HealthW in Table 4.3).
29It is worth remembering that I took the ratio γH
γASR
directly from Weil (2007, 1291),
thus this cannot be a source of discrepancy between our analyses.
30Even though Weil uses a 92-country sample, my replication in Column I consists of
a dataset containing 86 countries because I had to exclude the following countries due to
data availability: Hong Kong, Ethiopia, Algeria, Haiti, Guyana and Papua New Guinea. I
used Weil’s data to see if excluding these countries had any effect on his results, and this
was not the case, which confirms the validity of my sample in the replicating procedure.
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Figure 4.B.1: The evolution of adult survival rates since 1950
Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016) and World Population
Prospects (United Nations, 2017).
A quick comparison between my replication and Weil’s original results
shows that the share of income variance reduced by eliminating health gaps
across countries is slightly smaller using PWT than Weil’s data (7.1 and 9.9
percent respectively). Two factors account for this downward revision. The
first, and the most important, is that income variance in 1996 using data
from PWT 9.0 is 27 percent larger than using PWT 6.1 (Heston, Summers,
& Aten, 2002). The second factor is that the covariance between health and
physical capital is half using PWT 9.0. In my main results, choosing the
higher returns to health from Fogel (1994) counteracts these two downward-
pushing factors so that my main results in Table 4.3 and those of David Weil
are almost the same.
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Table 4.B.1: Comparison with Weil’s results
(I) (II)
var log(y) 1.55 1.22
var log(k)/var log(y) 0.158 0.221
var log(h)/var log(y) 0.022 0.032
var log(A)/var log(y) 0.224 0.144
cov [log(k),log(h)]/var log(y) 0.051 0.074
cov [log(A),log(k)]/var log(y) 0.155 0.137
cov [log(A),log(h)]/var log(y) 0.056 0.040
var log(v)/var log(y) 0.003 0.004
cov [log(k),log(v)]/var log(y) 0.014 0.024
cov [log(h),log(v)]/var log(y) 0.005 0.008
cov [log(A),log(v)]/var log(y) 0.015 0.015




the decline of mortality in
Germany, 1877-1913
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I highlighted how the epidemiological transition in
high-income countries led to a large increase in life expectancy, which then
spread to other parts of the world. In this chapter, I examine the drivers
of this transition from infectious to chronic diseases by examining the role
of sanitary interventions in one of the forerunners of this process: Germany
during the late 19th and early 20th century.
In the 1870s, the German mortality pattern resembled many of today’s de-
veloping countries in that infectious diseases were the main cause of death in
the population, especially among the youngest.1 In comparison with other
countries at the time, Germany experienced such persistently-high death
rates that the literature has termed this excess mortality as ‘German penalty’
(Leonard & Ljungberg, 2010). In the subsequent decades until the eve of the
first world war, the health situation of German citizens would dramatically
improve as crude death rates declined by a third, infant mortality by almost a
half, and life expectancy rose around 10 years (Knodel, 1974). Understanding
the causes of these health improvements is relevant for at least two reasons.
1According to data from the World Health Organization (2016), 20 percent of African
deaths consists of infants and a large portion of these are due to waterborne disease such
as diarrhea. In 1877, a stunning 38 percent of overall German mortality was accounted
for infants exclusively, and a large number of these were caused by diseases affecting the
digestive system.
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First, it provides insights about the drivers of the greatest world health im-
provements that took place in the second half of the 20th century during the
international epidemiological transition (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007). And
second, this research can help policy makers on the effectiveness of public
health policies on many developing countries today, where, as in late-19th-
century Germany, lack of access to sanitation infrastructures and ailments
related to it are a widespread problem (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; United Na-
tions, 2015a).
The factors explaining the mortality decline in the early phase of the epi-
demiological transition have been extensively analyzed, yet a consensus has
not been reached. On one side, some scholars emphasize the role of increasing
income and nutritional intake on the nutritional status of individuals, which
made people more resistant to the disease environment (McKeown, 1976; Fo-
gel, 1994; Floud et al., 2011). On the other side, studies by Preston (1975),
Easterlin (1999) or Deaton (2013) highlight the role of medical knowledge
and the implementation of public health infrastructures.2 In assessing the
relative importance of these different views, an emerging literature finds that
clean water provision explains a very significant part of the mortality decline
around the turn of the 20th century.3 However, the focus of these studies
on water provision has overlooked substantial public efforts in establishing
sewerage systems.
The analysis of systems of waste disposal along with waterworks is rele-
vant because the prevalence of ailments transmitted through fecal-oral mecha-
nisms does not only depend on clean water provision. First, the effectiveness
of piped water alone may fall short because of the recontamination of the
sources or during transport to the households (Fewtrell et al., 2005; Kremer,
Leino, Miguel, & Peterson, 2011). Second, in the absence of efficient systems
2These are not the only explanations mentioned in the literature, although they have
received most of the attention. The long-term process of mortality decline is best understood
in a multi-causal framework that not only considers different factors acting independently,
but also interacting with each other (Fogel, 2004, 8). In the next section, I will provide a
more detailed discussion about some of these.
3Cutler and Miller (2005) find that almost half of the decline in total and infant mortal-
ity is accounted for water purification technologies in large American cities during the first
four decades of the 20th century. Ferrie and Troesken (2008) show for the city of Chicago
that between 30 and 50 percent of the decrease in crude death rates up to 1925 was due to
clean water provision. Using a larger sample of 61 American cities, Beach, Ferrie, Saave-
dra, and Troesken (2016) confirm the robustness of the previous findings in the American
context. Ogasawara et al. (2016) consider the city of Tokyo and concludes that the modern
water supply system accounts for more than a third of the decline in crude and child death
rates during the interwar period.
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of waste disposal the incidence of enteric diseases may still remain high due to
the spread of disease via insects attracted by excrement, or fecal-oral trans-
mission mechanisms as a result of open defecation or the use of inadequate
toilets (Brown, 2000; Alsan & Goldin, in press; Ramani, Fru¨hauf, & Dutta,
2017; Kesztenbaum & Rosenthal, 2017).
By analyzing the effect of safe water and efficient systems of waste disposal
on several measures of mortality in the German context, this chapter provides
a new perspective on the literature in three different aspects. First, consider-
ing their joint effect yields new insights into the degree of complementarity or
substitutability of these infrastructures. Therefore, we can examine whether
safe water provision alone had limited effects. Second, my focus goes beyond
‘traditional’ analyses of very large cities (e.g. Cutler, 2005) since my sample
contains municipalities whose population ranged from a few thousands to
more than a million. Third, the analysis of cities located in different states
within the German empire complements studies that have considered a rela-
tively homogeneous area or a single city (e.g. Ferrie and Troesken, 2008; Alsan
and Goldin, 2015; Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017). Even after 1871, pub-
lic health policies were the responsibility of the different states and therefore
were shaped by diverse political and sanitary institutions (Hennock, 2000).
To quantify the effect of sanitary infrastructures on mortality, I develop
two datasets containing information on city-level mortality disaggregated by
different types of disease and age; and the timing when substantial improve-
ments were made in water provision and waste disposal. After matching them,
I track cities over time and estimate the extent to which the introduction of
sanitary infrastructures accounts for changes in mortality. Even though the
establishment of these large scale projects was not a historical accident, their
timing is plausibly exogenous for several reasons. First, sanitarians had to
fight political battles that lasted, in some cases, decades until the projects
were approved and finally implemented (Hennock, 2000; Cutler & Miller,
2005). Related to this, the existence of several contemporary theories ex-
plaining the mechanisms of disease transmission with different implications
for public health and the economic interests of the local elite influenced the
decision-making process of public authorities (R. J. Evans, 1987; Vo¨gele,
1998). A further element of randomness was added due to the large degree of
political independence across German states that resulted in differing public
health policies (Hennock, 2000). Supporting this reasoning, I will show in the
empirical exercise that introducing five-year lead variables does not indicate
the existence of relatively high levels of mortality prior to the intervention
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years.
The results for my sample of 41 cities show that improvements in water
provision have a significant effect on overall mortality. However, their effects
were somewhat limited due to the recontamination of sources and the ex-
posure of citizens to excrement in the absence of efficient systems of waste
disposal. Including sewerage infrastructures in the analysis shows that the
existence of both interventions in a city has a larger effect on mortality than
in the absence of either of them. Taking into account their complementary
effect, they explain at least 19 percent of the reduction in crude death rates
during the period 1877-1913.
In explaining this finding, I argue that the main mechanism is the reduced
incidence of diseases transmitted via fecal-oral mechanisms. Supporting this
idea, I show that sanitary infrastructures account for 24 percent of the de-
cline in infant mortality, which is largely affected by waterborne diseases. In a
second step, I look at the effect of both interventions on waterborne diseases
affecting digestive organs and find a large effect, whereas the same does not
apply for airborne illnesses such as tuberculosis or pneumonia. This confirms
the idea that enteric-related diseases are mostly influenced by the introduc-
tion of the sewerage and safe water interventions, while deaths from etiologies
with a different pathological basis are not affected. Finally, I show that the
observed mortality decline is related exclusively to the introduction of water
supply and sewerage systems because assuming that the interventions took
place before the actual years yields statistically insignificant results.
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I will discuss
the historical context in Germany in terms of health and sanitary infrastruc-
tures. Second, I will present the data. Third, I will outline the methodology
used for the analysis. Then, I will present the results and discuss the main
mechanisms. And finally, I will test the robustness of my results and conclude.
5.2 Historical context
5.2.1 The mortality decline and associated factors
In the decades leading to the analyzed period, Germany started experienc-
ing a strong urbanization process. From the mid-19th century to 1880 the
percentage of population living in rural areas steadily declined from 67 to
59 percent (Knodel, 1974, 4). In some areas, this process was more intense
than in others as the experience of the Ruhr area shows. Whereas in 1800
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the combined population of this region amounted to less than 40,000 people,
a century later close to one and a half million people lived there (Leonard
& Ljungberg, 2010). The rapid population growth of urban areas deterio-
rated citizens’ health because overcrowding and congestion in cities provided
a favorable environment for the transmission of airborne and waterborne
infectious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis or typhoid fever).4 Consequently, an ex-
cess mortality in urban areas relative to the countryside, the so-called urban
penalty, became clearly visible both in terms of infant and overall mortality
(Vo¨gele, 1998).5
In the late 1870s, the urban penalty was at its highest with an excess mor-
tality of 10 percent in cities with respect to the countryside (Vo¨gele, 1998).
Putting these figures in international perspective reveals the existence of, as
Leonard and Ljungberg (2010, 119) put it, a ‘German penalty’ since mortality
rates were higher with respect to other countries such as England (Guinnane,
2003). If we consider the age dimension of this process, we can clearly see
that the two penalties particularly affected urban infants who suffered pre-
dominantly from diseases affecting the digestive system. This overall pattern
was also different across regions within the German empire because infant
mortality rates (IMR) were higher in the eastern and southern regions than
in the north-western part of the nation (Haines & Kintner, 2000). Despite
the bleak status of citizens’ health during these years, it is precisely at this
time when the trends start changing and a sustained health improvement can
be observed. As illustrated by the case of Prussia, in the three decades prior
to 1900 overall and infant mortality not only converged between urban and
rural regions, but also across other German states. Actually, progress was
so remarkable that the urban-rural differential disappeared shortly around
the turn of the 20th century, even though urbanization accelerated in these
decades (Vo¨gele, 1998; Gehrmann, 2011; Matzerath, 1990).
What drove the decline in urban mortality? Analyzing the British expe-
rience, the seminal work of McKeown (1976) brought the role of nutrition
to the forefront. Arguing by residual analysis, Thomas McKeown observed
that deaths by infectious diseases in Britain, such as tuberculosis, experi-
4The early phase of industrialization not only had negative consequences for citizens’
lives because wages typically rose due to increases in productivity. See Steckel and Floud
(1997) and Gallardo-Albarra´n (2016) for an analysis of the evolution of broader welfare
(i.e. combining wages, health, working time and economic inequality) during this process.
5In the case of infant mortality rates, Gehrmann (2011) notes that they did not undergo
the same development across the board. For instance, whereas infant deaths rose in the
regions of Prussia and Bavaria, Hesse and Wuerttemberg exhibited the opposite trend.
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enced a steady decline before effective treatments became available.6 Since
investments in sanitary infrastructures did not have a large potential to re-
duce overall mortality, his argument goes, rising living standards must have
improved the ability of immune systems to deal with infectious diseases. This
thesis has been later refined by Fogel (1994) and Floud et al. (2011) intro-
ducing the concept of nutritional status, which is a function of the nutritional
intake and the demands made on that intake when considering factors that
affect individuals like diseases, climate or type of work. In this framework, a
poor diet worsens individuals’ nutritional status impeding the normal func-
tioning of the body, thus resulting in worse health outcomes.7
Cutler et al. (2006) concur with the view that income may have played
an important role on mortality, but only before the mid-19th century. After-
wards, they argue that public health policies and new knowledge stemming
from the germ theory of disease were more important. Part of the advances
in medical knowledge, although slow and somewhat rudimentary for today’s
standards, translated into treatments for several diseases such as smallpox,
rabies or diphtheria (Easterlin, 1996, 1999). However, even though vaccina-
tion against smallpox in Germany was made universal and compulsory from
1875 to 1889 (Hennock, 1998), the potential of such treatments of reducing
mortality significantly was rather limited since they did not provide a cure
to the main killers such as tuberculosis. A more important role for medicine
can be recognized in relation to diffusing new health knowledge. By under-
standing the transmission mechanisms of diseases, households could adopt
more hygienic habits while dealing with home cleanliness, food preparation
or infant care to reduce their exposure to infectious illnesses (Mokyr & Stein,
1996; Mokyr, 2000). One way of spreading best-practices was through the pro-
vision of health care. Bauernschuster, Driva, and Hornung (2018) find that
the compulsory health insurance scheme established in 1884 by Otto von Bis-
marck reduced mortality through the diffusion of new hygiene knowledge by
physicians.8
6Some scholars have argued that the epidemiological evidence presented by McKeown is
not conclusive for the idea that rising nutritional improvements have been the predominant
source of mortality decline (Szreter, 1988, 2005).
7Costa (2015, 508) notes that the distinction between nutritional status and diet (or
nutritional intake) is crucial in Fogel’s work and it has often been missed among his critics.
8Evidence for this channel has been found for other countries. Winegarden and Murray
(1998, 2005) and Bowblis (2010) find that government-sponsored health insurance schemes
contributed to the mortality decline in several European countries from the 1870s until
the first world war by making medical care more affordable and disseminating information
concerning health awareness. For a more recent period, Strittmatter and Sunde (2013)
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Besides reducing the high prevalence of infectious diseases through the
adoption of healthier habits, municipal and state institutions also improved
the quality of water provision and waste disposal (Preston, 1975; Deaton,
2013).9 In the case of Britain, the United States, France or Japan, an emerg-
ing body of literature has found empirical evidence pointing to an important
role of water provision and sewerage systems (Cutler & Miller, 2005; Alsan
& Goldin, in press; Ogasawara et al., 2016; Chapman, 2017; Kesztenbaum
& Rosenthal, 2017). Beyond reducing the exposure of citizens to waterborne
diseases, in large cities these infrastructures may also have reduced deaths
by other diseases as morbidity from waterborne diseases decreased and the
population became more resistant (Ferrie & Troesken, 2008).
In the German context, this argument can find some support by looking
at Figure 5.1. As we can see, the decline in crude death rates (CDR) accel-
erated in the 1870s and coincided with the centralized provision of water by
municipalities. This correlation has not gone without notice in the German
literature. Spree (1988), Vo¨gele (1998) and Hennock (2000) have argued that
water supply systems made urban environments safer in Germany given the
high prevalence of waterborne diseases in comparison with other countries.
However, while this literature has made use of a large amount of quantitative
and qualitative material, their conclusions are based on correlations. There-
fore, they do not provide a quantification of the extent to which public health
infrastructures reduced mortality in relation to other potential explanatory
factors. In this chapter, I contribute to the literature by providing the first
empirical evidence of the individual and joint effect of water supply and sew-
erage systems on different measures of mortality by age (i.e. overall and infant
mortality) and disease. An early attempt to quantify the role of sanitary in-
frastructures on mortality was performed by Brown (2000). My study differs
with it in several respects. First, I consider a more general measure of mortal-
ity beyond infant mortality. Moreover, my sample contains a more complete
argue that the introduction of public health care systems had a significant immediate effect
on infant mortality and crude death rates.
9It should be noted that the literature has also looked at other public efforts to reduce
mortality such as increasing breastfeeding rates or food regulation. With respect to the
former, Vo¨gele, Rittershaus, and Halling (2013) find that such measures had a limited
effect because infant welfare centers enforcing breastfeeding required a large number of
bureaucratic, and sometimes discriminatory, procedures that discouraged working class
mothers from attending them. Also, the municipal provision of pasteurized milk for infants
remained marginal (Vo¨gele, 1998). Concerning food safety, the German Empire enacted a
law in 1879 to improve things on this matter. However, the implementation of this system
took many years (Guinnane, 2003).
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Figure 5.1: CDR and waterworks during the second half of the 19th century
in Germany
Note: Grahn (1904) for waterworks and Thomas (2015) for crude death rates.
picture of the German urban context in that not only the largest cities are
analyzed. Second, I disaggregate by waterborne and airborne illnesses to ob-
tain a more precise idea about the mechanisms involved. And third, I study
the interaction between improvements in water provision and waste disposal
since the analyzed cities established the latter after introducing waterworks.
5.2.2 The sanitary revolution
It is worth highlighting that neither the technology nor the actual establish-
ment of piped water and sewerage systems were new in Germany during the
late 19th century. The first of these large scale health infrastructures was
established in Hamburg after a serious fire in 1842. Fearing future similar
events, rather than the high level of disease in the city, the local authorities
commissioned a British engineer to build a public system of water supply and
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waste disposal (R. J. Evans, 1987). Similar systems were installed in other
cities such as Altona, Berlin or Leipzig before the 1870s, although they were
exceptions rather than the norm since only seven percent of localities with
more than 2,000 inhabitants had a central water supply system by 1880. In
contrast, an extraordinary 47 percent of English cities had waterworks by
that time (Hennock, 2000).
This substantial gap in sanitary infrastructures would be quickly nar-
rowed in the subsequent decades until the turn of the 20th century. As shown
in Figure 5.1 (left axis), whereas in the 1860s less than 50 cities supplied
piped water to their citizens, in the following decade a hundred projects were
completed and then two hundred more during the 1890s. As a result of this
enormous public effort, more than four hundred cities benefited from central
water provision by 1900. Sewerage systems underwent a similar development
although with a delay of several decades. In towns with more than 1,000 in-
habitants, systematic plans to establish main drainage schemes grew from 17
in the 1870s to 186 in the 1890s (Hennock, 2000). At the same time, Figure
5.1 shows that these developments were followed by a long-term decrease in
crude death rates that accelerated during the period where most projects
were finished.
The establishment of these infrastructures were not complete historical
accidents, although their precise timing had a large random component for
several reasons. The first factor to consider is the state of medical knowledge
with regards to the spread of infectious diseases. Throughout most of the
19th century the predominant view among public officials, sanitarians and
scientists was that that illnesses were transmitted through poisonous and
bad-smelling vapors known as miasmas. As new knowledge gradually accu-
mulated, this view started to change. An important step was made after the
discoveries of John Snow or William Budd in the 1850s that water, and not
vapors, was the main carrier of cholera and typhoid. More formal knowledge
was created in the laboratories of Louis Pasteur in the 1860s and Robert
Koch from the 1870s onward by discovering pathogenic organisms respon-
sible of communicable diseases (Mokyr & Stein, 1996). Although this new
knowledge seemed to better explain the terrible health conditions of the ur-
ban areas, public authorities were still divided and therefore their willingness
to invest in certain public health infrastructures was low. Consider the case
of Hamburg as an example. This city was the first in Germany in having a
centralized water supply system. In contrast with its much smaller neighbor-
ing municipality, Altona, or the big city of Berlin, Hamburg did not filter its
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water, although it was planned already in 1852 (Grahn, 1904). As late as the
1880s, the head engineer of the State Waterworks established that a sand-
filtration plant was not really necessary for Hamburg because the water was
taken from the Elbe and stored, without further treatments, in large reser-
voirs (R. J. Evans, 1987, 147). This belief in turn automatically dismissed
measures of isolation and quarantine to fight against epidemics that were
not favored by the economic elite of the city, whose interests were closely
linked to the uninterrupted course of trade. Given the wealth of Hamburg
and the various epidemics it suffered during the 19th century, the precise
timing at which safe water was supplied did not ultimately depend on finan-
cial or health issues, but rather on the beliefs concerning disease transmission
mechanisms and the economic interests of the local elite (Vo¨gele, 1998).
Secondly, sanitarians at the time had to fight hard political battles over
years and sometimes decades in order to persuade city councils of the benefits
of the new sanitary technologies (Cutler & Miller, 2005). Consider the case
of Frankfurt. This municipality had an active project to build a sewerage
system since 1839. However, after several years of protest by the opponents
to this program led by Georg Varrentrapp, the city council cut off the funds.
The opponents to the project wanted a more comprehensive system that
could remove surface-water, household-waste water and human feces at the
same time. This system was preferred by Dr. Varrentrap, who was familiar
with the English sanitary movement and their more advanced sanitary tech-
nologies (Hennock, 2000). In 1863, a commission consisting of the director of
town planning, two engineers, Varrentrapp and a government building officer
revised the drainage system issue and paved the way for the beginning of
the project in 1867, which was finished decades later in 1896 (Brix et al.,
1934, 323). This complex and arduous process was not unique of Frankfurt,
but it also took place in other cities such as Hanover (1876-1889), Bielefeld
(1875-1890) or Mu¨nster (1880-1892), according to Hennock (2000).
A third element that adds to the randomness of the precise timing of water
infrastructures is related to the political organization of the German empire.
During the late 19th century, states had an important degree of autonomy
which translated into different public health policies, and therefore priorities
concerning the establishment of sanitary infrastructures within the Empire.
Hennock (2000) argues that this autonomy was often well-secured since when
German sanitarians tried in the early 1870s to persuade the state authorities
to set up local health boards with prescribed duties, they refused on the
grounds that this would infringe the power of individual states (instead, an
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Imperial Health Authority was set up in Berlin with limited advisory power).
The Prussian authorities did not show much interest on new developments
in sanitary policy because they did not attend – except for two delegates –
neither the international congress on hygiene that took place in Brussels in
1852 nor its subsequent editions in 1876 and 1884 (Hennock, 2000).
The last point deals with the local factors that determined the timing
of sanitary infrastructures. As suggested previously, municipalities were the
prime responsible authorities for the construction of these systems. After
the manifold hurdles were passed and local authorities were convinced of
establishing sanitary infrastructures, discussions emerged with regards to the
specific technology to be used and its funding. Given the lack of precise
knowledge about the mechanisms of disease transmission, local authorities
had to decide whether to first implement a sewerage or a water supply system
(or both). Once this decision was made, new questions emerged with respect
to each specific system. For instance, to provide piped water municipalities
had to consider whether it would have to be taken directly from a nearby
river, reservoirs located next to them, a lake or underground water (also if the
water was to be filtered). With respect to sewerage systems, some technologies
involved carrying wastewater together with rain water and others in separate
canals. These choices involved a process of deliberation and discussion that
differed by city in that geographic conditions and political dynamics varied
substantially.
Another variable to take into account was whether the infrastructures
were to be financed publicly or privately. During several decades after mid-
19th century, both possibilities were used, and choosing one over the other
had consequences for their timing. For instance, the city of Mu¨lheim decided
to build waterworks and called for bids in 1873. However, the contractor
commissioned in 1874 could not find any investors for the city. Therefore,
the city had to build it itself, finishing the works in 1876 (Schramm, 2004).
Brown (1988) has looked at this issue more formally by empirically assess-
ing the determinants of the timing of water provision in the Rhineland. The
study finds that industrial demands and median’s voter tax payment are the
most important factors, and not health-related variables such as cholera out-
breaks or population density. This evidence suggests that emerging industries
such as cloth finishing and dyeworks fostered the demand for water supply
both because they needed it in their production process and because of the
rising incomes they brought to a local elite that demanded this type of infras-
tructures. In turn, the economic elite had a large influence on local political
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matters since franchise was granted to a small minority of wealthy residents.
After excluding the poorest section of the city inhabitants, the remaining
20 to 35 percent of adult males were assigned into three voting classes. The
group paying the top third of total taxes (i.e. income, property and business
taxes) chose one third of the assembly, the next third chose another third,
etcetera (Brown, 1988, 310).
5.3 Data
I will use city-level data to investigate the role of sewerage and water supply
systems on the mortality decline. For various measures of mortality, popu-
lation and birth data I have used the annual reports of the Imperial Health
Office between 1877 and 1913 that record such information for cities with
more than 15,000 inhabitants (Vero¨ffentlichungen des Kaiserlichen Gesund-
heitsamtes and Medizinalstatistische Mitteilungen). Using the data in these
reports, I constructed indicators of infant mortality rates (per 1000 births);10
overall mortality (per 1000); and deaths due to digestive and respiratory ail-
ments (per 1000). Analyzing measures of mortality according to age and type
of disease are useful to deal with some of the potential weaknesses related to
the latter type such as misdiagnosis. As noted in Ferrie and Troesken (2008)
for the city of Chicago, and more generally for the American context, this
issue was relatively common in the late 19th century. For instance, in the
case of typhoid fever it often was confused with other diseases in its early
stages since it resembled respiratory diseases such as pneumonia or bron-
chitis. Accurate diagnosis was only possible after the development of new
tests.11
To obtain information on the year at which each city established either
of the sanitary infrastructures analyzed in this research, I proceeded in two
steps. First, I began with water provision and used Grahn (1898-1902, 1904)
to record the cities that had this infrastructure by 1900.12 Then, I identified
10Following Alsan and Goldin (in press) and Brown (2000), I have used infant mortality
rates per birth instead of per person. In the robustness tests I also use a per-person measure
and the results are unchanged.
11Vo¨gele (1998, 25) mentions that these difficulties were also present in Germany where
deaths were classified according to their symptoms rather than the actual cause in a modern
sense. The study of Jo¨rg Vo¨gele points to a further issue of death certification. Whereas
in some states such as Hamburg, Wurtemberg or Bavaria expert death certification was
obligatory since the early and mid-19th century, this was not the case in Prussia until
later.
12The interventions coded mostly involved providing piped water from various sources
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those cities whose intervention date took place after 1881 due to both lack of
mortality data for the pre-1877 period, and the need of having some variation
before and after the establishment of a certain sanitary infrastructure. The
second step involved finding data on the years at which sewerage systems
started operating. As before, I restricted the sample to the cities that intro-
duced this system before 1909 to have at least five years of variation after
its construction.13 Matching the two datasets results in a 41-city sample (27
of them had sewerage systems by the end of the period).14 In Table 5.1 I
present some descriptive statistics for three selected years: 1877, 1900 and
1913. Comparing these figures with those for Germany as a whole in Knodel
(1974, 5), we can conclude that they are relatively similar. Whereas infant
mortality and crude death rates were 26.1 and 227 respectively for overall
Germany in the period 1876-1880, the cities in my sample exhibit values of
25.8 and 247 in 1877 (the same applies for 1913).
Before presenting the rest of the variables used in the analysis, a careful
discussion about the main variables of interest is necessary (i.e. sanitary in-
frastructures). In this chapter, I follow the literature and look at the date at
which sanitary projects started operating.15 However, this approach has sev-
eral weaknesses that make difficult identifying the existence of a significant
effect of sanitary improvements on mortality. First, the procedure assumes
that the whole population is covered by a certain infrastructure even though
this is not realistic in some cases. For instance, although the city of Koblenz
finished its canal network in 1899, there was no obligation to be connected to
it and the poorest part of the city did not benefit from it several years after
(e.g. lake, underground, etcetera). In the case of Hamburg, the intervention consisted on
filtering water.
13It is important to note that canalization did not always imply that a system of waste
disposal was in place. A large number of cities first started these projects to control rain-
water and, in some cases, household wastewater without including human feces. Given
that the mechanism of mortality reduction explored in this chapter concerns the fecal-oral
transmission of infectious diseases, I coded the intervention years when all waste could
be disposed through canals. A further important note is that contrary to water provision,
there are cities in the sample that did not get sewerage systems (this does not influence
the results as I show in the robustness section).
14I also excluded localities that only had data for a few years. The result sample con-
sists of: Schwerin, Stargard, Tilsit, Insterburg, Bromberg, Landsberg, Munich, Stuttgart,
Nu¨rnberg Fu¨rth, Zwickau, Gera, Weimar, Weissenfels, Spandau, Brandenburg, Charlotten-
burg, Guben, Kottbus, Hamburg, Osnabru¨ck, Bielefeld, Hildesheim, Oldenburg, Harburg,
Barmen, Hagen, Trier, Rheydt, Solingen, Mainz, Mannheim, Kaiserlautern, Worms, Du¨ren,
Ludwigshafen, Giessen, Herford, Lu¨denscheid, Oppeln and Neumu¨nster.
15See Brown (2000), Cutler and Miller (2005), Alsan and Goldin (in press) or Beach et
al. (2016).
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics for some selected variables
Statistic CDR IMR log pop Percent Share Share Citizens per
Industry Protestant Catholic dwelling
1877 mean 25.09 243.95 10.36 0.34 0.69 0.29 8.28
sd 3.50 59.22 0.74 0.13 0.30 0.29 1.72
min 16.37 135.99 9.68 0.13 0.04 0.00 6.03
max 33.42 373.44 12.78 0.64 0.99 0.95 13.61
1900 mean 19.42 215.08 10.88 0.38 0.68 0.30 9.22
sd 3.06 58.99 0.80 0.13 0.29 0.28 2.42
min 14.54 93.72 10.12 0.15 0.04 0.01 5.99
max 25.88 335.88 13.46 0.70 0.98 0.95 18.24
1913 mean 13.52 139.90 11.16 0.40 0.66 0.31 9.98
sd 2.59 32.75 0.86 0.13 0.27 0.28 3.21
min 9.46 61.85 10.24 0.16 0.05 0.02 6.80
max 20.87 191.00 13.84 0.71 0.97 0.95 21.02
Note: see the text for the sources. CDR stands for crude death rates; IMR for infant mortality
rates and log pop for log-transformed population
its establishment. A similar case can be observed in Trier where although
its infrastructures were set in 1903, the second part of the city, on the right
bank of the river, was finished in 1905 (Salomon, 1906-1911). A further issue
has been identified in the American context where some well-off neighbor-
hoods may have had earlier access to the sanitary infrastructures (Troesken,
2002). Second, the completion of water supply and sewerage systems did not
end with their opening in a given year. Maintenance and extension works
could improve their efficiency as engineers and sanitarians learned from ex-
perience and new medical knowledge became increasingly available (I will
elaborate more on this later). The third issue concerns the sanitary tech-
nologies that could be used. In the case of sewerage systems, municipalities
could install a mixed system that carried rain and waste water together or
a separate system with different canals carrying rain water and wastewater
separately. On top of this, the geographic features of each city determined
two further aspects of the project. On one side, the canals could be above
ground, underground or a mix of both. On the other side, the procedure
to transport waste water through the canal network could rely on natural
slopes, artificial elevation using steam pumps, air pressure or vacuum (Brix
et al., 1934). Given that these systems may perform differently in different
contexts, a simple binary variable does not account for the heterogeneous ef-
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fects they may have on mortality.16 All these considerations suggest that the
effect of sanitary infrastructures on mortality may take some time after their
establishment. Therefore, the found effects can be interpreted as lower-bound
estimates because using dummy variables for the sanitary interventions leads
to a downward bias in the estimates.
What does the timing of the sanitary revolution look like in my sample?
In Figure 5.2 I present the number of improvements in water supply (WSI)
and waste disposal (WDI) that took place during the period 1877-1913. As we
can see, starting in the early 1880s an increasing number of cities introduced
centralized systems of water supply, and by 1900 all of them had established
this infrastructure. Consistent with the literature, the introduction of sewer-
age systems came somewhat later and seemed to take off around the turn of
the 20th century.
Figure 5.2: Timing of improvements in water supply and waste disposal
Note: the sources are Grahn (1898-1902, 1904) and Brix et al. (1934). WSI and WDI
stand for water supply and waste disposal improvements.
16Including this aspect of sewerage systems into the analysis is very problematic because
I do not have enough information on this and, most importantly, some cities could have
several systems in place such as Hildesheim (Salomon, 1906-1911). Also, with the growth
of urban areas and the integration of municipalities that had different sewerage systems in
place, categorizing the resulting city is not straightforward.
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5.4 Methodology
The empirical analysis exploits the plausibly exogenous timing of safe water
and sewerage interventions. In this framework, I will use several measures of
city-level mortality annually to examine whether the introduction of public
health infrastructures had an effect on their decline in the subsequent years
after its introduction. More specifically, I will estimate the following model:
log(mortalityi,t) = β0 + β1WSIi,t + β2WDIi,t+
d′i,tγ + o
′
i,tδ + ζi + ηt + ζi · t+ i,t,
(5.1)
where i and t index city and time respectively; mortality can refer to
per-person total mortality, infant mortality, and deaths by infectious diseases
affecting the digestive and respiratory organs; WSI and WDI refer to water
supply and waste disposal improvements (turning one in the year t in which
city i implemented one of these) conditional on city-fixed effects, time effects
and city-specific linear trends (ζi, ηt and ζi · t respectively). The city-specific
effects (ζi) are useful for controlling for municipality-level factors that may
have an impact on mortality and that remain constant through time such
as climate, geographic features or certain institutional aspects. The time
effects (ηt) are of crucial importance to isolate the effect of public health
infrastructures from factors that change over time and that are common to
the whole sample (e.g. weather fluctuations). The last set of control variables
(ζi · t) refer to factors that are specific to each of the cities and that may
change over time such as wage increases. Following Alsan and Goldin (in
press), I cluster the standard errors at the city level.17 To account for potential
autocorrelation with an alternative approach, in the robustness section I will
also use up to 5-year lags of the dependent variable as done by Cutler and
Miller (2005).
If we are interested in the effects of improvements in water provision, β1
is the coefficient of interest. It shows the average mortality levels after clean
water is supplied in a city. To look at the effect of improvements in waste
disposal, we must consider β2. Given that all cities in my sample, except for
Hamburg, introduced sewerage systems after clean water was provided, β2
represents the marginal effect of such infrastructures once water supply has
been provided. When discussing the results, I will mainly focus on the joint
effect of changes in water provision and waste disposal as captured by β1 and
β2.
17This procedure is also recommended by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
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It is important to note that besides controlling for city, time and city-
specific time varying effects, I also include a set of demographic variables
(these are included in the vector d). At the city level, I control for total pop-
ulation. At the district level (Regierungsbezirk), I control for the percentage
of males in the population, the age structure (i.e. percentage of individuals
below 15, between 15 and 40, 40 and 60, and above 60) to make sure that
the change in, say, infant mortality is not due to a change in the proportion
of these over total population. To measure potential differences in childbear-
ing practices or general attitude towards life, I include two variables that
measure the percentage of the population with a catholic and protestant
background.18 Also, to make sure that trends in urbanization do not drive
the results, I include a variable that measures the number of citizens per
dwelling and the share of people in a given district living in municipalities
larger than 2,000 inhabitants (see Table 5.1 and 5.A.1).19
I included variables that capture the percentage of people working in
industry and services at the district level (o) motivated by the idea that the
introduction of waterworks was influenced by the presence of industry (mostly
cloth finishing and dyeworks) in the city (Brown, 1988). Furthermore, as
noted by Alsan and Goldin (in press, 9), this information may be important
in the case of infant mortality rates because if mothers working in factories
18Imhof (1981) argues that the impoverishment of the population and the lack of cattle
led to bad infant feeding practices and the development of a fatalistic mentality that was
particularly present in catholic areas. More recently, Gehrmann (2011) has highlighted the
role of customs and attitudes in determining the survival chances of infants. A further
issue that this variable would capture is that of registration of infant deaths. According to
Vo¨gele (1994) and Haines and Kintner (2000), in catholic areas the number of registered
still-births was relatively lower due to the custom of emergency baptism. In areas where
infant deaths occurred within a mandatory three-day registration period infant mortality
was underrated.
19This information was gathered from the population censuses of 1880 (Kaiserliches
Statistisches Amt, 1883), 1900 (Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1903) and 1910 (Kaiserliches
Statistisches Amt, 1915). Yearly data was obtained using linear interpolation and extrapola-
tion for the first and last three years of the analyzed time period. For the gender structure
of the population, I took information for an additional benchmark in 1905. It is worth
mentioning that these data are unfortunately more aggregated than the main variables
of interest concerning mortality and sanitary interventions. With controls at the district
level I expect to account for broad trends in several demographic trends that may not be
captured by the time effects and city-specific linear trends. Luckily, given the varied spatial
distribution of the cities analyzed, I am exploiting variation from 28 different districts:
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Danzig, Gumbinnen, Bromberg, Frankfurt an der Oder, Oberbay-
ern, Neckarkreis, Mittelfranken, Zwickau, Reuss a¨lterer Linie, Sachsen-Weimar, Merseburg,
Potsdam, Hamburg, Osnabru¨ck, Minden, Hildesheim, Oldenburg, Lu¨neburg, Du¨sseldorf,
Trier, Rheinhessen, Mannheim, Pfalz, Aachen, Oberhessen, Oppeln and Schleswig-Holstein.
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are less likely to breastfeed, their children may be more exposed to feeding
alternatives that may make use of contaminated water. In the robustness
section, I will look at more disaggregated data by sector to confirm that this
potential issue is not driving the main results.20
I will perform two additional exercises to further support the assump-
tion that the introduction of sanitary infrastructures was not determined by
mortality in the years prior their introduction. The first consists of adding
two 5-year lead variables of each treatment in Equation 5.1. A positive and
significant coefficient of this variable would indicate that five years prior the
coded interventions mortality levels were relatively high. A negative coef-
ficient would indicate the presence of pre-intervention negative trends that
would be ascribed to other factors than the main variables of interest.
The second exercise elaborates further on this idea and tests the sizable
and highly-significant coefficients for WSI and WDI. If the main findings are
correct, then a level-shift in the mortality measures should be observed upon








i,tδ + ζi + ηt + ζi · t+ i,t,
(5.2)
where k indexes the lag (or lead) chosen for the analysis.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main Results
Before turning to the results of the model outlined in the previous section, it
is instructive to look at some of the raw data for several cities and the tim-
ing of both centralized water provision and sewerage. In Figure 5.3 I present
information on overall mortality (left side) and infant mortality (right side)
for two relatively large and small cities: Charlottenburg, Stuttgart, Branden-
burg and Guben. The thick vertical line marks the year when a system of
piped water started operating, and the other line the opening of a sewerage
system. Consider infant mortality rates in Charlottenburg. Before any inter-
vention took place, the number of infant deaths hovered around 350 per 1000
20The data on the occupational structure of the population comes from the information
provided in the censuses standardized and processed by Hohls and Kaelble (1989).
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births, a figure that was 54 percent higher than the national average. By the
end of the period, IMR dropped to around 100 (60 percent of the national
average). This decline took place gradually in the course of the almost four
decades considered with substantial drops immediately after water provision
and waste disposal improved in 1884 and 1890 respectively. For CDR, we can
observe the same pattern. It is also interesting to note the mortality decrease
that took place after 1903 several decades after the sanitary interventions. At
the turn of the 20th century, the sewerage network was extended into areas
of the city that were previously not covered by a proper system of waste
disposal (Salomon, 1906-1911, 194). This decline would not be fully captured
by the dummy-variable approach I discussed previously, which reinforces the
idea that my results provide a lower-bound estimate of the effect of sanitary
infrastructures. The case of Stuttgart is slightly different because the coded
improvement in waste disposal only came 20 years after safe water was pro-
vided. In this case, we observe an initial decline in infant mortality and a
period of almost stagnation during the 1880s and 1890s. A substantial drop
would only come shortly after a sewerage system was established. The last
four examples of Figure 5.3 show a similar pattern for much smaller cities:
pre-intervention years were not only marked by high mortality rates, but also
by high volatility.
With this simple exercise, we can clearly see the potential influence of san-
itary interventions, although we cannot rule out the influence of confounding
factors. To isolate their effect, I estimate Equation 5.1 and present the re-
sults in Table 5.2. In Column 1, I look at the individual effect of safe water
provision on CDR and observe that it has a statistically significant and neg-
ative sign. This result is in line with those of Cutler and Miller (2005) and
Ogasawara et al. (2016), although the size of the effect is smaller (the reasons
for these differences will be discussed below). If we consider improvements in
waste disposal in Column 2, the similar strong and negative relationship is
observed.
Do clean water supply and efficient systems of waste disposal complement
each other? To examine this, I regress overall mortality on WSI and WDI
in Column 3. I find that the coefficients for both variables are significant and
negative. Jointly, both sanitary infrastructures reduced mortality per person
by 0.10 log points. Given that the total mortality decline in my sample is
0.53, water and sewerage infrastructures are associated in my sample with at
least a 19-percent reduction in overall mortality (0.10/0.53).
In the last column of Table 5.2, I add two 5-year lead variables of each
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Figure 5.3: Mortaliy and sanitary interventions in four selected cities
Note: the thick and thin vertical lines mark the year at which improvements in water
supply and sewerage systems take place. The sources for water supply and sewerage
systems see Figure 5.2; for mortality I used the publications of the Imperial Health
Office (Vero¨ffentlichungen des Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamtes and
Medizinalstatistische Mitteilungen).
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Table 5.2: The impact of improvements in water supply and sewerage on
overall mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WSI -0.0407** -0.0348** -0.0340**
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0153)






Joint Effect -0.101*** -0.0871***
(statistic) (15.1) (11.01)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1462 1462 1257
R-squared 0.892 0.893 0.894 0.859
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as
the demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
treatment and test whether in the years leading to the sanitary interventions
mortality levels were relatively high. A positive and significant coefficient
would indicate that their timing may have responded to mortality instead
of other factors such as the presence of certain industries in a city (Brown,
1988). For this purpose, I added two lead variables for WSI and WDI to the
main specification in Column 3. Two points are worth highlighting from this
exercise. First, these variables do not have a consistent sign and, most impor-
tantly, neither of them is significant. This also should make us confident that
the intervention variables are not capturing pre-existing decreasing trends in
mortality that may be ascribed to other factors (this issue will be explored
in more detail in the next section). And second, the coefficients estimated in
Column 3 are not sensitive to including these variables.
The second part of my analysis is concerned with one of the most impor-
tant factors behind the mortality decline in these years: infant mortality. Also,
considering this indicator will shed some light on the potential mechanisms
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since infants deaths were predominantly waterborne. In the first column of
Table 5.3, I show the individual effect of piped water on infant mortality. As
one would expect, the coefficient is negative and significant indicating that
infant mortality is 0.05 logarithmic points lower in cities where its inhabi-
tants had access to clean water. If we consider sewerage systems instead, we
observe the same robust and negative relationship.
Confirming the previous findings, including both WSI and WDI does
not alter the view that both infrastructures are individually important for
the decline of mortality since their coefficients are significant and negative.
Moreover, the lower coefficient for WSI supports the limited effects of piped
water found by Kremer et al. (2011), possibly due to the recontamination
of sources or proximity of citizens to excrement. The estimates in Column
3 imply that infants living in cities where both infrastructures were present
had much larger chances of surviving. Actually, 24 percent of the mortality
reduction over this period can be accounted for the introduction of these
infrastructures (0.11/0.45). Interestingly, this result is very close to that in
Brown (2000) using a sample of large German cities.21 Finally, the lead vari-
ables are insignificant. Thus, we can be confident that my estimates are not
picking the effect of pre-existing trends or that the introduction of these
infrastructures are related to high-mortality levels in the years prior the in-
terventions.
These results provide empirical support for the ideas advocated by
Preston (1975) or Deaton (2013): the improvement of the disease environ-
ment was an important factor in explaining the mortality decline in the early
phase of the demographic transition. This should not be interpreted as a
dismissal of arguments emphasizing rising income as a driver of improving
health (McKeown, 1976; Fogel, 1994; Floud et al., 2011). The analysis in
this chapter does not say anything about the precise relative importance
of income since the percentage left unexplained by sanitary infrastructures
is partially explained by the lower-bound nature of the exercise and, most
importantly, other factors that were operating simultaneously such as milk
provision, health care, professional support during deliveries, etcetera (Costa,
2015; Lazuka, Quaranta, & Bengtsson, 2016; Bauernschuster et al., 2018).
21This comparison should be made with caution though, since the variable capturing
the state of waste disposal in Brown (2000) is whether water closets were installed in the
entire city.
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Table 5.3: The impact of improvements in water supply and sewerage on
IMR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WSI -0.0529*** -0.0475** -0.0432**
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198)






Joint Effect -0.1085*** -0.0997**
(statistic) (11.84) (8.41)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1462 1462 1257
R-squared 0.878 0.878 0.880 0.860
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as
the demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
Other benchmark estimates in the literature for large American cities and
the city of Tokyo suggest that clean water provision accounted for between 30
and 50 percent of the infant mortality decline (Cutler & Miller, 2005; Ferrie
& Troesken, 2008; Ogasawara et al., 2016). The larger effect of these studies
can be explained by several factors. First, the size of the cities is much bigger
than in my sample. Consequently, the potential for improving the disease
environment is larger in more densely-populated areas because congestion
and overcrowding caused by urbanization was more problematic. Certainly,
the degree to which inefficient waste disposal posed a threat to citizens’ health
in some of the cities with 20,000 or 30,000 inhabitants considered here was
lower than in urban agglomerations such as Chicago or Tokyo. Second, the
treatments analyzed by Cutler and Miller (2005) and Ogasawara et al. (2016)
represent superior improvements in water provision than those considered
here, namely water filtration and chlorination. A third reason is the learning
effect experienced by engineers and local politicians concerning building and
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running these sanitary infrastructures, which in turn may have increased their
efficiency. Given that the time period considered in this chapter is earlier than
in the aforementioned studies, the municipalities analyzed here possibly faced
more uncertainties that those building these systems in the first decades of
the 20th century.
5.5.2 Mechanisms
The results in the previous section highlighting the role of systems of water
provision and sewerage jointly seem to show that the main mechanism for
the reduction of mortality is the reduced exposure of citizens to fecal-oral
transmission diseases. Piped water provided safe water for drinking, cooking
and feeding infants as long as the sources were germ free. While this may
have been the case if a city took water from its underground or any other
a priori clean source, the benefits could be limited due to recontamination
during transport or at the source (Fewtrell et al., 2005; Kremer et al., 2011).
Also, open defecation, the use of inadequate toilets or waste storage close
to households contribute to the prevalence of enteric diseases (Brown, 2000;
Alsan & Goldin, in press; Ramani et al., 2017; Kesztenbaum & Rosenthal,
2017).
The larger effect of water supply and sewerage found in the regressions
where infant mortality rates are used seem to confirm the presence of these
mechanisms because this group of the population is the most vulnerable to
enteric diseases.22 A further piece of evidence in this direction can be gained
by taking advantage of some of the digestive diseases recorded in the sources
(e.g. diarrhea, enteritis and catarrh of the stomach). Given that these are
mainly transmitted through fecal-oral mechanisms, the sanitary interventions
must have affected their development more decisively than any other type of
disease.
To examine this, I present the results of regressions using deaths affect-
ing the digestive organs as the dependent variable in Table 5.4. Interestingly,
the provision of safe water is negatively related to mortality from digestive
ailments, although not significant (Column 1). If we consider improvements
in waste disposal instead, the coefficient turns significant and negative. This
suggests that while piped water alone had limited effects, the two infras-
tructures acted together in contributing to a cleaner and safer private and
22According to Vo¨gele (1998), more than two thirds of infant deaths in large German
cities and in Prussia were related to waterborne illnesses.
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public environment once sewerage systems were implemented and all waste
was carried away in an efficient manner. Note that despite WSI not being
significant, this variable and WDI are jointly significant at the five percent
level. Together, they account for a stunning 49 percent of the reduction in
mortality from the digestive diseases recorded in this variable.
Table 5.4: The impact of improvements in water supply and sewerage on
digestive diseases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WSI -0.115 -0.102 -0.0890
(0.0727) (0.0728) (0.0718)






Joint Effect -0.244** -0.251**
(statistic) (11.84) (8.41)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1462 1462 1257
R-squared 0.755 0.755 0.756 0.751
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as
the demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
If sanitary interventions mostly protected the population from diseases
transmitted through fecal-oral mechanisms, then we should expect a much
lower (or lack of) impact on airborne diseases affecting respiratory organs
such as tuberculosis or pneumonia. To test this, I use deaths by respiratory
diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, measles, diphtheria, croup, etcetera) as a depen-
dent variable in Table 5.5.
186 Sanitary infrastructures and mortality
Table 5.5: The impact of improvements in water supply and sewerage on
respiratory diseases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WSI 0.0212 0.0236 0.0176
(0.0292) (0.0289) (0.0294)






Joint Effect -0.0037 -0.0094
(statistic) (1.15) (0.38)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1462 1462 1257
R-squared 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.725
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as
the demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
In line with the main hypothesis of this chapter, neither improvements
in water provision nor waste disposal had a significant effect on airborne
diseases. WDI has a negative sign, which yields some support for the dif-
fused effects found for the city of Chicago by Ferrie and Troesken (2008),
although it is not significant (regressions using individual diseases show the
same pattern).
While all the evidence presented so far should give us confidence that san-
itary infrastructures lowered the rate of mortality by improving the safety
and cleanliness of the disease environment, one may be skeptical about the
size of their effect. In other words, how can we be sure that the ascribed
impact to sanitary interventions is not picking up the effect of other inter-
ventions such as pasteurized milk supply, street cleaning or food regulation?
If the main variables of interest are not capturing trends in factors related
to mortality other than the public health infrastructures considered in this
chapter, we would expect a level-shift in mortality only in the intervention
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year (or immediately afterwards), and not before.
In Figure 5.3, I argued that this was indeed the case for four cities in
the sample. Shortly after the introduction of piped water and sewerage, both
CDR and IMR experienced a steady decline. Then, in the fourth specification
of each regression table (i.e. Column 4) I have shown that the five-year lead
intervention variables not only do not affect the main results, but also are not
significant in any of the regressions. To further complement these analyses
with a more detailed and formal exercise, I have estimated different models
using up to four-year lead and lag intervention variables (see Equation 5.2)
to determine whether a level-effect can be observed when a city has both cen-
tralized water provision and a sewerage system. Figure 5.4 plots the size of
the coefficients for each lag and lead of WDI as well as their 95 percent con-
fidence interval in regressions where the dependent variable is CDR.23. As we
can see, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero before both
interventions take place. Then in the actual intervention year it turns statis-
tically significant and, most importantly, a substantial level effect is observed
with respect to the rest of the coefficients. Immediately after the intervention
year, the effect of having both sanitary infrastructures remain high and then
gradually decrease as one may expect after a one-time intervention.
Figure 5.4: Impact on overall mortality before and after both sanitary
interventions have been implemented
23The same applies to IMR (see Figure 5.A.1)
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It is interesting to further explore the idea that the effect of sanitary in-
frastructures are not unique to the actual intervention year. We may expect
that sanitary infrastructures continue having an impact on mortality right
after their implementation because an increasing number of households con-
nect to the network, engineers and local authorities accumulate knowledge on
how to best operate them or new knowledge on disease spread mechanisms
guide their management. In Table 5.6 I look at these effects by using WSI
and WDI as before, their five-year lead versions and all the controls. If we
first consider CDR, we can see that the joint significance of the lag inter-
vention variables point to delayed effects, although not for IMR. In the case
of digestive diseases, they are remarkable because together they account for
almost all the reduction in mortality from this category. These findings are
consistent with those by Cutler and Miller (2005) in that delayed effects are
significant for digestive diseases, but not for CDR.
Table 5.6: Delayed effects of interventions on various mortality measures
CDR IMR Digestive Respiratory
diseases diseases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WSI -0.0256 -0.0452** -0.0915 0.0197
(0.0174) (0.0215) (0.0782) (0.0303)
WDI -0.0635*** -0.0704*** -0.164** -0.0340
(0.0170) (0.0236) (0.0827) (0.0379)
WSI lag5 -0.0248** 0.00743 -0.126** 0.0190
(0.0122) (0.0173) (0.0580) (0.0282)
WDI lag5 -0.00982 -0.0140 -0.102** 0.0206
(0.0146) (0.0207) (0.0521) (0.0233)
Joint Effect -0.0891*** -0.1156*** -0.2555** -0.0143
(statistic) (15.93) (12.80) (6.72) (1.06)
Joint Effect (5-year lag) -0.0346* -0.0065 -0.228*** 0.0396
(statistic) (4.67) (0.64) (10.47) (1.42)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1292 1292 1292 1292
R-squared 0.896 0.883 0.773 0.782
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as the
demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
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5.5.3 Robustness Tests
In this section, I show that the main estimates discussed previously are robust
to a number of alternative tests. The first of these looks at the percentage
of infant mortality decline accounted for sanitary infrastructures when using
a per-capita instead of a per-birth measure. Comparing the results of this
exercise in Table 5.A.2 with those of Table 5.3, we can see that employing
either of these the coefficients for WSI, WDI are always negative and highly
significant. The implied reduction in IMR in Column 3 of Table 5.A.2 is 20
percent, quite close to the estimate in the previous section of 24 percent.
Continuing with IMR, in Figure 5.A.1 I test whether the substantial level
effect found after the introduction of sanitary infrastructures for CDR can
be found for this variable too. As we can clearly see, no coefficient is signif-
icantly different from zero before the intervention takes place, and a large
negative effect is observed when public health infrastructures started operat-
ing. This evidence together with Figure 5.4 strongly suggest that the effects
captured by WSI and WDI are related to the interventions, and not to other
confounding factors.
In Table 5.A.3, I replicate the benchmark results for overall mortality
in Table 5.2, but using more refined measures of the occupational structure
of the labor force. For instance, in Column 1 I consider the ratio of female
over males employed in agriculture, industry and services. In Column 2 I
use industry-level measures to control for differences in employment across
these.24 In the last column I consider the ratio of female to male workers in
the same industries as before. The different specifications show that changes
in these controls barely have an impact on the size, sign or significance level
of the main estimates of this chapter.
In the next robustness test, I repeat the main estimations for all mortal-
ity variables, but using a sample in which all cities receive both treatments.
This exercise is interesting for at least two reasons. First, it tests the main
findings throughout the chapter on a different sample as the number of cities
that receive both sanitary infrastructures is reduced to 27 cities. And second,
I check that the main results are not driven by these cities, if they had a set
of characteristics that are substantially different from the rest. Three points
are worth highlighting from this exercise in Table 5.A.4. First, the negative
24The sub-sectors are: agriculture, mining, metal production, metal processing, machine
construction, chemical industries, textile industry, cloth industry, food industry, construc-
tion, supply industries, ‘other industries’, producers’ services, transport, trade, social ser-
vices, public services, personal services, ‘other services’.
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association between sanitary interventions and CDR, IMR and deaths affect-
ing digestive organs holds strongly. Secondly, the percentage of the mortality
decline in this sample accounted for improvements in water provision and
sewerage is 19, 24 and 40, which are virtually the same as the ones calculated
previously (19, 24 and 49 respectively). And third, respiratory diseases are
not affected by any of the public health projects considered, thus reinforc-
ing the idea that a reduced exposure to diseases transmitted via fecal-oral
mechanisms is the main driver of the mortality decline.
The last robustness test concerns a potential issue with serial correlation.
The main estimates of this chapter use clustered errors at the city level. In
Table 5.A.5 I experiment with the approach by Cutler and Miller (2005)
by including five lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side of
Equation 5.1. As we can see the results are practically unchanged. Both
piped water and sewerage systems had a sizable and significant impact on
CDR, IMR and deaths by digestive diseases.
5.6 Conclusions
The prevalence of waterborne diseases and the lack of access to sanitary in-
frastructures in many developing regions nowadays is a well-known feature
of European countries at the turn of the 20th century such as Germany. In
this country, the challenges posed by a strong process of urbanization and
industrialization during the course of the 19th century resulted in a steady
deterioration of its urban health status up to the 1870s. The situation was
so dramatic in these years that around 40 percent of overall mortality was
accounted for by infants deaths. Immediately after this decade, the bleak pic-
ture portrayed by contemporaries and health indicators would dramatically
improve so that by 1913 CDR and IMR had declined by a third and a half
respectively. By creating a new dataset on city-level mortality and interven-
tion dates for water supply and sewerage systems, I have looked into one of
the key factors behind this process: public health investments.
I find that improvements in water supply have a significant effect on
mortality. Piped water provided safe water for drinking, cooking and feed-
ing infants as long as the sources were germ free. However, the effects of
this infrastructure were limited due to water recontamination and the lack
of efficient systems of waste disposal. When including sewerage systems in
the analysis, I observe a much stronger effect of public health infrastructures
on mortality indicating that both of them were largely complementary. Ac-
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cording to my results, improvements in water supply and sewerage disposal
alone accounts at least for 19 percent of the observed mortality decline dur-
ing the period 1877-1913 (24 percent if we take into account learning effects).
The main mechanism behind the mortality decline is the reduced exposure
of citizens to fecal-oral transmission diseases.
This idea is broadly supported by three further pieces of evidence. First,
sanitary interventions had a larger effect on IMR which are mostly affected
by waterborne diseases (a fifth of its decline is explained by the introduction
of sanitary infrastructures). Secondly, I find sizable and highly-significant
results for deaths from several digestive diseases (more than 50 percent of
the decline from these are accounted for the main variables of my analysis),
while the same is not true for respiratory diseases which are mainly airborne.
And thirdly, I showed that the infrastructure variables are not affected by
pre-intervention trends since a significant and negative effect on mortality is
only found after the actual intervention dates, and not before.
The findings in this chapter point to the importance of going beyond ‘tra-
ditional’ approaches focusing on safe water provision since their individual
effect on mortality alone may be somewhat limited. The importance of san-
itary interventions supports a stream of the literature that has highlighted
the role of public health (as opposed to nutrition) as the main determinant
of long-term health improvements. In an environment in which communica-
ble diseases move freely due to bad water quality and inefficient storage of
human waste, the protection that citizens receive from improving the disease
environment seems to be a critical factor explaining the improvement of the
health status of the population.
The case of 19th-century Germany has also implications for present-day
policy makers because the comprehensive efforts put in by German authori-
ties in that period resemble programs such as the ‘Swachh Bharat Mission’
to achieve universal sanitation in India or the Water, Sanitation and Hy-
giene (WASH) program to bring basic sanitary infrastructures to everyone
in over 100 countries (UNICEF, 2017). The case of Germany at the turn of
the 20th century suggests that these types of initiatives have a great poten-
tial to reduce the prevalence of infectious diseases via fecal-oral transmission
mechanisms, specially through their complementarities with systems of water
supply.
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5.A Supplementary material and robustness tests
Table 5.A.1: Summary statistics
Statistic Overall IMR log pop Percent Percent Percent
Mortality Agriculture Industry Services
1877 mean 25.09 243.95 10.36 0.41 0.34 0.25
sd 3.50 59.22 0.74 0.13 0.13 0.07
min 16.37 135.99 9.68 0.05 0.13 0.18
max 33.42 373.44 12.78 0.64 0.64 0.60
1900 mean 19.42 215.08 10.88 0.36 0.38 0.25
sd 3.06 58.99 0.80 0.15 0.13 0.07
min 14.54 93.72 10.12 0.03 0.15 0.18
max 25.88 335.88 13.46 0.66 0.70 0.59
1913 mean 13.52 139.90 11.16 0.35 0.40 0.25
sd 2.59 32.75 0.86 0.16 0.13 0.08
min 9.46 61.85 10.24 0.03 0.16 0.17
max 20.87 191.00 13.84 0.66 0.71 0.60
Share Share Share pop. Share pop. Share pop. Share pop.
male female below 15 15-40 40-60 above 60
1877 mean 0.49 0.51 0.36 0.38 0.18 0.08
sd 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
min 0.48 0.49 0.30 0.36 0.15 0.05
max 0.51 0.52 0.40 0.45 0.21 0.10
1900 mean 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.39 0.18 0.08
sd 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
min 0.48 0.48 0.31 0.34 0.15 0.05
max 0.52 0.52 0.40 0.44 0.20 0.11
1913 mean 0.49 0.51 0.34 0.40 0.18 0.09
sd 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06
min 0.30 0.48 0.22 0.26 0.13 0.05
max 0.52 0.72 0.40 0.47 0.21 0.48
Share Share Citizens per Citizens per Share pop.
Protestant Catholic squared meter dwelligs in cities (>2000)
1877 mean 0.69 0.29 131.56 8.28 0.42
sd 0.30 0.29 160.04 1.72 0.21
min 0.04 0.00 33.93 6.03 0.13
max 0.99 0.95 1024.46 13.61 0.94
1900 mean 0.68 0.30 188.91 9.22 0.55
sd 0.29 0.28 289.17 2.42 0.19
min 0.04 0.01 41.66 5.99 0.19
max 0.98 0.95 1850.11 18.24 0.98
1913 mean 0.66 0.31 248.45 9.98 0.62
sd 0.27 0.28 418.44 3.21 0.20
min 0.05 0.02 49.51 6.80 0.22
max 0.97 0.95 2659.61 21.02 0.98
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Figure 5.A.1: Impact on IMR before and after both sanitary interventions
have been implemented
Table 5.A.2: The impact of sanitary interventions on IMR (per 1000
inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WSI -0.0901*** -0.0811*** -0.0731***
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0255)






Joint Effect -0.181*** -0.1518***
(statistic) (21.35) (14.34)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1462 1462 1257
R-squared 0.924 0.924 0.925 0.906
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as
the demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
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Table 5.A.3: The impact of sanitary interventions on CDR (with varying
occupational controls)
(1) (2) (3)
WSI -0.0385** -0.0425** -0.0377**
(0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0163)
WDI -0.0672*** -0.0637*** -0.0770***
(0.0198) (0.0174) (0.0187)
Joint Effect -0.1057*** -0.1062*** -0.1147***
(statistic) (15.66) (18.39) (30.88)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1426 943
R-squared 0.895 0.901 0.930
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Column 1 considers the ratio of female over males employed in
agriculture, industry and services. Column 2 includes industry-level
measures to control for differences in employment across these. And
Column 3 uses the ratio of female to male workers in the same industries
as before. All regressions include time effects, city fixed effects,
city-specific trends as well as the demographic and occupational controls
discussed in the text.
Table 5.A.4: The impact of sanitary interventions on several mortality
measures (for cities that receive both interventions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDR IMR Digestive Respiratory
diseases diseases
WSI -0.0287 -0.0459* -0.0480 0.0661
(0.0211) (0.0262) (0.0978) (0.0441)
WDI -0.0746*** -0.0672*** -0.172** -0.0562
(0.0183) (0.0206) (0.0770) (0.0453)
Joint Effect -0.1033*** -0.1131*** -0.22** 0.0099
(statistic) (19.45) (15.21) (7.95) (3.09)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 968 968 968 968
R-squared 0.901 0.869 0.744 0.787
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific
trends as well as the demographic and occupational controls discussed in the
text.
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Table 5.A.5: The impact of sanitary interventions on several mortality
measures (adding up to 5-year mortality lags)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDR IMR Digestive diseases Respiratory diseases
WSI -0.0348** -0.0489** -0.0576 0.0183
(0.0161) (0.0211) (0.0679) (0.0228)
WDI -0.0662*** -0.0642*** -0.135** -0.0435
(0.0196) (0.0217) (0.0641) (0.0293)
Joint Effect -0.101*** -0.1131*** -0.1926** -0.0252
(statistic) (15.10) (14.22) (6.49) (2.46)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1462 1257 1257 1257
R-squared 0.894 0.886 0.789 0.801
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: all regressions include time effects, city fixed effects, city-specific trends as well as the
demographic and occupational controls discussed in the text.
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De twintigste eeuw heeft als nooit tevoren vooruitgang laten zien in de
kwaliteit van leven op het vlak van inkomen en gezondheid. Voor een groot
aantal landen betekende deze eeuw een definitieve breuk met een verleden
waarin tijdelijke verbeteringen in de levensstandaard altijd werden gevolgd
door perioden van soms langdurige economische malaise en lichamelijke
ziekte. In navolging van de metafoor van Nobelprijswinnaar Angus Deaton
kunnen we stellen dat miljoenen mensen wereldwijd een ‘Great Escape’
hebben meegemaakt: een ontsnapping uit een regime waarin armoede en een
vroege dood de norm waren, naar een nieuwe realiteit waarin bijvoorbeeld
ondervoeding en kindersterfte in veel landen tot het verleden ging behoren.
De gevolgen van deze ontsnapping kan men het beste zien in ontwikkelde
landen waarvoor lange datareeksen beschikbaar zijn en waar verbeteringen in
zowel materie¨le welvaart als gezondheid het sterkst zijn geweest. Een goede
illustratie van dit proces is West-Europa. Economische vooruitgang heeft
tussen 1870 en 2010 geleid tot een enorme groei van het aantal goederen en
diensten dat een gemiddeld persoon kan consumeren. Tegen het einde van
de negentiende eeuw had de gemiddelde inwoner van Europa – omgerekend
naar het prijsniveau van 1990 – een inkomen van ca. $2.000. Tegenwoordig
kan dezelfde gemiddelde Europeaan elk jaar $25.000 besteden aan voeding,
onderdak, onderwijs, of recreatie. De verbeteringen in gezondheid zijn eve-
neens aanzienlijk. De levensverwachting bij geboorte is meer dan verdubbeld
sinds 1870: van 35 naar 80 jaar. De kansen op een lang en gezond leven in
de nentwintigste eeuw zijn vele malen hoger dan men in de negentiende eeuw
had kunnen vermoeden.
Individuele gezondheid en inkomensniveaus zijn sterk toegenomen in de
loop van de twintigste eeuw, maar deze toename is niet gelijkmatig verdeeld
geweest. Er bestaat een aanzienlijke ongelijkheid tussen landen. Voor wat
betreft inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking zien we dat een kleine groep
landen de rest van de wereld ver achter zich heeft gelaten. Voor wat be-
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treft gezondheid liggen de zaken iets anders: verschillen in levensverwachting
tussen landen namen toe tot 1950 maar zijn daarna weer afgenomen. Dit
kwam doordat in de vroege twintigste eeuw slechts een beperkt aantal regio’s
profijt had van de kennis van bijvoorbeeld door bacterie¨n veroorzaakte ziek-
ten. Na 1950 zorgde de internationale verspreiding van deze kennis voor een
convergentie die ook leidde tot een grote stijging van de levensverwachting
in ontwikkelingslanden.
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt welke oorzaken hebben geleid tot deze ‘Great
Escape’ en wat de gevolgen hiervan zijn geweest voor de welvaart en het
welzijn van mensen. Een beter zicht op deze oorzaken en gevolgen is essentieel
voor een beter begrip van het ontstaan van de grote ongelijkheden in inkomen
en gezondheid die we vandaag de dag zien; ongelijkheden die hoog op de
internationale ontwikkelingsagenda staan. Daarnaast draagt dit proefschrift
bij aan ons begrip van gebeurtenissen in het verleden; een begrip dat op zijn
beurt licht kan werpen op de mogelijke gevolgen van ontwikkelingsbeleid.
Het inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking is een cruciale indicator in het
onderzoek naar welvaart en levensstandaard mede doordat deze ook samen-
hangt met het niveau van gezondheid en met andere belangrijke welzijnsindi-
catoren zoals onderwijs. Een groeiend aantal studies betoogt echter dat teveel
nadruk op inkomensgerelateerde variabelen kan leiden tot een eenzijdig per-
spectief. Een meerdimensionaal kader is daarom van belang om een completer
begrip te krijgen van de ontwikkeling van de levensstandaard. Hiermee heeft
deze literatuur een cruciale vraag op de voorgrond geplaatst: hoe kunnen we
‘brede welvaart’ en welzijn meten en vergelijken, zowel tussen landen als door
de jaren heen? Deze vraag staat centraal in de eerste helft van dit proefschrift.
Het meten van welzijn is niet alleen in de hedendaagse context van be-
lang, maar ook voor ons begrip van het verleden en voor de lessen die we
hieruit kunnen trekken. Dit is vooral van belang als de diverse indicatoren
een zeer verschillend beeld laten zien van het verloop van menselijke ontwikke-
ling. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien hoe de ontwikkeling van de levensstandaard in de
Europese landen tussen 1913 en 1950 een perfect voorbeeld hiervan vormt.
Inwoners van Europa werden in deze periode geconfronteerd met een bi-
jzonder dieptepunt in inkomensgroei, onder meer door de effecten van de
wereldoorlogen, door ongelukkig macro-economisch beleid en door de lang-
durige depressie van de jaren dertig. Tegelijkertijd werd deze periode ook
gekenmerkt door een ongekende toename van de gemiddelde levensverwacht-
ing van 47 naar 65 jaar. Dit kwam onder meer doordat nieuwe kennis van de
effecten van bacterie¨n op ziekte en gezondheid leidde tot beter beleid op het
vlak van de volksgezondheid en maatregelen die leiden tot betere hygie¨ne.
Naast gezondheid verbeterde het leven van Europeanen in deze periode nog
op twee andere manieren. Ten eerste verminderde – buiten de landbouwsec-
tor – het gemiddeld aantal gewerkte uren per jaar met 600 uren, nadat in
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het interbellum de achturige werkdag en in sommige gevallen de betaalde
vakantie werden ingevoerd. Ten tweede nam de inkomensongelijkheid sterk
af na 1913. Dit betekende dat nationale-inkomensgroei aan een steeds groter
deel van de bevolking ten goede kwam.
Welzijnsindicatoren op basis van andere variabelen dan alleen het gemid-
deld inkomen laten dus een ander, positiever, beeld zien voor de eerste helft
van de twintigste eeuw. In het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift geef ik
een uitgebreid beeld van ‘brede’ welvaart in deze periode, door gebruik te
maken van een maatstaf die is gebaseerd op de variabelen inkomen, ongeli-
jkheid, vrije tijd en gezondheid. De weging van de diverse onderdelen van
deze samengestelde indicator hangt af van hun relatieve nut. Ik schat de wel-
vaartniveaus van tien West-Europese landen en de Verenigde Staten aan de
hand van nutsfuncties en werk daarmee binnen een theoretisch onderbouwd
kader.
De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk tonen aan dat het niveau van welzijn
in Europa, in vergelijking met de Verenigde Staten, aan het begin van de
twintigste eeuw 15 procent lager was dan op basis van alleen inkomen per
hoofd van de bevolking kan worden becijferd (d.w.z. ruim 50 procent van
het Amerikaanse niveau). Dat het Europese welzijn in deze maatstaf lager
uitkomt, wordt verklaard door een hoger sterftecijfer en door een groter aantal
gewerkte uren vergeleken met de Verenigde Staten. In verder onderzoek naar
hoe deze verschillen zich ontwikkeld hebben, vind ik slechts beperkte aanwi-
jzingen van convergentie. Tegen het einde van de periode (1950) zien landen
met relatief lage welvaartsniveaus in 1913 (zoals Italie¨ of Spanje) vergelijkbare
groeivoeten als landen met hogere niveaus (zoals het Verenigd Koninkrijk of
Nederland). Dit suggereert dat verschillen tussen landen groter en blijven-
der zijn dan geschetst wordt door andere samengestelde welzijnsindicatoren,
zoals bijvoorbeeld de Human Development Index.
Voor wat betreft groei kom ik tot de conclusie dat de indicator van het
gemiddeld inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking resulteert in een onderschat-
ting van de groei van levensstandaard in zowel Europa als de V.S. van ca.
1,5 procentpunt per jaar. Omdat de nieuwe welzijnsmaatstaf meeneemt dat
mensenlevens in 1950 sterk waren verbeterd door betere sanitaire voorzienin-
gen, de ontdekking van antibiotica, de verbeterde positie van werknemers en
een gestage afname van ongelijkheid, geeft deze maatstaf aan dat welzijn
halverwege de twintigste eeuw was verdubbeld ten opzichte van het begin
van de eeuw. Daarnaast tonen de resultaten uit dit hoofdstuk aan dat de
voornaamste bijdrages aan de groei van welzijn voortkomen uit inkomen en
gezondheid; deze dragen voor respectievelijk 0,6 en 1,4 procentpunt bij aan
jaarlijkse groei. Deze resultaten sluiten goed aan bij de voorkeuren die in
de literatuur op basis van enqutes worden gevonden. Deze resultaten bieden
daarmee ook een solide motivatie voor het verdere onderzoek van dit proef-
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schrift, waarin de factoren die ten grondslag liggen aan de groei van deze
dimensies gedurende de ‘Great Escape’ centraal staan.
Hoofdstuk 3 begint met de dimensie inkomen en analyseert welke factoren
bepalend waren voor het patroon van toenemende ongelijkheid tussen landen
gedurende de twintigste eeuw. Om deze factoren inzichtelijk te maken, heeft
de literatuur rekenmethodes gebruikt die de oorzaken van economische groei
onderverdelen in de accumulatie van productiefactoren (fysiek kapitaal en
menselijk kapitaal) en een residu: totale factorproductiviteit (TFP). TFP is
een weergave van de efficie¨ntie waarmee productiefactoren worden gecombi-
neerd. Op dit moment stelt de literatuur dat TFP de voornaamste bron is
van divergentie van inkomens per hoofd van de bevolking. Om die reden, zo
stelt de literatuur, moeten we voor een antwoord op de vraag waarom som-
mige landen rijker zijn dan anderen beter begrijpen wat de determinanten
zijn van productiviteit.
Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt of deze stelling ook geldt als we uitgaan van
een langetermijn perspectief. Dat kan door te berekenen hoe belangrijk TFP
is geweest voor variatie in inkomensniveaus tussen landen sinds 1900. Met
behulp van een nieuwe dataset van fysiek kapitaal toon ik aan dat de rol
van accumulatie van productiefactoren in het verleden veel groter was dan
tegenwoordig. Volgens mijn berekeningen verklaren fysiek en menselijk kap-
itaal tot 65 procent van de variatie in inkomen binnen de steekproef anno
1900, terwijl dit anno 2008 ca. 30 procent is. We kunnen daarom concluderen
dat het percentage in de inkomensongelijkheid dat door TFP kan worden
verklaard in de loop der jaren is toegenomen.
Het leeuwendeel van de groei in TFP vond plaats tussen 1929 en 1990.
Dit viel samen met een golf van groei in productiviteit gedurende de jaren
dertig en veertig die zijn oorsprong had in de V.S. en die zich na de oorlog
verspreidde naar Europa en Japan. Een andere reden voor de toename in
TFP na 1950 is het krachtige proces van kapitaalverdieping binnen Aziatische
economiee¨n.
Hoofdstuk 4 bouwt voort op het voorgaande hoofdstuk in het onderzoek
naar de factoren achter de divergentie van inkomens gedurende de twintigste
eeuw. Dit doe ik door gezondheid te introduceren als een belangrijk aspect van
menselijk kapitaal in het productieproces. Een uitgebreide literatuur toont
aan dat gezondere werknemers productiever zijn, aangezien ze in staat zijn
om harder, langer en intelligenter te werken. Binnen dit uitgebreide kader
kan worden verkend wat het gevolg was voor mondiale inkomensongelijkheid
van de internationale verspreiding van medische kennis en de convergentie
van gezondheidsniveaus.
De analyses van dit hoofdstuk tonen aan dat gezondheid historisch gezien
een belangrijke bron is geweest van inkomensongelijkheid tussen landen. Vo´o´r
de grote daling in sterftecijfers – omstreeks 1900 – verklaart de variatie in
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gezondheid bijna 20 procent van deze inkomensongelijkheid. Gedurende de
eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw stijgt dit percentage naar 26 procent, do-
ordat verbeteringen in gezondheid door toedoen van nieuwe kennis slechts in
een kleine groep landen plaatsvinden. Vanaf halverwege de twintigste eeuw
tot 1990 neemt de rol van gezondheid als bron van mondiale inkomensongeli-
jkheid af van 26 tot 12 procent. De grote vooruitgang in de gezondheid van
werknemers die wereldwijd plaatsvond tijdens deze internationale epidemi-
ologische transitie, droeg daarmee bij aan aanzienlijke verbeteringen van de
relatieve productiviteit.
De laatste conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat de relatieve rol van gezond-
heid voor inkomensniveaus sinds 1990 redelijk constant is gebleven; gezond-
heid convergeert minder snel dan voorheen. Ontwikkelingslanden maken hi-
erin minder grote stappen doordat deze in toenemende mate te maken krij-
gen met chronische hart- en vaatziekten en aandoeningen aan de luchtwegen;
ziekten die veel moeilijker te bestrijden zijn dan infectieziekten.
Hoofdstuk 5 sluit dit proefschrift af door de´ factor te analyseren die leidde
tot zowel de baanbrekende vooruitgang in gezondheid en welvaart – besproken
in hoofdstuk 2 – als ook in de ongelijkheden tussen landen die in hoofdstuk
4 besproken werden: de epidemiologische transitie. Zoals het voorbeeld van
Duitsland in de late negentiende eeuw goed aantoont, kunnen de oorsprong
en sommige van de oorzaken van deze transitie worden herleid tot een kleine
groep gendustrialiseerde landen.
In de jaren zeventig van de negentiende eeuw waren de voornaamste dood-
soorzaken onder de Duitse bevolking infectieziekten, met name ziekten aan de
spijsverteringsorganen en ziekten aan de luchtwegen, vooral onder de jeugd.
In de decennia die daarop volgden – tot aan de Eerste Wereldoorlog – laat de
Duitse volksgezondheid een spectaculaire verbetering zien. Gelijktijdig met
deze verbeteringen in de volksgezondheid maakten lokale overheden werk van
het terugdringen van ziekten door het aanleggen van waterleidingen. Het-
zelfde gold voor het aanleggen van riolering, alhoewel deze ontwikkeling een
paar decennia later volgde.
Dit hoofdstuk analyseert het verband tussen de versnelling in deze san-
itaire revolutie in Duitsland en de daling van de sterftecijfers. Hiervoor stel
ik een dataset samen die jaarlijkse informatie bevat over sterfte in alle grote
Duitse steden tussen 1877 en 1913. Deze sterftecijfers bevatten informatie
per leeftijdsgroep en geven een uitsplitsing naar verschillende soorten ziek-
ten. Om sanitaire verbeteringen te meten, breng ik in kaart in welke jaren
grote verbeteringen plaatsvonden in de aanleg van waterleidingen en rioler-
ing.
De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk tonen aan dat kwalitatieve verbeteringen
in de watervoorziening een significant effect hadden op de algehele sterfte.
Echter, dit effect bleef enigszins beperkt doordat zonder een goedwerkend
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systeem van riolering waterbronnen snel weer vervuild raakten. Ik laat zien
dat, zodra een stad zowel een centrale watervoorziening als een systeem van
rioleringen heeft aangelegd, dit gepaard gaat met een sterkte daling van de
sterfte. Deze twee voorzieningen tezamen verklaren tenminste 19 procent van
de daling in sterftecijfers. Dit onderbouw ik op twee manieren. Ten eerste
verklaart de verbetering in sanitaire voorzieningen bijna e´e´n derde van de
afname in kindersterfte; kindersterfte wordt in sterkte mate bepaald door
ziekten die via water worden overgedragen. Ten tweede is het mogelijk om
ziekten te onderscheiden naar gelang de wijze van overdraging: via water of
via lucht. Door dit te doen toon ik aan dat verbeteringen in de watervoorzien-
ing met name samenhangen met ziekten die via water worden overgedragen.
Deze voorzieningen hebben met name invloed op darmziekten, terwijl ziekten
met andere oorzaken en pathologische bases niet benvloed worden.
Deze resultaten zijn van direct belang voor beleid op het vlak van de
volksgezondheid voor ontwikkelingslanden die – net zoals Duitsland in de late
negentiende eeuw – te maken hebben met een gebrek aan sanitaire voorzienin-
gen en de daarmee samenhangende medische problematiek. Een gebrek aan
een goedwerkende riolering leidt tot een ongecontroleerde verspreiding van
ziekten binnen lokale gemeenschappen.
Wanneer men de inzichten van dit laatste hoofdstuk combineert met
die uit de rest van het proefschrift, is het aannemelijk te maken dat de
ontwikkeling van een betere leefomgeving die leidt tot minder gezondheid-
srisico’s e´e´n van de voornaamste oorzaken is geweest van de verbeteringen
van welzijn gedurende de twintigste eeuw. Dit aspect van vooruitgang wordt
echter nauwelijks weerspiegeld in de maatstaf van inkomen per hoofd van
de bevolking. Dit komt doordat deze maatstaf welzijnsverbeteringen onder-
schat, tenzij verbeteringen in de volksgezondheid gepaard gaan met verbe-
teringen in de materie¨le welvaart, zoals aangetoond in hoofdstuk 2. Maat-
staven van menselijke vooruitgang die door academici en beleidsmakers wor-
den gehanteerd zouden moeten weergeven dat gedurende de afgelopen hon-
derd jaar de kansen op een lang en gezond leven een ongekende sprong voor-
waarts hebben gemaakt. En andersom: inwoners in die delen van de wereld
waar de technologiee¨n die leiden tot verbeteringen in de volksgezondheid
minder ontwikkeld zijn, zijn dus in feite slechter af dan wat zou worden gem-
pliceerd door indicatoren die alleen zijn gebaseerd op gemiddeld inkomen.
De kloof in de volksgezondheid die we vandaag de dag zien tussen landen
is niets nieuws. In hoofdstuk 4 toonde ik aan dat gedurende de ‘Great Es-
cape’ een ongelijke verspreiding van sanitaire voorzieningen en medische ken-
nis aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw in eerste instantie verantwoordelijk
was voor de groeiende ongelijkheid in de volksgezondheid. Dit proces duurde
tot halverwege de twintigste eeuw en versterkte op zijn beurt de verschillen
in productiviteit tussen landen. Zoals hoofdstuk 2 aannemelijk maakt, is
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de mondiale ongelijkheid in welzijn – naast de ongelijkheid in economische
welvaart – toegenomen gedurende deze periode. Dit concludeer ik omdat ik
slechts beperkte aanwijzingen vind van convergentie binnen de groep van lan-
den die in deze tijd een grote vooruitgang zagen in de volksgezondheid. In de
tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw zorgden zowel de internationalisering van
de medische kennis, als ook de inzet van de internationale gemeenschap en
talloze lokale individuen en instituties, ervoor dat er gedurende de periode tot
1990 een ommekeer plaatsvond in de trend. Vandaag de dag lijken we aan de
vooravond te staan van een hernieuwde divergentie in mondiale gezondheid,
aangezien enkele indicatoren zoals de levensverwachting in sommige landen
gedurende de laatste decennia minder sterke vooruitgang laten zien. Deze
divergentie en de oorzaken ervan vormt geen thema van dit proefschrift; dit
is het onderwerp van verder onderzoek. De resultaten van dit proefschrift to-
nen echter wel aan dat het vermijden van een nieuwe periode van divergentie
een enorme winst voor de volksgezondheid zou betekenen, met als resultaat
hogere productiviteit en een groter welzijn. Om die reden zou dit onderwerp
hoog op de agenda moeten staan van beleidsmakers wereldwijd.
